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1. Learning from errors at work: Benefit from potentially
adverse events
Many people would probably agree that it is desirable to learn from one’s errors. It is
part of conventional wisdom that errors – although undesirable events – bear the potential
to improve and to gain new insights. Popper (1968, 1992) built his philosophy on the
idea that errors are the only way to approach truth as well as a functional mechanism for
societal development. On the individual level, research on the development of professional
expertise and workplace learning indicates that the experience of errors plays a crucial role
for the acquisition and differentiation of flexibly applicable professional knowledge (Eraut,
Alderton, Cole, & Senker, 1998; Ericsson, 2006c; Gruber, 1999a).
This thesis aims to explore under what conditions employees are able to put their errors
at work to good use by engaging in activities that aim at learning from them. This
question emerged from observations that companies and their employees often act under
particular error avoidance strategies (Tjosvold, Yu, & Hui, 2004; Van Dyck, Frese, Baer,
& Sonnentag, 2005; Zapf, Frese, & Brodbeck, 1999). But if errors are a useful source
of learning and development, why are people averse to committing errors, particularly,
if they occur in a work context (Wehner & Mehl, 2003)? On the individual level, one
reason for our dislike of errors is that they cause us distress (Zapf, 1991). They indicate
where we are deficient, where we did not pay enough attention, or misjudged the situation,
thus questioning our standing and our pride as proficient workers. Furthermore, errors
may be dangerous and can cause undesirable things to happen (Perrow, 1984). On the
level of an organisation they can endanger the creation of economic value, but can also be
hazardous to a company’s employees or customers. The research on safety and accidents
is full of examples of minor errors leading to disastrous outcomes (Perrow, 1984; Reason,
1990). As a consequence, there is a long tradition of research on human factors and
safety management, aiming to provide approaches for estimating a system’s reliability,
evaluating the potential damage from specific errors, analysing error causes, and preventing
errors (Flanagan, 1954; Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006; Rasmussen, 1987b; Senders
& Moray, 1991; Zimolong, 1990).
However, the described error avoidance approach creates a dialectical tension: on the one
hand, companies and their employees are keen to avoid errors; on the other hand, scholars
have indicated that errors cannot be prevented completely and that too a heavy reliance
on error prevention can have detrimental effects (Van Dyck et al., 2005; Kohn, Corrigan,
& Donaldson, 1999; Perrow, 1984; Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999; Senders &
Moray, 1991; Volpert, 1992; Wehner, 1992; Wehner & Mehl, 2003; Zapf et al., 1999).
Examples of such detrimental effects are that the potential occurrence of errors is insuffi-
ciently anticipated, that employees lose their skills in dealing with them, and that learning
opportunities are missed. For these reasons, a shift from an exclusive error prevention ap-
proach towards an error management strategy has been proposed (e.g., Zapf et al., 1999).
Error management concepts suggest, in addition to prevention, dealing with errors in an
efficient way and learning from them. This approach is based on the assumption that a
systematic analysis of occurring errors, e.g., through incident reporting databases (Barach
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& Small, 2000), can provide organisations with information about necessary adjustments
of knowledge, strategies, and behaviour. Consequently, the case has been made that learn-
ing from errors is an important technique of organisational learning (Argote & Todocara,
2007; Argyris, 1982; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Ellstro¨m, 2001; Kriegesmann, Kley, &
Schwering, 2005; Peters & Peters, 1987; Senge, 1990; Sitkin, 1992).
In contrast to the existing lines of inquiry on error prevention and organisational learning
from errors, the issue of individual learning from errors at work has received only marginal
attention in research. There are only a few scattered studies focussing explicitly on how
and under what conditions errors encountered in daily work processes can contribute to the
learning of teams and individuals (Arndt, 1996; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson,
1996; Meurier, Vincent, & Parmar, 1997; Tjosvold et al., 2004). A potential reason for this
gap in the literature is that studies on human error and safety typically conceive humans
as a source of unreliability that needs to be controlled by error prevention systems (Zapf
et al., 1999; Zimolong, 1990). Some authors assume that humans cannot reliably avoid
error (e.g., Reason, 1990) and focus on creating work systems that reduce the probability
of errors and are error-tolerant by restricting their possible impact. Consequently, these
perspectives have made only minor contributions to a theory of (individual) learning from
errors (Ohlsson, 1996).
However, there is evidence from studies on learning environments – in school as well as
in work contexts – indicating that the experience of errors can contribute to individuals’
learning and to the improvement of their knowledge and performance (Ellis & Davidi,
2005; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005; Klockmann, 2005;
Van Lehn, 1988; Meyer, Seidel, & Prenzel, 2006; Oser & Spychiger, 2005; Weingardt,
2004). Moreover, research on experiential learning, case-based reasoning, and learning
through work has indicated that errors are significant sources for professional learning
(Cseh, Watkins, & Marsick, 2000; Ellstro¨m, 2001; Eraut et al., 1998; Ericsson, 2006c;
Gruber, 1999a; Kolodner, 1983). However, what is missing are theoretical frameworks
explaining individual learning from errors during daily work, research instruments that
allow its measurement, as well as systematic empirical research that directly addresses the
issues of how learning from errors is related to the individual interpretation of an error
and to fostering or inhibiting conditions for learning at the workplace. To know what
conditions may enhance or constrain individual learning from errors at work is relevant
for explaining individual differences in learning from errors and for the practical goal to
create work environments that support learning from errors. Conditions on the individual
and the contextual level of analysis have to be considered, because experiential learning
through work emerges through the engagement of individuals in activities and interactions
under the conditions of a specific workplace (Billett, 2001c). This engagement results
from an interaction of the individuals’ personal characteristics with the affordances and
constraints the workplace provides. As for learning from errors, it has been claimed that
especially the individual interpretation of an error situation as well as the quality of social
relationships at the workplace shape individual responses to errors (Arndt, 1996; Cannon
& Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1999; Ellstro¨m, 2001; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Tjosvold
et al., 2004). However, the few existing studies on learning from errors at work do not yet
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underpin these claims systematically enough, as will be discussed later. A potential reason
might be that no systematic attempts have been made to derive an operationalisation for
the measurement of learning from errors from learning theory (Bauer & Mulder, in press).
1.1. Research questions
In this thesis, the aim is to contribute to closing the stated gap in research by address-
ing the question: What individual and contextual variables foster or constrain employees’
engagement in learning after the experience of an error at work? This broad question
is broken down into four intertwined, more specific research questions that guide the in-
vestigations. The first research question addresses prerequisites for conducting empirical
research on learning from errors, namely, the conceptualisation and measurement of learn-
ing from errors.
Research Question 1. How can learning from errors at work be conceptualised and
measured?
Research Questions 2 and 3 concern determining variables on the individual and the con-
textual level that are hypothesised to predict the individual engagement in learning from
errors. These variables are the individual interpretation of the error situation and the
perceived quality of social relationships at work.
Research Question 2. To what degree does the individual interpretation of an error
situation foster or constrain the engagement in learning from errors at work?
Research Question 3. To what degree does the perception of the social context at work
foster or constrain the engagement in learning from errors at work?
Although the main focus here is to investigate how the interpretation of an error and
the perception of the social context predict the engagement in learning from errors, the
interrelation between these predictors needs to be addressed (Research Question 4). As
stated above, learning at work is assumed to be shaped by an interaction of individual
and contextual variables (Billett, 2001c; Eraut et al., 1998).
Research Question 4. How are the variables regarding the individual interpretation of
an error and the perception of the social context at work interrelated?
1.2. Outline of the thesis
The process of answering the stated research questions requires, firstly, the development
of a theoretical framework that elaborates individual learning from errors at work. This
framework addresses the questions how ’error’ can be conceptualised, how errors that
emerge in daily work processes can contribute to individual learning, and what individual
and contextual variables may foster or constrain learning from errors at work. A clar-
ification of these components is required in order to develop a research instrument for
learning from errors that is based on available theories on errors and learning (Research
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Question 1), and to elaborate hypotheses about the relations among the interpretation of
an error, the perception of the social context, and learning from errors, that can be inves-
tigated empirically (Research Questions 2—4). A research model for learning from errors
at work will be developed that includes variables regarding the individual interpretation
of an error situation and the quality of social relationships at work as predictors for the
engagement in error-related learning activities.
For addressing the research questions empirically, on the basis of the theoretical framework,
three empirical studies are conducted in the domain of hospital nursing. The first reason
for selecting this domain is that learning from errors is an urgent issue in nursing, regarding
quality management and patient safety (Bogner, 1994; Kela & Kela, 2006; Kohn et al.,
1999; Meurier et al., 1997; Meurier, 2000; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). Secondly, the
highly standardised nature of work processes in nursing facilitates the identification of
errors and provides transparent criteria for judging actions as errors, as will be elaborated
later (Bu¨ssing & Glaser, 2002; Deutsches Netzwerk fu¨r Qualita¨tsentwicklung in der Pflege,
2007). The studies contribute to answering the research questions in the following way.
Study 1. In Study 1 the theoretically derived conceptualisation of errors and error-related
learning activities is contextualised to the domain of nursing in order to attain an
operationalisation (Research Question 1). For this purpose, experts in nursing are
interviewed about concrete errors that occur in nurses’ everyday work and about
learning activities that enable nurses to learn from these errors. The data on errors
are required for the construction of authentic error cases that can be used as stimulus
material in later studies. The data on the learning activities help to advance the
theoretically developed framework of learning activities, to contextualise it to the
domain, and to select concrete learning activities for an operationalisation of learning
from errors.
Study 2. In Study 2, two research instruments for measuring learning from errors at work
are developed on the basis of the findings from Study 1, applied, and compared
(Research Question 1). They differ in the way in which they ground the questions
on error-related learning activities in concrete error episodes. In the first instrument,
vignettes of error cases that are developed from the interviews are presented to the
subjects. In the second instrument, the participants are asked to describe self-
experienced error episodes. Both instruments have in common that the questions
on learning activities relate to the specific error situations. The findings from this
study inform the decision to apply one of these instruments in the third study.
Furthermore, the study provides a pre-test of the assumed relationships among the
variables under investigation (Research Questions 2—4).
Study 3. Study 3 involves the application of the developed research approach in a cross-
sectional field study in order to test the hypotheses about the relationships among
the interpretation of an error situation, the perception of the social context, and the
engagement in learning from an error, and to create more differentiated hypotheses
for further research on learning from errors (Research Questions 2—4). This is ac-
complished in a model generating structural equation modelling process (Jo¨reskog,
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1993) in which an initial model (a) is specified on the basis of substantive hypotheses,
(b) tested, and (c) respecified on the basis of the findings and substantive consid-
erations in order to advance the model and to provide new hypotheses for future
research.
The three empirical studies build upon each other: An initial, theoretically founded con-
ceptualisation of learning from errors is contextualised to the domain under study and
operationalised (Study 1). Research instruments are built, tested, and improved on this
basis (Study 2). The gathered knowledge is applied in order to test and advance as-
sumptions about learning from errors that are derived from theory and existing findings
(Study 3). Together, the studies enhance our understanding of how learning from errors at
work can be conceptualised and investigated (Research Question 1), and of how the indi-
vidual interpretation of an error situation as well as the perception of the social context at
work may shape the engagement in learning after an error (Research Question 2—4). By
doing so, the studies begin a process of answering the broader question of what individual
and contextual variables foster or constrain employees’ engagement in learning after the
experience of an error at work, and help to ask more precise questions about learning from
errors in further research.
Admittedly, the scope of this research is limited in several respects. Most important, the
findings are limited to the chosen domain of nursing. It is unclear to what degree the
findings generalise to other fields of work. Nevertheless, the case here adds to research on
professional learning and development by providing a research approach as well as initial
findings for an under-investigated, but highly relevant, way of professional learning and
by situating the investigation in a domain in which this way of learning seems particularly
important (Edmondson, 1996; Eraut et al., 1998; Kela & Kela, 2006; Meurier et al., 1997;
Meurier, 2000). The theoretical framework of learning from errors and the suggested
research approach can potentially be adjusted and applied to other fields of work and to
other research questions.
The following parts of this thesis are organised as follows. In the next chapter, the theoreti-
cal framework of learning from errors is developed (Chapter 2). This framework elaborates
the components of learning from errors, that is, (a) the error situation as antecedent of
learning, (b) the learning process and its outcomes, and (c) individual and contextual
determinants that may affect the individual engagement in learning from errors. From
the discussion of conditions for learning from errors, a research model and hypotheses
will be derived that are subject to investigation in the empirical part. In chapter 3 these
hypotheses are summarised and an overview of the empirical studies is provided. The
following chapters present the methods, findings, and conclusions from the three studies
(Chapters 4, 5, & 6). A concluding chapter will summarise the findings in relation to the
stated research questions and provide an outlook on issues for further research (Chapter 7).
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2. Theoretical framework of learning from errors at work
This chapter presents a theoretical framework that conceptualises learning from errors at
work. The discussion involves elaborating on (a) the conceptualisation of ’error’ as an-
tecedent of learning, (b) the learning process and its potential outcomes, and (c) individual
and contextual determinants that are hypothesised to affect the individual engagement in
learning from errors. An overview of these components of learning from errors at work is
provided here, before a discussion of them in more detail in the following sections.
1. Conceptualising learning from errors requires defining what constitutes an error and
what types of errors can particularly be assumed to provide a potential for learning
(Section 2.1). These questions will be addressed by drawing upon cognitive and
action-oriented approaches to human error that have elaborated intensively on error
definitions and taxonomies (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Rasmussen, 1987b; Reason, 1990;
Senders & Moray, 1991). This theoretical perspective is relevant here because it
enables the conceptualisation of ’error’ and of types of error in the context of goal-
directed action at work (Hacker, 1998; Volpert, 1992). The discussion will start
with providing existing definitions of error. Then two common characteristics of
these definitions will be elaborated. Firstly, errors occur in goal-oriented action.
The explication of the underlying theory of action (Hacker, 1998; Volpert, 1992) will
lead to a typology of errors on the basis of a differentiation of levels of cognitive
regulation of action (Reason, 1990, 1995). This typology is relevant here, because
different types of error imply a different learning potential (Bauer & Mulder, 2007;
Glendon et al., 2006; Keith & Frese, 2005). Secondly, errors involve a deficient
deviation from a desired goal. Evaluating actions as errors involves the judgement
of knowledgeable members of a field of work by drawing upon normative criteria. A
definition of ’error’ for the purpose of this study will be derived from this discussion.
2. In a second step, it must be clarified how learning from errors takes place and what
can be learned from an error. The concept of ’learning from errors at work’ im-
plies the notion of constructing or modifying knowledge through the experience of
errors encountered during daily work. Therefore, Section 2.2 starts with contextu-
alising learning from errors in experiential learning theories and theories of learning
through work (Billett, 2004b; Eraut et al., 1998; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Kolod-
ner, 1983; Schank, 1999; Scho¨n, 1983). Learning from errors will be conceptualised
under two different but complementary perspectives on experiential learning: firstly,
under a cognitive perspective that explains learning as the acquisition and modifi-
cation of knowledge and focusses on the memory and knowledge structures involved
(Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999; Schank & Abelson, 1977); secondly, under an activ-
ity perspective that focusses on learning in terms of the engagement in deliberate
overt or cognitive learning activities (Eraut et al., 1998; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984;
Scho¨n, 1983). Whereas the cognitive perspective explains why errors provide learn-
ing chances and how learning from errors can contribute to improve action in work
contexts, one of its drawbacks is that it focusses mainly on modelling cognitive pro-
cesses and structures which cannot be measured directly in empirical research. The
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learning activity perspective compensates for this problem by identifying concrete
activities that lead to the learning processes and outcomes described by the cog-
nitive perspective. Thereby it provides fruitful possibilities for operationalising the
learning process. An initial set of learning activities will be derived from conceptions
of experiential learning cycles (Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984) that model experiential
learning in terms of (a) reflection, (b) the development of new action strategies, and
(c) experimenting with and implementing the new strategy.
3. Finally, Section 2.3 elaborates on conditions on the individual level and the level of
the social context at work that are hypothesised to relate to learning from errors on
the basis of substantive considerations or initial evidence. The selected variables on
the level of the individual interpretation of an error are the estimation of an error
situation as a chance for learning, the degree to which negative emotions are evoked
by an error, and the tendency to cover up an error (Rybowiak et al., 1999). On
the level of the quality of the social context, the perception of a safe team climate is
investigated (Edmondson, 1999). From this discussion, hypotheses about the relation
of these variables with the engagement in learning from errors will be derived.
Together, these three components build a conceptual framework of learning from errors
that is required for addressing the stated research questions. The conceptualisations of
’error’ and ’learning from errors at work’ provide a theoretical basis for operationalising
learning from errors for the empirical studies (Research Question 1). The discussion of
individual and contextual variables that are hypothesised to affect learning from errors
guides the investigations to answer Research Questions 2—4.
2.1. Characteristics of errors
An explanation of how individuals can learn from their errors at work requires clarifying
the concept of ’error’ as the antecedent of the learning process and elaborating on the
question whether different types of errors bear a similar potential for learning. The goal of
this section is to attain a conceptualisation of error and to make a decision which specific
error type to focus upon in the empirical studies.
2.1.1. Errors as inadequate actions in relation to a goal
Cognitive and action-oriented approaches to human error provide a basis for explaining
what constitutes an error, what types of error can be distinguished, and what kinds of
errors provide particular chances for learning (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Rasmussen, 1987b;
Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 1991; Volpert, 1992; Zapf et al., 1999). These approaches
analyse errors from the perspective of goal-directed action and its cognitive regulation.
Their conception of error is commonly used in applied studies on the occurrence and
reduction of human error in work settings (Bogner, 1994; CIRSmedical, 2005; Glendon
et al., 2006; Hofinger, 2002; Holzer, Thomeczek, Hauke, Cohnen, & Hochreutener, 2005;
Kohn et al., 1999; Strauch, 2002). For the purpose of the present study, drawing upon
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these approaches allows us to define error in the context of action in the workplace and to
introduce a typology of errors that is based on the cognitive regulation of action.
Cognitive and action-oriented approaches to human error define errors as individual actions
that result in a deficient deviation from a desired goal (e.g., Frese & Zapf, 1994; Rasmussen,
1987a; Reason, 1995; Senders & Moray, 1991; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Action in this sense
also encompasses decisions and omissions (Meurier et al., 1997). The following definitions
are illustrative for this line of literature.
“For my present purpose an error is the failure of planned actions to achieve
their desired goal. All errors involve some kind of deviation.” (Reason, 1995,
p. 18)
“We could, therefore, define an error as a human action that fails to meet an
implicit or explicit standard. An error occurs when a planned series of actions
fails to achieve its desired outcome, and when this failure cannot be attributed
to the intervention of some chance occurrence.” (Senders & Moray, 1991, p. 20)
These and other definitions share two characteristics (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Strauch, 2002)
that are shortly addressed here, and elaborated in the following paragraphs.
1. Errors occur in goal-directed human action. Understanding how errors relate to
action in work contexts requires the introduction of a theory of human action and
its regulation (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1998; Volpert, 1992). The position will
be advanced that a distinction of levels in the cognitive regulation of action leads to
a differentiation of types of error (Hacker, 1998; Rasmussen, 1987a; Reason, 1990)
and that especially knowledge- and rule-based errors bear a potential for learning
(Bauer & Mulder, 2007; Glendon et al., 2006; Keith & Frese, 2005).
2. Errors involve a deficient deviation from a desired goal or state. Evaluating an action
as ’error’ implies making a judgement in respect to criteria which are implicit in the
desired goal (Hacker, 1998; Rasmussen, 1987b; Reason, 1995; Senders & Moray, 1991;
Volpert, 1992; Wehner & Stadler, 1989). Hence, the question of what constitutes an
error depends on evaluative norms, the validity and acceptance of which may depend
on the respective sociocultural environment. This norm-dependency of errors can
cause problems for research on learning from errors, because one and the same action
might be evaluated to be an error, or not, in different social and cultural contexts.
Although this problem cannot be solved completely here, the position will be taken
that it can possibly be addressed in empirical studies by focusing on authentic cases
that have been judged to be errors by knowledgeable members of the domain under
investigation.
2.1.2. Characteristic 1: Occurrence in goal oriented action
The first element of the error definitions presented above is that errors occur in the context
of intentional, goal-directed action. Elaborating on this characteristic requires clarifying
the underlying theory of human action. Action Theory (Hacker, 1998; Volpert, 1992) de-
2.1. Characteristics of errors 11
livers an appropriate perspective for this purpose because several scholars in the field of
human error directly draw upon this theory (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Zapf et al., 1999) or use
identical categories to analyse the cognitive regulation of action (Rasmussen, 1987a; Rea-
son, 1990). This communality results from joint roots in the Russian tradition of activity
theory (Leontiev, 1978) and in cybernetic applications of computer-models in psychology
(Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Two features make Action Theory particularly rel-
evant here. Firstly, it allows us to locate and describe errors in the process of action at
work and enables a differentiation of error types according to the level of cognitive action
regulation. Secondly, Action Theory employs similar conceptions of knowledge and learn-
ing like theories of experiential learning at work that will be used later to conceptualise
learning from errors. Therefore, both lines of theory are compatible and can be integrated
to build a framework of learning from errors that is required for this study. Below, first,
action will be defined as a hierarchical-sequential process. Secondly, a distinction of levels
of action regulation will be introduced that, thirdly, will be applied to a differentiation of
error types. Finally, the learning potential of different error types will be discussed.
Action as hierarchical-sequential process. Action Theory defines action as “. . . goal
oriented behaviour that is organized in specific ways by goals, information integration,
plans, and feedback and can be regulated consciously or via routines” (Frese & Zapf, 1994,
p. 271). Action represents a mediator between subjects and their environments and serves
the attainment of desired outcomes. It comprises the definition of goals and subgoals,
and the derivation of action plans based on one’s knowledge and information about the
environment.
Action has two dimensions, a hierarchical and a sequential one (Hacker, 1998):
1. In the hierarchical dimension, goals as well as actions are arranged on three strata ac-
cording to their complexity (cf. Leontiev, 1978). Complex networks of actions which
contribute to the achievement of superordinate goals are called activity and build the
top stratum. While activities consist of dependent actions (second stratum), actions
consist of dependent operations – e.g., movements – which build the lowest stra-
tum1. Accordingly, activities, actions, and operations can be represented as nodes
in a pyramid of hierarchically nested goals, dependent subgoals, and sub-subgoals
(Hacker, 1998; Volpert, 1987). The nodes consist of so-called cyclic functional units.
They comprise (a) a comparison of the actual state with the defined goal, (b) an
execution to yield the goal, and (c) another comparison of the feedback resulting
from the execution with the desired goal (cf. ’Test-Operate-Test-Exit’-units; Miller
et al., 1960).
2. While the hierarchical dimension is structured by the complexity of goals, the se-
quential dimension describes action as an ordered sequence of attaining lower level
goals that are required before a superordinate goal can be attained (Hacker, 1998;
1Unfortunately, the term ’action’ is used in two ways: First, to refer to the specific level of actions and,
secondly, in a broad sense for ’human action’, encompassing all three levels. In order to distinguish
these understandings, the term ’action’ will be set in italics when referring to the specific level of action,
and in normal type when referring to the broad understanding.
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Volpert, 1992). Hence, ‘sequential’ implies the step-by-step processing of subsequent
nodes in the hierarchical pyramid of related goals and subgoals.
The distinction of a hierarchical and a sequential dimension of the action process helps
to enhance our understanding of errors and their role in human action in the following
way. As stated above, errors involve the failure of an execution to yield a specific intended
goal or subgoal, at a specific position in the hierarchical-sequential action process. Errors
endanger the attainment of subsequent goals and higher order goals if no compensating
steps are taken, because attaining higher order goals is dependent on attaining related
subgoals (Volpert, 1987, 1992). Hence, an erroneous action establishes a ’critical situation’
(Badke-Schaub, 2002) in which the achievement of the desired goal is endangered. From
thereon the error may be detected and corrected, or defences in the environment may
work so that no damage results (i.e., a ‘near-miss’; Aspden, Corrigan, Wolcott, & Erickson,
2004; Barach & Small, 2000; Dovey & Phillips, 2004; Glendon et al., 2006; Hofinger, 2002).
Otherwise, the higher order goal is failed and an ’adverse event’ may occur (Reason, 2005).
In order to further understand how the hierarchical dimension of action relates to errors,
a more precise description of levels in the cognitive regulation of action is required.
Levels of cognitive action regulation. The introduced hierarchical differentiation can
also be applied to the cognitive regulation of action (Hacker, 1998; Rasmussen, 1987a),
making a differentiation of error types according to the level of regulation necessary (Frese
& Zapf, 1994; Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990; Norman, 1981; Rasmussen, 1987b; Rea-
son, 1990, 1995). The discussion below addresses the question how action is regulated
and how the mental representation underlying it can be modelled, before turning to the
differentiation of error types in the following paragraph.
Three levels of cognitive regulation can be distinguished (Hacker, 1998; Rasmussen, 1987a),
that also build the basis of error taxonomies (e.g., Reason, 1990): (1) skill-, (2) rule-, and
(3) knowledge-based regulation2. These levels of action regulation are not alternative
processes, but “(. . . ) categories of behavioural control which are probably all active at all
times” (Rasmussen, 1987c, p. 294).
(1) Skill-based regulation concerns the performance of highly automated patterns of be-
haviour which are typically not controlled consciously. However higher levels of regula-
tion monitor the ongoing action in relation to goal attainment. Skill-based regulation
mainly occurs in the performance of sensorimotor operations, but is not restricted to
them. The underlying knowledge is part of the individual’s tacit knowledge, that is,
it guides action but cannot be verbalised easily by the subject (Ellstro¨m, 2006; Eraut,
2000; Simons, 2005).
(2) Rule-based regulation occurs by applying routinised procedures to familiar situations.
Rules are considered to be if<situation>—then<action> relations which are stored
in memory and can be applied flexibly. They can be specified or adjusted to meet
2Frese and Zapf (1994) introduced a fourth level of metacognitive regulation. However, this is dropped
by the authors themselves in a more recent publication (Zapf et al., 1999).
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the requirements of a specific situation at hand. Conscious control is possible, but
not necessary, at this level of action regulation. Rules can be acquired experientially
from former occasions, by following instructions or guidelines, or can be developed
situationally by conscious problem-solving (Rasmussen, 1987a).
(3) Knowledge-based or intellectual (Hacker, 1998) regulation is applied in situations
which are novel in a sense that they cannot be accomplished with a set of exist-
ing rules. In such situations, a plan for action has to be developed on the basis of
a goal-means analysis and relevant knowledge (Ellstro¨m, 2006). This includes delib-
erate, conscious problem solving, making predictions on the basis of mental models,
experimenting, evaluating alternative solutions, and decision making.
The knowledge representations which the different forms of action regulation are based
upon and that enable a person to act are called ‘operative image systems’ in Action
Theory (Hacker, 1998). They are conceptualised “(. . . ) as the sum of internal long-
term representations of condition-action-result interrelations” (Frese & Zapf, 1994, p. 286).
Operative image systems are knowledge structures that guide action and its regulation in
a given situation. The term operative emphasises their action-oriented character. They
comprise schematic behavioural information for given situations (e.g., movement schemata,
flexible action schemata), as well as strategies, metaplans, and heuristics for intellectual
regulation. Operative image systems are learned and modified through acting, i.e., through
the engagement in work tasks. This is an important link to conceptions of experiential
learning at work that model changes in individuals’ knowledge through the engagement
in work tasks and through the experience of episodes at work, as will be elaborated later
(e.g., Billett, 2001b; Eraut, 2000).
The discussion of levels and bases of action regulation is important for conceptualising
error, because errors can occur on every level and at any stage of the hierarchical-sequential
regulation of action. Hence, a conceptualisation of error has to take into account these
different levels of cognitive control in order to distinguish specific types of error (Frese &
Zapf, 1994; Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990; Norman, 1981; Rasmussen, 1987b; Reason,
1990, 1995), as will be discussed in the next paragraph.
Types of errors. Reason (1990, 1995) distinguishes two basic categories of errors:
(1) slips and lapses (SL) and (2) knowledge- and rule-based errors (KRE)3.
1. SL are failures of execution, that is, they concern the performance of an action.
They result from problems in unintentional memory and attention processes and are
often caused by internal or external distractions (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). In both
cases, the action plan is appropriate to attain the desired goal, but the action is not
performed as intended (Norman, 1981). The difference between slips and lapses is
3Reason calls them ‘mistakes’. While this terminology is commonly accepted in research on human error
and safety management, the terms ‘error’, ‘mistake’ and ‘failure’ are used inconsistently in research on
individual and team learning from errors (Bauer & Mulder, in press). Therefore, I find it more precise
to use ‘error’ as the superordinate term together with the appended adjectives (cf. Senders & Moray,
1991).
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that slips relate to observable behaviour and result from attention problems, whereas
lapses are caused by memory failures (Glendon et al., 2006; Reason, 1995).
2. In contrast, KRE concern the action plan and result from problems in the intentional
application of knowledge and rules, that is, intrapersonal if-then-relations. They oc-
cur during conscious problem solving and involve decision making, inference, as well
as judgement of the situation. In KRE, actions are performed as intended, but the
underlying plan is deficient or inappropriate to attain the goal (Senders & Moray,
1991). Rule-based errors typically involve the misinterpretation of a situation, e.g.,
when well rehearsed procedures are over-generalised and wrongly applied to situ-
ations that seem to be familiar. Subcategories of rule-based errors are the ‘wrong
application of a good rule’, ‘non-application of a good rule’, and ‘application of a bad
rule’ (Reason, 1990). Knowledge-based errors result from deficiencies in the available
knowledge – e.g., incomplete mental models, insufficient or wrong knowledge –, but
also from bounded rationality in analysing a problem, and faulty causal thinking
(Reason, 1995; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). They usually occur in novel situations which
cannot be accomplished with a set of existing solutions and require deliberate plan-
ning and problem solving. The distinction between rule- and knowledge-based errors
is not a sharp one, because rules are a form of knowledge, too. Besides this con-
ceptual problem, they are empirically hard to distinguish (Bauer & Mulder, 2007).
Reason (1990) treats them both as one category, as will be done here.
Below, it will be discussed in what way errors of either type provide a potential for expe-
riential learning.
Types of errors and learning from errors. The introduced distinction between error
types is relevant here, because the position has been advanced that different types of errors
bear a different learning potential, or at least require different forms of learning (Bauer
& Mulder, 2007; Glendon et al., 2006; Keith & Frese, 2005). Individuals can hardly learn
from SL in a cognitive way and avoid them reliably, because the underlying causes are not
entirely under their control (Reason, 1990, 2005). In the error management literature a
system-perspective is preferred which claims that only the work system can be changed
in order to minimise errors, not the fallible human condition (Reason, 2005). SL can be
addressed effectively by attending to the work conditions and environment (Glendon et
al., 2006). For example, if nurses keep mixing up certain remedies, then it makes sense to
change the environment and put them in separate places.
In contrast to SL, KRE are based on intentional decision processes and the application
of declarative and procedural knowledge. Therefore, they are accessible to learning in
the sense of a change in knowledge and skills as the basis of competent action. Keith
and Frese (2005) argue that the highest learning profit will occur from errors on higher
levels of regulation. Glendon et al. (2006) favour learning and training as a means for
reducing KRE. Hence, a narrow system perspective that is generalised over all types of
errors is inappropriate. An exclusive focus on ‘the system’ neglects the fact that individuals
are able to learn from their errors (e.g., Ellis & Davidi, 2005; Keith & Frese, 2005) and
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underestimates the potential of individual error-related learning processes and competence
development.
Drawn together, the position advanced here is that empirical studies on learning from
errors should clarify which type of error they focus upon and provide a rationale for the
ways these errors can contribute to learning. For the purpose of this study, it is decided
to focus on KRE for two reasons: first, because the underlying causes of KRE may be
subject to intentional change through the engagement in learning activities. In section 2.2
learning activities that are relevant for this type of error will be identified. Secondly, there
seems to be a lack of research addressing KRE, leaving a gap in knowledge of a relevant
category of errors (Glendon et al., 2006; Meurier et al., 1997; Zhao & Olivera, 2006).
So far, it has been discussed that errors occur in goal oriented action and that different
types of errors have to be distinguished, based on the cognitive regulation of action and
the knowledge underlying it. The following section elaborates on the second characteristic
of error, the deviation from a desired goal.
2.1.3. Characteristic 2: Deficient deviation from a desired goal
The second characteristic of errors is that they imply a deficient deviation from desired
goals (Hacker, 1998; Norman, 1981; Rasmussen, 1987b; Reason, 1995; Senders & Moray,
1991; Volpert, 1992; Wehner & Stadler, 1989). The discussion of this characteristic en-
hances our understanding of errors by casting light on the process of evaluating actions
as errors and by addressing the inherent problem of norm-dependency. The term ’evalu-
ation’ is used in a broad sense here, that includes everyday processes of integrating data
about an object (e.g., an action) and explicit or implicit standards (i.e., norms) to a global
judgement of the object (Scriven, 1991; Westermann, 2002). Below, first the concepts
’deviation’ and ’goal’ will be defined. Secondly, it will be discussed how far the norm-
dependency of judging actions as errors constitutes a problem for this study. Thirdly, a
social evaluation perspective will be introduced that explains the process of evaluating
actions as errors. Taking this perspective, the conclusion for the empirical studies will be
to focus on concrete cases that are judged to be errors by knowledgeable members of the
domain of nursing.
Deviation and goals. According to Volpert (1992), ’error’ is a subclass of the broader
concept of deviation. A deviation occurs, when against planning and justified expectation
a goal is at least temporarily not achieved. Deviation is the broader concept because it
stands for unsuccessful actions in general and not every deviation is caused by human
error. In this respect, Volpert’s (1992) use of the term ’deviation’ is similar to the concept
of ‘failure’ in motivational and attributional theories (e.g., Atkinson, 1986; Heckhausen,
1975; Weiner et al., 1971). In errors, the deviation is attributed to the action(s) of an
actor and occurs contrary to his/her expectations and intentions (Reason, 1995; Senders
& Moray, 1991; Volpert, 1992; Zapf et al., 1999). This characteristic distinguishes errors
from deliberate violations of rules and standardised procedures (Reason, 1990; Volpert,
1992; Zimolong, 1990). Furthermore, it only makes sense to speak of an error if the
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deviation would have been potentially avoidable by the actor (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Heid,
2005; Senders & Moray, 1991; Volpert, 1992; Zapf et al., 1999). Avoidability implies that
the actor needs to have had sufficient skills and knowledge as well as available alternatives
to act in a way that would have led to the expected and desired result. If this is not the
case, the term accident is more appropriate (Senders & Moray, 1991).
In an action context, speaking of deviations only makes sense in relation to goals
(Kleinbeck, 2006; Volpert, 1992). Goals are anticipative cognitive structures, that is,
they anticipate desired states or results and guide the action process (Frese & Zapf, 1994).
They imply first a motivational dimension – i.e., the desired state, which reflects individ-
ual, organisational, or societal wishes and needs – and secondly a cognitive dimension –
i.e., they structure action and provide criteria of comparison for the effectiveness of an
action. In work contexts, goals usually are implicit in the work tasks which are provided
by the organisation and involve an implicit or explicit standard by which the achievement
of the goal can be judged (Hacker, 1999; Kleinbeck, 2006; Volpert, 1992). Therefore, the
norm-dependency of goals and errors has to be addressed.
Norm-dependency of goals and errors. The concept of goals implies a normative
component in that goals reflect individual, organisational, or societal wishes and a nor-
mative standard is necessary to judge their attainment. If error is defined as a deficient
deviation from a goal, then error itself is a normative category. As Rasmussen (1987b)
argues, error can only be defined with reference to human intentions or expectations.
Hence, error is an evaluative term of language which is used by a beholder on the basis of
a comparison between an observed state and a normative anticipation, in order to express
a deficient discrepancy between the two, not an objective characteristic of an action or a
result (Bauer, 2004; Weingardt, 2004).
This normative component of errors complicates research on learning from errors because
the validity and acceptance of norms and standards depends on the respective socio-
cultural environment (Bauer, 2004; Billett, 2001c; Harteis, Bauer, & Heid, 2006; Ras-
mussen, 1987b; Senders & Moray, 1991; Weingardt, 2004). One implication is that the
same action may be evaluated to be an error or not if the context changes, e.g., from a
high technology unit of a university hospital to a rural hospital. Billett (2001c) argues that
even in occupations that seem to be similar at the sociocultural level, what is regarded an
acceptable practice is largely shaped by the situational requirements of specific workplaces,
influenced, however, by the goals and norms of the sociocultural practice. Even within
one context, “(. . . ) changes of the criteria of judgement, i.e., changes in requirements to
system performance, in safety requirements, or in legal conventions, will be able to turn
hitherto accepted performance into erroneous acts” (Rasmussen, 1987b, p. 24). Hence, the
interpretation of what an error is and whether specific actions can or should be evaluated
as errors, may vary substantially between contexts, between individuals in the same con-
text, and even within one individual if the context changes. For the purpose of studies
on learning from errors, this results in the task to justify why the errors under study are
arguably errors for the investigated domain.
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Social evaluation perspective on error. In the light of the problems discussed above,
research on errors and learning from errors seems to be a dubious endeavour, because it
seems to be impossible to get a firm, objective grasp on error. Although studies on human
error have emphasised that actions can only be evaluated to be errors in relation to goals
(Rasmussen, 1987b), these studies have not elaborated how these evaluative processes
can be modelled and have not addressed the problem of norm-dependency. However, this
problem is not unique to the concept of error, but concerns also other concepts that specify
a quality of human action, such as ‘superior expert performance’ (Ericsson & Lehmann,
1996; Ericsson, 2006a) or ‘creativity’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). Research on these concepts
has addressed the problem of norm-dependency by indicating that the social evaluation
of an individual’s actions by knowledgeable members of a community is an important
criterion for judging expertise or creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola, & Lehtinen, 2004; Palonen, 2003; Sternberg & Lubart, 1992).
The proposal made here is to draw an analogy from Csikszentmihalyi’s (1999) model of
creativity to the problem of explaining how individual actions are judged as errors. The
concepts error and creativity both concern the evaluation of actions as outstanding, in ei-
ther a desirable or an undesirable way. The core of this analogy is the evaluation of actions
by knowledgeable members of a community by drawing upon evaluative criteria. Although
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1999) approach to creativity and the conceptions of human error dis-
cussed above differ in their scope of analysis – the latter employ a micro perspective on
cognitive processes underlying human action and its regulation whereas Csikszentmihalyi
takes a sociological perspective on how creative achievements contribute to the develop-
ment of culture – the analogy is helpful for conceptualising error by modelling processes
and conditions of evaluating actions as errors.
According to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1999) model of creativity an individual action is acknowl-
edged to be creative, if (a) it is judged as outstanding, novel, and useful by people with
a central and powerful status, (b) in a given ’domain’, i.e., a specific practice with its
related rules, values, and standards, (c) at a given point of time. Norms are present in
this approach in a twofold way: first, in the socioculturally and historically developed
values and standards of the domain, which provide a reference framework, and secondly,
in the judgement of a contribution by knowledgeable individuals that is based on their
interpretation of the domain’s standards and values. The reference to a given point of
time acknowledges that the domain and its standards are not static but develop in the
course of time.
In analogy, an action can be called an error if (a) it is evaluated as a deficient deviation
from an expected standard (Senders & Moray, 1991; Volpert, 1992) (b) by knowledgeable
peers or central people in a given domain, organisation, or a local community (Hakkarainen
et al., 2004; Wenger, 1998), (c) at a given point of time. This social evaluation perspective
on error is implicitly present in the definitions of error that were introduced above and it
is illustrated more explicitly in the following two statements:
“A nursing error was defined as any wrongful decision, omission or action for
which the nurse felt responsible, that has adverse or potentially adverse con-
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sequences, and that would be judged wrong by knowledgeable peers at the time
it occurred [italics added].” (Meurier et al., 1997, p. 133)
“If there is general agreement that an actor, Z, should have done other than
what Z did, Z has committed an error.” (Senders & Moray, 1991, p. 81)
This social evaluation perspective takes into account the hierarchical nature of work or-
ganisations which implies that usually not one actor alone evaluates whether an action
is an error, but a superordinate person or group participates in the judgement, or may
impose it on the actor. There are multiple sources from which evaluative criteria may be
obtained. National standards for an occupation may be applied that are codified in le-
gal conventions, as well as rules and standards fixed by an organisation, or a community’s
shared values and ways of doing things (Wenger, 1998). This reflects the complex interplay
of goals and norms of the sociocultural practice, the requirements of specific workplaces,
and individual idiosyncrasies in interpreting and enacting the practice (Billett, 2001c). For
example, nurses’ work is largely shaped by local guidelines and standard procedures that
are supposed to reflect national ’expert-standards’ based on the state of the art in medical
care (Bu¨ssing & Glaser, 2002; Deutsches Netzwerk fu¨r Qualita¨tsentwicklung in der Pflege,
2007). These standards provide transparent criteria for errors, with the underlying norm
that a patient’s health or healing process must not be affected in a negative way by medical
mismanagement (Bogner, 1994; Kohn et al., 1999). They may be used by members of an
organisation to evaluate the appropriateness of specific actions. Although discrepancies
between the espoused values of the organisation and their individual interpretation may
occur, it can be assumed that an organisation and individuals in a supervisory position
have the power of definition (Heid, 1999).
The introduced social evaluation perspective on errors fills a gap in cognitive and action-
oriented approaches to human error by enabling analyses of evaluation processes of specific
error episodes. Whereas the human error approaches describe the general structure of
errors in the context of human action in terms of an action-goal relationship, the social
evaluation perspective can be used to explain how and why an action is judged to be an
error in a given context. For the present discussion on a definition of error, I conclude
that a specific case is an error for a given domain if it has been evaluated to be one by
knowledgeable members. As a consequence, I propose that research on learning from errors
should be grounded in specific error cases that are collected from a domain under study.
Under the social evaluation perspective, it can be explained why a specific case is assumed
to be an error, whereas the development of a general definition of error for a given domain
seems hardly possible in the light of the problems raised above.
2.1.4. Summary: Definition of error for this thesis
Drawing together the discussion so far, I conceptualise errors for the purpose of this study
as follows.
• An error is an individual action that is performed in such a way that (at least tem-
porarily) a goal is not achieved and the achievement of higher-order goals is endan-
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gered. Action in this sense also encompasses decisions and omissions. It is important
to distinguish between the erroneous action and the outcome: the term ‘error’ con-
cerns the erroneous action, regardless of whether an adverse outcome results. An
inadequate action establishes a critical situation in which the achievement of the
desired goal is endangered. From thereon the error may be detected and corrected,
or defences in the environment may work so that no damage results (‘near-miss’).
Otherwise, an adverse event may occur, which comprises an undesirable negative
outcome.
• Errors can be classified on basis of the underlying level of cognitive action regulation.
Two error types are distinguished here: (a) slips and lapses and (b) knowledge- and
rule-based errors. It is crucial for research on errors to specify in advance what type
of error is in focus, because errors vary in the learning potential they provide. For
the present study I decide to focus on knowledge- and rule-based errors, because
this errors type can be assumed to be open to deliberate changes through learning
activities.
• Error is a normative category that involves judgement on the basis of normative
criteria. The problem that norms are not unequivocally valid in different socio-
cultural contexts cannot be solved entirely. Based on a social evaluation perspective
of errors, the position advanced here is to employ a pragmatic solution by relying
on concrete error cases that are evaluated to be errors by knowledgeable members
of the specific work domain under investigation.
2.2. Conceptualisation of learning from errors
In this section a conceptual framework for understanding learning through errors in the
workplace is advanced. Although the issue of individual and team learning from errors at
work is receiving growing attention in empirical research (Arndt, 1996; Edmondson, 1996;
Meurier et al., 1997; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003), the existing studies
have not yet systematically elaborated a theoretical framework that explains individual
learning through errors at work and guides its operationalisation for empirical research
(Bauer & Mulder, in press). Most of the studies on errors and learning from errors focus
either on the organisational level (e.g., Argote & Todocara, 2007; Argyris & Scho¨n, 1996;
Barach & Small, 2000; Dovey & Phillips, 2004; Kaufmann et al., 2002; Kriegesmann et al.,
2005; Sitkin, 1992; Uribe, Schweikhart, Pathak, & Marsh, 2002) or on learning from errors
in organised learning environments, such as training (e.g., Ellis & Davidi, 2005; Heimbeck
et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005, 2008; Klockmann, 2005; Van Lehn, 1988; Meyer et
al., 2006; Oser & Spychiger, 2005). Therefore, they make only limited contributions to
improve our understanding of individual learning from errors at work (cf. Ohlsson, 1996).
The position advanced here is to contextualise learning from errors in theories of expe-
riential learning and learning through work (’workplace learning’) (Billett, 2004b; Eraut
et al., 1998; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999; Scho¨n, 1983).
Learning from errors at work implies the notion of constructing or modifying knowledge
through the experience of an episodic event encountered during daily work. Therefore,
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individual learning from errors can be conceptualised as a sub-category of experiential
learning at work. This contextualisation allows us to integrate learning from errors with
conceptions of professional development that emphasise the role of experiential learning
(Billett, 2004a; Boshuizen, Bromme, & Gruber, 2004b; Eraut, 1994, 2000; Ericsson, 2006a;
Gruber, 1999a; Gruber, Harteis, Mulder, & Rehrl, 2005; Kolb, 1984; Scho¨n, 1983; Simons
& Ruijters, 2004).
Below, the following steps for the development of a framework of individual learning from
errors at work will be taken. Firstly, definitions of the concepts ’learning’, ’experience’,
and ’experiential learning’ in the context of professional learning and development are
provided. Secondly, learning from errors will be conceptualised under two complementary
perspectives on experiential learning. The cognitive perspective explains learning as the
acquisition and modification of knowledge and focusses on the memory and knowledge
structures involved (Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999; Schank & Abelson, 1977). The activity
perspective understands learning as a self-directed and self-organised effort to improve
performance and focusses on learning in terms of the engagement in deliberate overt or
cognitive learning activities (Boshuizen, Bromme, & Gruber, 2004a; Eraut et al., 1998;
Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Scho¨n, 1983; Van de Wiel, Szegedi, & Weggeman, 2004). The
integration of both perspectives has the potential to deepen our understanding of learning
through errors by explaining its processes on the basis of established learning theories
and by providing possibilities for its operationalisation. In the conclusion of this section
the discussion will be integrated to a definition of learning from errors for the purpose
of this study. A framework of learning activities will be derived that builds the basis for
operationalising learning from errors in the empirical studies presented later.
2.2.1. Learning, experience, and experiential learning
The goal of this paragraph is to elaborate definitions of the concepts of learning, experience,
and experiential learning for the purpose of this study. These definitions are needed to
contextualise learning from errors in conceptions of experiential learning at work.
Simons and Ruijters (2004) advance a definition of learning in the context of professional
learning and development that is followed here.
“Learning, in our view, refers to implicit or explicit mental and / or overt
activities and processes leading to changes in knowledge, skills or attitudes or
the ability to learn of individuals, groups or organisations. These can under
certain conditions also lead to changes in work processes or work outcomes of
individuals, groups or organisations.” (Simons & Ruijters, 2004, p. 210)
This definition addresses three aspects of learning that are relevant for conceptualising
learning from errors.
1. The learning process as well as its outcome may be explicit or implicit. Eraut (2000)
distinguishes three modes of non-formal workplace learning according to their level
of intentionality and consciousness: ’Deliberative learning’ is basically intentional,
with time being especially set aside for it. ’Reactive learning’ is learning that follows
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as immediate reaction to a specific event. It is nearly spontaneous, no time is specif-
ically set aside for it, and the level of intentionality may vary. ’Implicit learning’
is conceptualised as non-conscious and unintentional, and the learner may not even
be aware of the outcome (cf. Simons, 2005). Because learning from errors occurs
as a reaction to an unexpected event and is not part of the normal work process,
learning from errors typically will take place in a deliberative mode or in a reactive
mode. Eraut (2000) notes that practitioners will be most likely in a deliberative
mode when they are reflecting on their experience. However, this does not necessar-
ily imply awareness of the learning process in the sense that the focus of intention
would be on learning or that the individual would call the process ’learning’ (Simons,
2005).
2. The definition of learning indicates that learning processes involve cognitive as well
as overt learning activities. Similarly, the outcome of learning can be analysed in
terms of cognitive structures and changed performance. Learning from errors will
be conceptualised below both in terms of cognitive processes and in terms of the en-
gagement in learning activities, while the empirical part will focus on the latter. As
Kwakman (2003) states, measuring learning in terms of learning activities is legiti-
mate, but it has to be acknowledged that the engagement in learning activities and
the cognitive learning process itself are not the same. Models of learning activities
without an explanation of the cognitive processes that are assumed to be triggered
by them, stay inherently normative. Therefore, the discussion both of a cognitive
and an activity perspective is required for conceptualising learning from errors.
3. Finally, the definition indicates that learning can take place on the individual, group,
or the organisational level. Although the focus here is on individual learning, the
framework of learning through errors developed below can potentially be extended
to the team level. Several scholars have elaborated on how theories of individual
and group learning are linked through the common notion of adaptive processes
through cycles of reflective, experiential learning (Cressey, Boud, & Docherty, 2006;
Ellstro¨m, 2001; Hoeve & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Ja¨rvinen & Poikela, 2001). In this
understanding, team learning involves, but goes beyond, individual learning and
comprises processes of re-negotiating and changing shared knowledge, routines, and
practices. This perspective analyses work teams under a micro perspective (Bauer
& Gruber, 2007) that integrates the individual and the group level (Edmondson,
1996). It contrasts with a macro-perspective on team and organisational learning
that is mainly interested in learning in terms of organisational change. Hence, the
framework of learning from errors developed below focusses on individual learning,
but is potentially applicable to analyse links between individual and team learning.
Contextualising learning from errors in theories of experiential learning requires further-
more elaboration of the concepts of ’experience’ and ’experiential learning’. Experience
means encountering episodes that are personally relevant to a subject (Gruber, 1999a).
The term ’episode’ refers to a personally encountered event in a certain situation at a cer-
tain time (Gruber, 1999b; Tulving, 1993). Experiential learning means to construct new
or to modify existing knowledge through the active participation in personally relevant
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episodes in a natural context, e.g., a workplace (Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984). Personally
relevant implies that the subjective interpretation of the episode as well as its emotional
and motivational valence play an important role for the initiation and the quality of learn-
ing processes.
As indicated above, experiential learning is regarded as crucial in the process of professional
development (Billett, 2004a; Boshuizen et al., 2004b; Eraut, 1994, 2000; Ericsson, 2006a;
Gruber, 1999a; Gruber et al., 2005; Kolb, 1984; Scho¨n, 1983; Simons & Ruijters, 2004).
Fundamental mechanisms of experiential learning are (a) the integration of new experiences
into prior knowledge, (b) the generalisation over repeatedly encountered similar episodes,
as well as (c) the indication and integration of deviant episodes, involving learning from
errors (Gruber, 1999a; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999). There is general agreement that
reflection on an experience is a key learning activity in these processes (Boud, Keogh,
& Walker, 1989a; Boud, 1999; Ellstro¨m, 2006; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Moon, 2004;
Scho¨n, 1983; Simons & Ruijters, 2004). Eraut (1994) conceives reflection as an essential
element of experiential learning. The concept of reflection will be elaborated more deeply
in the following sections (2.2.2 and 2.2.3). For the moment, reflection will be shortly
defined as “(. . . ) a generic term for those intellectual and affective activities in which
individuals engage to explore their experiences in order to lead to new understandings and
appreciations” (Boud et al., 1989a, p. 19).
The aspects of experiential learning can be summarised in the following definition of ex-
periential learning for the purpose of this study. Learning from experience is a process
of acquiring new or modifying existing knowledge and skills through the participation in
personally relevant episodes in natural settings. The learning process may take place im-
plicitly, be initiated as immediate reaction to an (unexpected) situation, or be initiated
deliberately with the intention to learn with time especially set aside for it. For the latter
two modes of learning, reflection is a key activity. Learning from experience is action
oriented in a sense that it results from individuals’ active engagement in given episodes
and that its outcomes may contribute to improve the ability to act in a given context.
Experiential learning as defined above comprises learning from errors as a subcategory.
Errors constitute unexpected situations and – if perceived as relevant – may evoke the
intention to change one’s behaviour or the underlying dispositions to which the error is at-
tributed. The following two sections will address the question how learning from errors can
be explained more precisely from a cognitive perspective that focusses on the acquisition
and modification of knowledge, and from an activity perspective that focusses on learning
in terms of the engagement in experiential learning activities. Both perspectives are linked
through the shared assumption that learning is an adaptive process that is mediated by
reflection.
2.2.2. The cognitive perspective: Modification of scripts in dynamic memory
The conceptualisation of learning from errors at work requires explaining how the ex-
perience of an error can lead to a modification of individuals’ knowledge and how this
may contribute to future improved action. For this purpose, a cognitive perspective on
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learning from errors will be introduced below by drawing on theories of dynamic memory
that model changes in episodic memory structures and describe processes of case-based
reasoning (Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Several scholars have
argued that these concepts are particularly useful for the analysis of professional develop-
ment and work related learning of individuals or teams (Bauer & Gruber, 2007; Eraut,
1994; Gruber, 1999a; Hoeve & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Strasser & Gruber, 2004). The posi-
tion advanced here is that learning from errors can be explained as the modification of
scripts through the experience of deviant episodes, comprising error situations. Although
the process of script modification cannot be measured directly for reasons given below,
this discussion adds to our understanding of learning from errors by modelling the cogni-
tive processes and structures underlying learning from errors. Furthermore, the cognitive
perspective provides links between theories of experiential learning and the cognitive and
action-oriented approaches to human error that were used above to conceptualise error
(Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1998; Rasmussen, 1987b; Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray,
1991; Volpert, 1992).
In the following paragraphs the cognitive perspective will be elaborated. Firstly the con-
cepts of dynamic memory, scripts, and case-based reasoning are introduced. Secondly,
experiential learning at work and learning from errors will be modelled as the establish-
ment and modification of scripts. In the conclusion of this section the contribution made
by the cognitive perspective will be critically discussed.
Dynamic memory, case-based reasoning, and scripts. Theories of dynamic mem-
ory and case-based reasoning are relevant for conceptualising learning from errors because
they provide an explanation of how individuals can use knowledge about formerly ex-
perienced errors in new situations. These theories assume that individuals act in given
situations on the basis of episodic knowledge structures that are derived from experience
of specific episodes (Kolodner, 1993; Kolodner & Simpson, 1986; Schank, 1999). As in-
dicated by the notion of a ‘dynamic’ memory, this knowledge is subject to continuous
refinement and modification through the repeated experience of episodes. Theories of
dynamic memory and case-based reasoning imply assumptions about an episodic mem-
ory that stores information about personally experienced events and that enables per-
sons to remember and re-experience their own previous experiences (Tulving, 1972, 1993,
2002). In dynamic memory, cases – i.e., interpreted representations of formerly experi-
enced episodes (Kolodner, 1997) – are organised in script-like episodic memory structures
that are derived from the ‘raw’ experiences through reflection (’episodic memory organi-
sation packets’; Kolodner, 1983; Kolodner & Simpson, 1986). The case-based reasoning
approach describes how remembering cases is helpful to improve problem-solving and ac-
tion in recurrences of similar episodes. For example, O’Hare and Wiggins (2004) analysed
how former experiences of critical incidents during flights improved pilots’ later responses
to new critical flight events.
These conceptions of the acquisition, representation, and use of action-oriented knowledge
are based on schema and script theories of conceptual knowledge representation (J. R.
Anderson, 2005). Scripts are generalised episodic knowledge structures that are acquired
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and modified through the experience of episodes and that serve as a framework for the
accomplishment of similar recurring tasks (Schank, 1999; Schank & Abelson, 1977). They
comprise information about sequences of events, appropriate actions and procedures, in-
volved artefacts, and the division of social roles for a given class of situations. Scripts
serve as a set of default rules that apply until challenged and that can be changed on
the basis of experience (Hoeve & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Kolodner, 1993). For application,
scripts can be adjusted to meet the requirements of a specific situation at hand (Gruber,
1999b). These characteristics make scripts a powerful cognitive tool that allows for the
efficient representation of action-oriented knowledge. However, a restriction of scripts is
that they cannot account for action in novel situations, for which per definition no pre-
existing set of procedures is available. In novel situations the quality of mental models and
theoretical knowledge are important for developing effective action plans (cf. knowledge-
based regulation) (Gruber, 1999a; Stark, Mandl, Gruber, & Renkl, 1998). Then again,
by encountering once novel situations repeatedly, new scripts are established that can be
modified and fine-tuned by further experiences (Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999).
The concept of scripts is particularly useful for analysing knowledge, practices, and changes
of knowledge or practices in work settings (Boshuizen, 2004; Eraut, 1994; Hoeve &
Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Gruber, 1999a; Strasser & Gruber, 2004). For the purpose of con-
ceptualising learning through errors, the concept of scripts is helpful for two reasons.
First, it provides links between theories of experiential learning and the action-oriented
perspective on human error introduced above, because the concept of operative image
systems as an action-oriented knowledge system that is acquired or revised through action
is based on script theory (Hacker, 1998; Volpert, 1987; Wehner & Mehl, 2003; Zimolong,
1990). This provides a basis to integrate both lines of theory into a consistent framework
of learning from errors. Secondly, learning from errors can be conceptualised as a process
of script modification, as will be elaborated below.
Learning as the establishment and modification of scripts. Processes of expe-
riential learning at work – and learning from errors as a special case of such learning –
can be understood as the establishment and the modification of scripts (Bauer & Gruber,
2007). Hence, learning from errors involves changing the knowledge base that underlies
action regulation during task performance. For learning from errors, the processes of
script modification through the integration of deviant episodes in dynamic memory are
particularly relevant (Gruber, 1999a; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999). Through reflection
on the deviant episode, a respective script can be enriched by an additional part (i.e., an
index) that marks the deviant parts from the expected ones. The index assists the actor to
remember the deviant episode in recurrences of similar situations and to chose alternative
action strategies (i.e., case-based reasoning).
Indexing deviances from default scripts can be modelled in a process of six steps (Kolodner,
1983). (a) At first, an initial sequence of action is performed, or a decision is made, on
the basis of the existing episodic memory contents (’initial decision’). In the next steps,
(b) a resulting effect has to be noticed as a deviation (’noticing the failure’) and (c) the
erroneous action has to be identified (’assigning blame’). (d) Then the error may be
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corrected (’correcting the failure’). This correction concerns the consequences resulting
from the error, because ’The action itself is history the moment it is completed and cannot
be corrected or otherwise edited’ (Ohlsson, 1996, p. 247). (e) In order to learn from the
error, reflection on why it occurred and how it could have been prevented is required
(’explaining the failure’). (f) As a result, the experienced episode is integrated with prior
knowledge (’memory update’). This is accomplished by adding indices to the original
episode that refer to the explanation of the error. At the next occurrence of a similar
episode the index serves as reference to the faulty episode and may help to prevent the
same error. If the cause for a deviance cannot be identified or explained, at least the
difference between the expected and the deviant episode is indicated, so that it is possible
to search for a cause at the next occurrence of a similar episode.
Learning from errors plays a significant role for modifying and fine-tuning scripts (Gruber,
1999a; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999). As Schank (1999, p. 130) puts it, “Failure is the
root of change.” Learning from errors implies improving future action by enriching the
underlying knowledge base with conditions under which a script has proven inappropriate.
This enrichment is accomplished by reflection on possible causes of the error (assigning
blame) and explaining why it occurred and what might be done differently next time
(explaining the error). Remembering such deviant cases in later similar situations helps
to avoid repeating the same inappropriate application of (parts of) a script. However,
the quality of the reflection process in terms of the correct identification of the erroneous
action and finding an appropriate explanation is critical for improving future action.
Discussion of the cognitive perspective. So far, the position has been advanced
that learning from errors can be modelled as the modification and enrichment of scripts.
Experiences of error situations and reflection on them can contribute to extend scripts by
parts that enable an actor to improve future action and problem solving through case-based
reasoning processes. This cognitive perspective is able to explain processes and outcomes
of learning from errors at work. However, one of its problems is that the described cognitive
structures and processes are difficult to measure in applied empirical research. Case-based
reasoning has been investigated mainly by employing computational modelling techniques
(Kolodner, 1993). As Kolodner (1997) notes, the goal of case-based reasoning research
is to provide plausible cognitive models that serve to derive hypotheses about cognition
for empirical research. Therefore, empirical studies have to rely on the measurement of
behaviour that is supposed to indicate the existence of the assumed knowledge structures,
for example, through think-aloud protocols (outcome perspective), or through learning
activities that are supposed to effect changes in knowledge (process perspective).
In the following section, the case will be made that conceptualising and operationalising
learning from errors in terms of the engagement in experiential learning activities provides
a fruitful approach. Despite of the focus on cognitive structures, the model of error-driven
script modification implies concrete activities in which an individual has to engage in order
to learn from an error (Kolodner, 1983). Furthermore, there are similarities between the
model of script modification and experiential learning cycles that consist of experiential
learning activities (Hoeve, Mittendorff, & Nieuwenhuis, 2003; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984;
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Scho¨n, 1983; Van de Wiel et al., 2004). The reason for these similarities is that models
of script modification and models of experiential learning cycles both describe adaptive
processes as a reaction to the experience of an episode. They start out with concrete
experiences and model reflective activities that result in modified dispositions for future
action. The engagement in reflective activities – such as identifying possible causes of an
error, explaining why it occurred, and considering ways to prevent it in future – is poten-
tially more promising for measuring learning from errors in empirical research than script
modification. However, this activity perspective cannot replace the cognitive explanation
of learning from errors or make it obsolete, because models of learning activities without
an explanation of the cognitive processes that are assumed to be triggered by them stay
inherently normative (Kwakman, 2003). In the next section the discussion about learn-
ing activities will be extended and a more systematic model of learning activities will be
derived.
2.2.3. The activity perspective: Learning as the engagement in experiential
learning activities
In this section the proposition is advanced that learning from errors can be conceptualised
and operationalised in terms of the engagement in experiential learning activities. While
the above section mainly relied on psychological theories that frame learning as change
in memory structures, the activity perspective presented here is based on educational
theories of adult and professional learning that understand learning as a self-directed and
self-organised effort to improve performance through the engagement in learning activities
(Boshuizen, 2004; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Scho¨n, 1983; Van de Wiel et al., 2004).
Learning activities are defined to consist of actions which are supposed to effect a change
in the individual’s knowledge or skills (Schiefele & Schiefele, 1997). In this perspective
learning is closely linked to action and the boundary between both is not distinct (Billett,
2001c; Hager, 2004a). Taking such a perspective has been argued to be most appropriate
for modelling learning at work (Hager, 2004a). The notion of modelling and measuring
learning at work as the engagement in learning activities has been applied in several studies
(e.g., Billett, 2000; Berings, Gelissen, & Poell, 2005; Eraut et al., 1998; Kwakman, 2003;
Van Woerkom, 2003). However, so far there are no frameworks that systematically describe
error-related learning activities. Therefore, the question is which kind of learning activities
an individual has to engage in after the experience of a knowledge- and rule-based error.
This question will be addressed in the following paragraphs. Firstly, the notion of expe-
riential learning cycles will be introduced, which provides a systematic framework for the
identification of relevant learning activities. Secondly, two points of critique on the con-
ception of experiential learning cycles are addressed that are relevant here: the neglect of
the social dimension of learning (Fenwick, 2003) and the lack of elaboration on reflection
(Boud, Keogh, & Walker, 1989b; Boud, 2006; Ja¨rvinen & Poikela, 2001; Van Woerkom,
2003). Thirdly, the concept of experiential learning cycles will be applied to learning from
errors by identifying relevant error-related learning activities within the steps of the cycle.
The results of this discussion will be integrated to build a framework of learning activities
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that provides a basis for operationalising learning from errors (Bauer & Mulder, 2007, in
press).
Experiential learning as action–reflection–action cycles. A general framework of
learning activities can be derived from conceptions of experiential learning cycles (e.g.,
Boud et al., 1989a; Cseh et al., 2000; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Scho¨n, 1983; Van de
Wiel et al., 2004). Basically, these conceptions describe how an individual’s ’theory of
action’, that is, the knowledge and the beliefs underlying action, is revised as a response
to the experience of a concrete episode, mediated by reflection. This conceptualisation
of experiential learning involves the notion of a cyclic – or more precisely of a spiral –
progression starting and ending with action. According to Kolb (1984), an experiential
learning cycle involves a progression of the following steps.
1. At first, a specific conflicting episode is encountered (’concrete experience’). ‘Con-
flicting’ means that the episode is perceived as subjectively salient and relevant by
the subject, e.g., through recognising an unexpected dissonance between the current
theory of action and the feedback resulting from the performance. This conflict cre-
ates the motivational basis for the engagement in reflection (Step 2). The conflict
may emerge directly out of the situation, or be recognised later through feedback of
any kind.
2. In order to learn, reflection on the experienced episode and the applied theory of
action is required (’reflective observation’). This step involves a shift from the specific
involvement in action towards observation and “general analytic detachment” (Kolb,
1984, p. 31). Reflection in Kolb’s sense has an instrumental focus. Its purpose is to
analyse the situation and the effectiveness of the action in order to draw conclusions
for future action and problem-solving.
3. Reflective thinking may result in the derivation of a revised theory of action. This
can take the form of defining general principles operating in the episode (’abstract
conceptualisation’) or developing rules of thumb which guide future action.
4. The resulting knowledge can be applied in subsequent episodes through actively
experimenting with and evaluating the revised theory of action (’active experimen-
tation’). At this point the cyclic progression enters action again, on the basis of a
revised and enhanced understanding.
This notion of an experiential learning cycle is helpful for conceptualising learning from
errors in two ways. Firstly, Kolb’s (1984) model has been acknowledged in the human
error and safety management literature (Glendon et al., 2006). A similar model has been
introduced to describe processes of ’error recovery’ (Zapf, Lang, & Wittmann, 1991). Error
recovery starts with the detection of an error during an episode of action, followed by a
phase of analysing and explaining the error, then planning a strategy for its correction,
and finally implementing the developed strategy. Though this model of error recovery
addresses processes of error management – i.e., correcting an error and preventing or
reducing negative outcomes (Zapf et al., 1999) – and not of learning from errors, the
similarity to an experiential learning cycle can be ascribed to the underlying notion of an
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adaptive process. This similarity is not a matter of chance. Kolb conceives learning as the
“major process of human adaption” (1984, p. 32). He thus considers learning to encompass
other related concepts such as problem-solving or inquiry.
Secondly, Kolb’s (1984) conception of experiential learning can be related to the model of
script change in dynamic memory discussed above (Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999). The
joint basic argument is that people learn continually by modifying their knowledge through
their experiences. The experience of and reflection on deviant episodes are learning mech-
anisms of special relevance in both lines of theory. However, a difference is that though
Kolb (1984) refers to the change of knowledge, he focusses more on the engagement in
learning activities than on the underlying cognitive structures. Consequently, he argues
that learning should be considered as a process, not in terms of outcomes. This position
has also been advanced in constructivist theories and in research on professional develop-
ment and learning at work for conceptual as well as for empirical reasons (Collins, 1990;
Duffy, Lowyck, & Jonassen, 1993; Gruber, 1999a; Hager, 2004a, 2004b; Law & Wong,
1996). Several scholars have argued that for the empirical investigation of learning at
work, it is desirable to operationalise the variables under investigation as much in terms
of concrete workplace activities as possible, because these activities – in contrast to cog-
nitive structures – may be either observed directly or may be easier articulated by the
participants of a study (Eraut et al., 1998; Simons & Ruijters, 2004; Simons, 2005; Van
Woerkom, 2003).
For the purpose of this study the decision is made to operationalise learning from errors
in terms of the engagement in learning activities that are assumed to lead to the cognitive
processes described above (Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999). Kolb’s (1984) experiential
learning cycle provides a systematic framework for this purpose by allowing us to identify
relevant error-related learning activities in the steps of the cycle. However, several points of
critique of Kolb’s (1984) approach that are relevant here have to be addressed beforehand.
Critique and extensions. In particular, two points in Kolb’s (1984) conception of
experiential learning cycles have been subject to critique by other scholars: neglect of the
social dimension of learning (Fenwick, 2003) and the lack of elaboration on reflection (Boud
et al., 1989b; Boud, 2006; Ja¨rvinen & Poikela, 2001; Van Woerkom, 2003). Both points
are relevant here, because learning from errors is investigated in the social context of the
workplace and because the case has been made above that reflection plays an important
part in learning from errors. Therefore, theories have to be introduced that compensate
for the mentioned weaknesses of Kolb’s (1984) approach.
Neglect of the social dimension. A point of concern is that Kolb’s (1984) model neglects
the social dimension of learning as a process of co-construction and negotiation of meaning
(Fenwick, 2003). Although Kolb emphasises that learning involves transactions between
the person and the environment, he hardly elaborates on the social dimension of learning.
Particularly, the relevance of social exchange for learning has been stressed in socio-cultural
and constructivist learning theories (Lave, 1991; Rogoff, 1984; Valisner & Van der Veer,
2000), and in conceptions of learning at work and professional development (Billett, 2004a;
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Eraut et al., 1998; Felstead et al., 2005; Hakkarainen et al., 2004; Smith, 2003). For the
individual, engagement in social learning activities delivers opportunities to co-construct
knowledge and meaning from a situation. By including others’ perspectives, the own,
probably limited, perspective is extended. The effect is reciprocal: others involved have
the opportunity to profit from the experience of an individual, and group-learning may
be initiated in the form of changing established routines (Hoeve & Nieuwenhuis, 2006).
As for learning from errors, it has been emphasised that especially those activities that
go beyond finding a quick fix for an error in order to proceed with the original task,
and that aim at exploring underlying causes, require communication and collaboration
with others (Edmondson, 2004; Van Woerkom, 2003). Communication and exchange
about errors support the development of shared knowledge and understanding, but also of
solutions and strategies to handle errors and critical situations (Arndt, 1996; Cannon &
Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1996; Meurier et al., 1997; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Tucker
& Edmondson, 2003). Therefore, a framework of error-related learning activities needs
to take into account that learning activities can involve individual as well as cooperative
engagement (cf. Van Woerkom, 2003).
Lack of elaboration on reflection. Although Kolb’s (1984) model assigns reflection a high
value, it has been criticised in that he treats reflection as self-evident and neglects to
elaborate on its processes and components (Boud et al., 1989b; Boud, 2006; Ja¨rvinen &
Poikela, 2001; Van Woerkom, 2003). Conceptualising reflection on errors therefore requires
drawing upon more comprehensive theories of reflection (e.g., Boud, Cressey, & Docherty,
2006; Fenwick, 2003; Moon, 2004; Van Woerkom, 2003). Boud (2006) summarises several
common themes in the literature on reflection. These themes are discussed here and will
be applied to learning from errors in the following paragraph.
(a) Reflection refers to cognitive and emotional processes as well as to actions which serve
to examine experiences. Hence, reflection is not restricted to cognition but also involves
overt activities. (b) Reflection is triggered by the experience of conflict, such as surprise,
perplexity, hesitation, uncertainty, dissatisfaction, or discrepancy (cf. Kolb, 1984). Sev-
eral authors have elaborated on how emerging problems and unexpected outcomes lead
practitioners to leave a routinised and intuitive mode of action regulation and to enter
a deliberate, knowledge-based, and analytical one (Ellstro¨m, 2006; Eraut, 2000; Scho¨n,
1983). (c) Consequently, the third theme observed by Boud (2006) is that of reflection
as a conscious, volitional process of interpreting and making sense of experiences (cf. Ell-
stro¨m, 2006). Reflection in this sense relates to the reactive and deliberative modes of
learning, discussed above (Eraut, 2000). (d) Finally, reflection has been regarded mainly
as an individual activity the benefits of which concern the individual. This notion has been
subject to debate (Cressey et al., 2006; Høyrup & Elkjaer, 2006; Van Woerkom, 2003).
First, individual reflective processes may profit from social exchange while at the same time
reflection as a collectively shared practice has the potential to contribute to the compe-
tence development of others involved and may initiate processes of group or organisational
learning (Ja¨rvinen & Poikela, 2001). Secondly, even if reflection is performed individually,
its outcomes concern action in and relations with a social and technical-organisational en-
vironment and therefore are inherently social and contextual (Cressey et al., 2006; Hager,
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2004a). Hence, the association of reflection with the metaphor of the ‘brooding thinker’
is inadequate and needs complementation by a social negotiation perspective.
In addition to Boud’s summary, one more theme in the discourse on reflection is of impor-
tance. (e) Reflection has been analysed on a continuum between ‘instrumental’ and ‘crit-
ical’ reflection (Mezirow, 1990; Van Woerkom, 2003). “[Instrumental] Reflection enables
us to correct distortions in our beliefs and errors in problem solving. Critical reflection
involves a critique of the presuppositions on which our beliefs have been built” (Mezirow,
1990, p. 1). Hence, instrumental reflection concerns the contents and processes of problem
solving and serves learning how to act. In contrast, critical reflection has an emancipatory
focus and concerns questioning the underlying and often implicit goals, values, and beliefs
underlying action.
The discussed themes of reflection will be picked up again in the following paragraph,
when contextualising the notion of a learning cycle to learning from errors.
Application of the experiential learning cycle to error-related learning activ-
ities. In the previous paragraphs Kolb’s (1984) model of an experiential learning cycle
and extensions based on its critique have been discussed. Drawing together this discussion,
the following conclusions for a framework of error-related learning activities can be made.
1. Learning from errors can be modelled as well as operationalised by the engagement
in learning activities regarding the latter three steps of the learning cycle, after the
experience of an error episode. Learning from errors through the engagement in
learning activities implies intentional adaptive efforts as response to an encountered
error episode that aim to change the causes to which the error is attributed. The
steps of the learning cycle can be contextualised to learning from errors, as follows.
(a) Concrete experience. In learning from errors, a concrete experience means the
detection that an error has occurred. The starting point for the experiential
learning process is that an actor has detected the occurrence of an error, either
by him- or herself, or through feedback provided by others involved, technical
systems, or the functioning of the work system itself (Glendon et al., 2006;
Zhao & Olivera, 2006). After the detection, an actor may elect to engage in
error-related learning activities, or not. The decision to engage in learning may
depend on the actor’s interpretation of the error situation and the perception of
supportive contextual conditions, as will be elaborated later (Chapter 2.3).
(b) Reflection and analysis. Reflection on errors involves performing a root-cause-
analysis in order to identify probable causes of an error and to explain why it
occurred (Kolb, 1984; Kolodner, 1983). Reflection on errors can be contextu-
alised in the discussed themes in the discourse on reflection as follows. Reflection
on an error refers to a conscious, volitional process, involving cognition, emo-
tion, or overt action, that serves to examine, interpret, and make sense of this
experience. An actor may elect to engage in cognitive or overt reflective ac-
tivities (Theme a), as a response to a conflict induced by the detection of an
error (Theme b), with the aim to analyse its causes (Theme c). Reflection on
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errors has a social dimension in that it may be performed cooperatively, and its
outcomes concern action which cannot be thought of as separate from the socio-
cultural context in which it occurs (Theme d). Locating reflection on errors on
the continuum between instrumental and critical reflection (Theme e) is more
difficult. The focus of reflection on errors as discussed so far is an instrumental
one, that is, reflection is preformed in order to enhance future problem solving
and action. However, learning from errors is not restricted to instrumental re-
flection for two reasons. First, even if the goal is an instrumental one, the means
of achieving this goal can incorporate critical reflection. In depth reflection on
root-causes, results, and ways of prevention is required in order to achieve a
change (Arndt, 1996; Aspden et al., 2004; Bogner, 1994; Feldman & Roblin,
2000; Harteis, Bauer, & Haltia, 2007; Van Woerkom, 2003). Secondly, errors
can also bear the potential to initiate critical reflection by asking for an in depth
inquiry about underlying values and presuppositions of the practice. Learning
from errors is not limited to mere adaption and can result in breaking up existing
practices (‘developmental learning’; Ellstro¨m, 2006). Hence, reflection on errors
comprises facets of instrumental as well as of critical reflection.
(c) Development of a new action strategy. Based on the outcomes of the reflective
process a revised or new strategy for action has to be developed. While the
search for causes describes an analysis of the discrepancy between the actual
and the desired state, a thorough analysis of alternative action strategies is nec-
essary in order to develop adequate new options for action (Stiensmeier-Pelster
& Heckhausen, 2006). Concrete activities may involve considering strategies to
change the presumed cause of the error, identifying and reasoning about possible
alternatives for future acting, allocating required information and resources, and
planning the implementation. The boundary between reflection and the devel-
opment of a new strategy is not as distinct as the separation in two subsequent
steps, linearly following each other, may suggest. Phases of reflective examina-
tion and developmental planning may be intertwined and the focus of activity
may move to and fro, especially when social negotiation is involved.
(d) Implementation of the new strategy. The last step concerns the implementation
of the revised action strategy through experimenting and evaluating it after ex-
periences in similar situations. Experimenting means intentional efforts in order
to try out and test the new action strategy within the work context (Cannon &
Edmondson, 2005; Ellstro¨m, 2001; Kwakman, 2003; Sitkin, 1992; Van Woerkom,
2003). This may involve formulating hypotheses, performing mental as well as
overt trials, and to tune, reconsider, or reject the new action strategy based on
implicit or explicit evaluations of the outcomes. Again, phases of experimenta-
tion are likely to be intertwined with phases of reflection and planning. If the
strategy is evaluated as ineffective, re-entering phases of reflection and deliberate
planning is required. If the new strategy proves to be effective, it becomes part
of the standard repertoire for action in the given class of situations. In terms of
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Table 1: Framework of learning activities




Considering ways to change the cause
Considering alternatives for future acting




Experimenting with the new strategy
Evaluating the new strategy
scripts and routines, a new ‘dominant design’ is established, after it is applied
several times in relevant episodes (Hoeve et al., 2003).
2. Each of these learning activities may be performed individually or in cooperation
with others through social exchange and negotiation in informal or formal situations
(Van Woerkom, 2003). Concrete social learning activities may involve asking expe-
rienced colleagues for help and advice, jointly discussing and analysing the episode,
considering ways of preventing the error from happening again, planning and im-
plementing the new strategy, and providing mutual control and critique in future
situations (Bauer & Mulder, 2007; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Meurier et al.,
1997; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).
The discussion of learning activities can be summarised to build a conceptual framework
of error-related learning activities, as presented in Table 1 (Bauer & Mulder, 2007). For
the purpose of this study, this framework serves a heuristic to guide the operationalisa-
tion of error-related learning activities. The idealised notion of a cyclic process starting
out with experience is only one special possibility of a sequence of learning from errors.
Phases of reflection, planning, and experimentation can be intertwined and may follow
each other rapidly in a non-linear process. However, the notion of a complete learning
cycle is helpful here, because it enables the systematic construction of a framework of
relevant error-related learning activities. In saying that the framework is conceived as
a heuristic, it is acknowledged that it does not yet represent the final operationalisation
of learning activities to be applied in the empirical part of this study. The framework
represents an experiential learning cycle that has been applied to learning from errors,
but still needs contextualisation to the requirements of the specific domain under study
(i.e., nursing). This contextualisation cannot be accomplished theoretically but requires
exploratory research (Chapter 4).
2.2.4. Summary and definition of learning from errors at work
The goal of this section has been the development of a theoretical framework that explains
individual learning from errors at work and that provides a basis for operationalising
learning from errors (Research Question 1). Learning from errors has been explained under
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a cognitive and an activity perspective on experiential learning (Boshuizen et al., 2004b;
Eraut et al., 1998; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999; Scho¨n, 1983;
Van de Wiel et al., 2004). The integration of both perspectives contributes to deepen
our understanding of learning from errors and to base it upon established conceptions of
experiential learning and learning at work. By modelling the underlying cognitive processes
and structures, the cognitive perspective explains why errors provide learning chances that
can contribute to the improvement of individual dispositions underlying action at work.
The activity perspective places the learning process and its outcomes in the socio-cultural
context of a workplace and provides possibilities for operationalising learning from errors
by identifying learning activities that lead to the learning processes and outcomes described
by the cognitive perspective. On the basis of the results of this discussion, a framework of
learning activities has been developed that is consistent with the theoretical perspectives
of existing empirical studies on learning from errors (Arndt, 1994; Cannon & Edmondson,
2001; Edmondson, 1996; Meurier et al., 1997; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Tucker & Edmondson,
2003) in so far as these studies take an activity perspective on learning (Bauer & Mulder,
in press). However, the framework goes beyond these studies, in that it is systematically
derived from learning theory.
In conclusion, learning from errors at work is defined for the purpose of this study as
follows.
Learning from errors at work is a process of acquiring new or modifying ex-
isting knowledge and skills through the experience of personally relevant error
episodes in a work setting. Learning from errors is intentional and action ori-
ented, though the focus of intention does not need to be on ‘learning’ in an
explicit sense. The change of knowledge involves the enrichment of scripts by
adding indices that assist to remind of the deviant episode in future occasions
and to avoid committing the same error. These cognitive processes can be trig-
gered through the engagement in learning activities. Learning activities can
be modelled in the form of an experiential learning cycle, though the learning
subject will not always walk the shortest way through this cycle. The detec-
tion of an error, or receiving feedback about its occurrence, forms the starting
point from which a subject may elect to engage in individually or cooperatively
performed learning activities. Reflection on the episode is required in order to
learn. Reflection involves identifying causes and explaining why the error oc-
curred. The results of reflection provide a basis for the development of new
action strategies, and for experimenting with and evaluating these strategies.
The short term outcomes of learning from errors concern a renewed, corrected,
and deeper understanding on the knowledge level, and the subject’s ability to
avoid the error in future on the action level. The latter involves a change in
practice that may require breaking up underlying presuppositions through crit-
ical reflection. In the long run, the experience of error episodes can contribute
to the development of a rich knowledge base that enables action at work.
A consequence resulting from the conceptualisation of learning from errors as an inten-
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tional, goal-directed process of the engagement in learning activities is that learning from
errors cannot be assumed to happen automatically. The decision to engage in learning
activities belongs to the individual’s agency (Billett, 2001c, 2004b). Therefore, both indi-
vidual variables as well as the individual’s interpretation of the conditions at a workplace
must be taken into account as either supporting or constraining individual agency. A
discussion of this proposition and of the individual and contextual conditions that can be
assumed to relate to the engagement in error-related learning activities will be provided
in the following section.
2.3. Individual and contextual conditions for learning from errors
This section provides a discussion of individual and contextual conditions that are poten-
tially relevant for the individual engagement in error-related learning at work. From this
discussion hypotheses will be derived that are subject to investigation in the empirical
part of this study (Research Questions 2—4).
The discussion starts with the consideration that in research on learning at work indi-
vidual subjectivity has to be taken into account (Billett, 2006). Hence, errors as well
as the contextual affordances and constraints through which a workplace may shape re-
sponses to errors are relevant for learning in terms of their individual interpretation, not
as quasi-objective environmental entities (Billett, 2001b, 2004b; Ellstro¨m, 2001; Jørgensen
& Warring, 2002). On the basis of a summary of existing studies on learning from errors
at work (Arndt, 1996; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Meurier et
al., 1997; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Van Woerkom, 2003) it will
be concluded in particular that (a) the individual interpretation of an error, and (b) the
perception of a safe social context at work are important for learning from errors. How-
ever, the existing studies are too heterogeneous to provide strong, cumulative evidence for
these assumptions (Bauer & Mulder, in press). Therefore further inquiry is required. The
assumptions that the interpretation of errors and the perception of a safe social context
are related to learning from errors are elaborated upon by drawing on the concepts of in-
dividual ’error orientation’ (Rybowiak et al., 1999) and a safe team climate (Edmondson,
1999), respectively. From this discussion, a research model for individual learning from
errors at work will be derived that comprises hypotheses about how the interplay of these
variables fosters or constrains learning from errors at work.
2.3.1. The importance of subjectivity
Variables that either foster or constrain experiential workplace learning – and learning from
errors as a specific case of such learning – have been classified into individual and contextual
influences (e.g., Billett, 2001c, 2004b). As Billett (2004b) notes, workplace learning is
dually dependent, on the one hand on the affordances and constraints a workplace provides,
on the other hand on the individual’s interpretation of and decision to engage in such
affordances. Hence, these affordances and constraints a workplace provides are not quasi-
objective learning potentials that exist independent of individual subjectivity and agency
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(Billett, 2004b, 2006). Although possibilities to participate in workplace practices may be
highly structured, the recognition and the use of learning possibilities cannot be taken for
granted (Bauer & Gruber, 2007; Billett, 2001b; Ellstro¨m, 2001). Individuals subjectively
evaluate their environment and act on the basis of their idiosyncratic construction of
reality. As Jørgensen and Warring (2002) put it:
“Analysis of the technical-organisational and the socio-cultural environments
conveys knowledge about the learning potentials in the learning environments
of the workplace. But it is how these potentials (and constraints) are perceived
by the employees and how they interact with their subjective motivation that
determines what kinds of learning occurs.” (Jørgensen & Warring, 2002, p. 9)
Hence, employees may regard learning potentials at a workplace as irrelevant or fail to
recognise them while they are salient for external observers, and vice versa. This is es-
pecially relevant for deliberate and reactive forms of learning, like learning from errors.
Ellstro¨m (2001) states that even if a work situation offers a high degree of seemingly objec-
tive learning potentials, an individual may not be able to take advantage of them because
he or she lacks the knowledge or self-confidence to do so. He concludes that beyond objec-
tive job characteristics the individual subjective interpretation of workplace features and
events must receive attention.
Similar arguments come from research on human error. In their framework on error re-
porting, Zhao and Olivera (2006) argue that individuals elect to report or not to report
errors on the basis of a calculation of potential costs (e.g., efforts, fear of losing face,
repercussions, or disciplinary proceedings) and benefits (e.g., learning, preventing further
consequences, maintaining one’s self-concept as a good employee). The authors empha-
sise that contextual conditions affect individual cognitions and perceptions regarding this
evaluation, rather than being direct determinants of actual error reporting.
In summary, analyses of how individuals do or do not use errors at work as learning
opportunities have to consider the individuals’ idiosyncratic interpretation of an error
situation as well as the individual interpretation of contextual conditions that provide
affordances or constraints for learning. This concerns also the selection of variables under
investigation in this study. While this conclusion is drawn here on the basis of conceptions
of learning at work, it also receives initial support from the few existing empirical studies
on learning from errors at work. An overview of these studies will be provided in the next
paragraph.
2.3.2. Identifying relevant conditions for learning from errors at work
The current state of the literature on conditions that foster or constrain learning from
errors at work can be summarised as follows. Errors have to be taken as a reason to
start an inquiry about underlying causes, which requires an actor to develop a learning
orientation, even if his or her natural inclination may be otherwise (Argyris & Scho¨n,
1996; Edmondson, 2004; Sitkin, 1992; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). Negative emotions,
stress, and increased time pressure have to be regulated (Keith & Frese, 2005; Rybowiak
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et al., 1999; Zapf, 1991). A positive cost-benefit-balance must be perceived in return for
taking the effort to engage in learning activities and to overcome possible tendencies to
ignore or conceal the error (Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Furthermore,
the engagement in learning activities will typically involve conceding the error to others
(if it has not been discovered by others anyway). This involves taking interpersonal risks
like losing face and appearing incompetent as well as more tangible risks like disciplinary
proceedings or prosecution. Therefore the individual perception of the social environment
as safe for taking interpersonal risks as well as the expectation whether errors are dealt
with under a blame- versus a problem-solving or learning orientation will have a strong
weight in the balance (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Tjosvold et
al., 2004).
Unfortunately, only few of these propositions are based on systematic empirical evidence.
In a literature review (Bauer & Mulder, in press), only five studies could be found that focus
directly on individual or team learning from errors at work (i.e., Arndt, 1996; Edmondson,
1996; Meurier et al., 1997; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). Three more
studies were identified that treat learning from errors as part of a more complex dependent
variable, i.e., ‘team learning behaviour’ (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1999)
or ‘critically reflective work behaviour’ (Van Woerkom, 2003). One last study focusses on
the development of a questionnaire on individual ’error orientation’, a multidimensional
construct involving beliefs and attitudes towards errors as well as ways of dealing with them
(Rybowiak et al., 1999). Whereas error orientation might be a promising independent
variable for learning from errors, the study does not investigate this relation.
Table 2 contains a summary of the variables that have been found to be related to learning
from errors in the mentioned studies4. In the left column, each study is referred to by a
numerical code, which is linked to a listing of the studies below the table. The right hand
column presents the variables identified from the studies. However, obtaining evidence
about predictors for learning from errors from these studies is difficult, because there is
a large variability concerning the empirical approach, the level of learning (individual—
group), and the operationalisation of learning from errors (Bauer & Mulder, in press).
Some of them operationalise learning in terms of learning activities, as suggested above
(Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1999; Meurier et al., 1997; Tucker & Edmond-
son, 2003). However, none of the studies provided a systematic theoretical rationale for
its specific selection of learning activities. Other studies focussed on beliefs, attitudes, or
emotions about errors – e.g., that errors provide useful sources of learning or that people
in one’s organisation learn a lot from their errors (Rybowiak et al., 1999; Tjosvold et
al., 2004; Van Woerkom, 2003) – or on seemingly objective indicators for learning from
errors, i.e., detected error rates and the difference between reported and occurring errors
(Edmondson, 1996). Regardless of whether these operationalisations are valid for mea-
suring learning, the variability in them inhibits the accumulation of evidence, because
even if similar predictors are used in different studies they hardly predict the same thing.
Therefore, it is difficult to compare the studies and to integrate their findings.
4Only studies dealing directly with learning from errors or with learning from errors as part of a more
complex dependent variable are included.
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Table 2: Overview of variables related to learning from errors at work
from a review of empirical studies
Study Variables
(1) Unsympathetic and unjust reactions; helping and protective supervisor
(2) Supervisor direction setting, coaching, supportive vs. authoritarian; unit characteristics: qual-
ity of interpersonal relationships, espoused attitudes to errors (blame vs. learning); perceived
consequences of making errors
(3) Accepting responsibility vs. distancing and self-controlling strategies
(4) Problem solving orientation (i.e., communicating, discussing, and analysing errors) and coop-
erative goals in the team
(5) Support from the management, team psychological safety
(6) Learning oriented beliefs about errors in the team
(7) Team psychological safety
(8) Self-efficacy, difficulty with change, management job
Note. (1) Arndt (1996); (2) Edmondson (1996); (3) Meurier et al. (1997); (4) Tjosvold et al. (2004);
(5) Tucker and Edmondson (2003); (6) Cannon and Edmondson (2001); (7) Edmondson (1999); (8) Van
Woerkom (2003).
In summary, Table 2 must be interpreted as a collection of potentially relevant variables,
not as accumulated evidence. Therefore, Sitkin’s (1992, p. 260 f.) lament that “Although
there has been a substantial amount of attention to the benefits of failure, that work
has been non-cumulative, largely anecdotal or normative, and has not been subject to
systematic empirical testing” still has to be regarded as valid. Nevertheless, the selection
of variables made in the studies underpins the proposition advanced above, that relevant
determinants for learning from errors may be searched for in the interpretation of errors and
in the perception of a safe context for learning from errors. Therefore, this study aims to
investigate the relation of these variables with the engagement in learning activities after an
error at work, in order to contribute to the accumulation of evidence about what individual
and contextual variables foster or constrain employees’ learning from errors. For deriving
hypotheses, the following three paragraphs elaborate how (a) the individual interpretation
of errors and (b) the perception of a safe context may relate to the engagement in learning
activities after an error (Research Questions 2 and 3), and (c) how the interpretation of
errors and the perception of a safe context may be interrelated (Research Question 4).
2.3.3. Individual interpretation of errors and the error situation
Engaging in workplace learning activities belongs to the individual’s agency and therefore
is based on his or her personal history, knowledge, values, and beliefs (Billett, 2001b). The
accumulated experiences an individual has gathered with errors in general and at a specific
workplace in particular, may lead to a generalised appraisal of errors and what kind of
coping strategies are preferred. This appraisal will have an impact on how the individ-
ual interprets a newly encountered error situation and whether and how action is taken.
Rybowiak et al. (1999) proposed individual ‘error orientation’ as a multi-dimensional con-
struct that reflects this relationship. Error orientation subsumes individual attitudes and
emotions concerning errors as well as related strategies to deal with them. Although the
concept of error orientation as suggested by Rybowiak et al. (1999) suffers from several
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problems, as will be discussed below, its sub-dimensions contain potentially relevant vari-
ables that may have an impact on learning from errors. In this study particularly (a) the
estimation of an error situation as a chance for learning, (b) the degree to which negative
emotions are evoked by an error, and (c) the tendency to cover up an error are investigated
as predictors for learning from errors. Below, a critical discussion of the error orientation
construct as well as a rationale for this selection of error orientation variables are provided.
Problems of the construct ’error orientation’. Problems of the construct error
orientation that are relevant here can be classified as conceptual and empirical problems.
These problems are discussed here, before elaborating the application of the concept in
the context of this thesis.
The first conceptual flaw is that Rybowiak et al. (1999) provide no overarching theoret-
ical framework from which the eight proposed dimensions of error orientation (i.e, error
competence, learning from errors5, error risk taking, error strain, error anticipation, cov-
ering up errors, error communication, thinking about errors) are derived or that could
provide a rationale that these dimensions form a conceptually complete model. Although
the dimensions (and the scales built on their basis) have some face validity regarding the
goal of measuring individual orientations towards errors, no systematic efforts have been
made to establish content validity. Therefore, the composition of the error orientation
dimensions seems somewhat arbitrary. A related issue is whether the complex structure
of the construct in eight dimensions is necessary or whether it could possibly be reduced
(Bauer, Festner, Harteis, Heid, & Gruber, 2004). Rybowiak et al. (1999) present support-
ive data from confirmatory factor analyses. However, they themselves assume that the
structure could possibly be reduced to a few higher order constructs. A problem of the
complex structure is that for a given dependent variable probably not all error orientation
dimensions will be equally relevant. Therefore a selection from these dimensions has to be
made for the purpose of a given study (e.g., Keith & Frese, 2005). This problem might
cast doubt on the usefulness of the composite construct ‘error orientation’.
A related problem is that the error orientation construct consists of a mix of attitudes,
beliefs, emotions, and behavioural components. On the one hand, a combination of cog-
nition, emotion and behaviour is appealing because it presents a holistic picture of the
phenomenon. On the other hand, it evokes the impression that all error orientation di-
mensions are on the same level, whereas in fact hypotheses about dependencies between
the variables are possible. In particular, dependencies between variables expressing beliefs
or emotions concerning errors, and the behaviour in error situations (e.g., the engage-
ment in reflection or communication about errors) can be hypothesised (cf. Cannon &
Edmondson, 2001).
A last conceptual problem is that Rybowiak et al. (1999) omit to elaborate whether they
consider error orientation to be a stable trait or a situational construct. The items are
5’Learning from errors’ is a scale of the Error Orientation Questionnaire, that comprises beliefs that errors
are useful chances for learning. Therefore, it is referred to as the estimation of errors as chance for
learning, below.
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formulated in a general manner, thus evoking the impression of a trait perspective. How-
ever, the existence of a stable orientation towards errors, regardless of the type of error
and the context in which it occurs, has not yet been demonstrated empirically.
Turning to empirical issues, so far there is hardly any evidence about the validity of er-
ror orientation. Rybowiak et al. (1999) made efforts to establish construct validity by
placing the error orientation variables into a nomological net of relationships with vari-
ables such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, plan- and action-orientation, readiness for change,
control rejection, initiative, etc. Unfortunately, no criterion-related evidence about error
orientation exists, either from their study or from others. Despite the broad reception
of this contribution in the literature on errors, the construct has hardly been applied to
a learning context in empirical studies. Even those studies which place error orientation
in a learning context deliver no evidence for its relation with the engagement in learning
activities, because they focus on beliefs and attitudes about errors (Tjosvold et al., 2004)
or learning in a training environment (Keith & Frese, 2005). Other authors who have used
the error orientation construct have focussed mainly on the organisational level and have,
for instance, applied it to firm economic performance and firm goal achievement (Van
Dyck et al., 2005), or have constructed related instruments to assess error orientation in
the context of organisational (learning) culture (Putz, Schilling, Kluge, & Stangenberg, in
press; Stangenberg, 2005) or leadership and management (Korsten, 2003).
Despite these problems, error orientation variables seem to be relevant predictors for the
engagement in error-related learning, because they address a number of theoretically im-
portant aspects, as discussed below. However, for the purpose of this study these problems
require explicit decisions about (a) whether error orientation is treated as a personal trait
or as a situational construct, (b) which error orientation variables are focussed upon (rather
than using the instrument as it stands, or building a composite index for the whole con-
struct), and (c) what kind of relationships are assumed between the subsets. The following
paragraph will elaborate hypothesised relations of selected error orientation variables that
are investigated in this study.
Hypothesised relations between error orientation variables and the engage-
ment in learning from errors. For the purpose of answering the question how the
individual interpretation of an error relates to the engagement in learning activities after
an error (Research Question 2), three error orientation variables are investigated that cover
cognitive, emotional, and motivational aspects of the interpretation of an error situation:
(a) the estimation of an error situation as a chance for learning, (b) the degree to which
negative emotions are evoked by an error, and (c) the tendency to cover up an error. These
variables are conceived as situationally dependent here, that is, they relate to the specific
error situation at hand and are not stable traits. In the following paragraphs, the variables
and their hypothesised relationship to the engagement in learning activities are described.
Firstly, the estimation of an error situation as a chance for learning is selected, because
it has been argued that errors need to be interpreted as relevant learning opportunities
in order to make the effort of engaging in learning activities (Argyris & Scho¨n, 1996;
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Edmondson, 2004; Sitkin, 1992; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). This
position receives support from experiential learning theory, according to which only those
episodes become learning experiences which are perceived as relevant for the engagement
in learning activities (Gruber, 1999a). Furthermore, it has been argued that learning from
errors requires employees to adopt a learning orientation when their natural inclination
may be otherwise (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001). A learning orientation cannot be taken
for granted because in work performance typically an achievement orientation – in contrast
to a learning orientation – will be dominant, under which an error is likely to be perceived
as a threat (Kleinbeck, 2006; F. E. Weinert, 1999). Therefore, a deliberate shift to a
learning orientation is required, under which an error is interpreted as a provider of learning
relevant information. Rybowiak et al. (1999) found the estimation of errors as chances
for learning positively related to plan orientation, and action orientation after an error, as
well as with initiative. Therefore, it is hypothesised here that the estimation of errors as
chances for learning is a positive predictor for the engagement in learning activities.
Hypothesis 1. The estimation of an error as chance for learning predicts the engagement
in learning activities positively.
Secondly, error strain (i.e., negative emotions resulting from having committed an error)
is investigated as a predictor for the engagement in learning activities. The notion that
errors are stressful and related to negative emotions, such as fear, anger, guilt, or shame
is ubiquitous in the literature on errors (e.g., Arndt, 1996; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001;
Edmondson, 1996; Keith & Frese, 2005; Mehl, 1993; Meurier et al., 1997; Oser & Spychiger,
2005; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zapf, 1991; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). However, the impact of
negative emotions on learning from errors is conceptually ambiguous and has not yet been
investigated systematically. Scholars have claimed both fostering and inhibiting effects of
negative emotions on learning from errors.
Two points for a fostering effect of negative emotions can be made. Firstly, negative
emotions can lead to conditioning insofar as the error situation is associated with this
emotional experience (Thorndike, 1913). Therefore, the negative emotions will be remem-
bered when encountering a similar situation and thus have an alerting function. However,
learning in the sense of being able reliably to avoid the same error in future requires the
identification of its cause(s). Therefore the learning process cannot be explained only by
conditioning. Secondly, Oser and Spychiger (2005) (focussing on the moral dimension of
errors and on school children) argued that negative emotions may create a feeling of rele-
vance that causes the actor to engage in reflection. This is consistent with the assumption
of experiential learning theories that the personal relevance of an episode is important
to interpret the situation as an opportunity for learning (Gruber, 1999a). Nevertheless,
Oser and Spychiger (2005) assume no straightforward positive effect of negative emotions.
They distinguish between positive and negative ‘embarrassers’ (Bescha¨mer) that are ei-
ther conductive or obstructive to learning. A positive embarrassment is assumed to be
driven internally by the actor’s self-indignation, while a negative one is induced externally
by unsympathetic, mortifying, or cynical reactions from others.
In contrast, several other scholars have made a case for inhibiting effects of negative emo-
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tions on learning from errors for several reasons (e.g., Edmondson, 1999; Greif, 1996;
Keith & Frese, 2005; Rybowiak et al., 1999). Firstly, negative emotions can lead to res-
ignation and brooding and thus inhibit taking an action-orientation after an error. For
example, Rybowiak et al. (1999) report medium negative correlations of error strain to
action orientation and initiative after an error. Secondly, negative emotions can interfere
with cognitive processes such as planning and reflection. The occurrence of errors results
in emotional pressure which induces stress and rigid thinking (Zapf, 1991). If the negative
emotions cannot be regulated effectively, they distract attentional resources away from
the task (and handling the error) towards the self (Keith & Frese, 2005). This can influ-
ence judgement and decision making, especially in the ‘hot’ phase directly after an error
(Greif, 1996; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Follow-up errors may occur due to rash and poorly
planned action. Thirdly, negative emotions may prevent individuals from the engagement
in learning activities. Boud (1999) considers feelings of inadequacy and embarrassment as
the greatest barriers to taking action in a potential learning situation. Zhao and Olivera
(2006) cite evidence that individuals who feel negative emotions are more likely to at-
tend to the perceived costs and threats of making an error public (cf. Edmondson, 1999).
They assume that especially fear, shame, and embarrassment have negative effects on er-
ror reporting, whereas guilt may also support it because it can act to motivate reparative
actions.
Drawn together, scholars agree upon that errors go along with negative emotions. How-
ever, there is disagreement about their effects on learning. Nevertheless, in the discussion
so far there is a stronger basis for the assumption of negative effects on cognition and
learning activities. Hypotheses about differential effects of specific emotions are still at an
early stage. In particular, individual cognitive activities like reflection and planning may
be hampered through these emotions. Furthermore, individuals who are feeling strong
negative emotions may fear the risk of making an error public through the engagement
in social learning activities. Therefore, it is hypothesised here that the experience of the
negative emotions fear, worry, anger, and embarrassment (as conceptualised in the EOQ
scale ‘error strain’) inhibits the engagement in learning activities.
Hypothesis 2. Error strain predicts the engagement in learning activities negatively.
Finally, the motivational tendency to cover up errors, because one expects disadvantages
from communicating it, is investigated as a predictor for engagement in learning activi-
ties. This variable is relevant here, because social learning strategies in particular involve
making an error public (cf. Edmondson, 1999). Since error orientation variables are con-
ceptualised as situationally dependent here, the term ‘tendency’ does refer to a perceived
negative cost-benefit-balance regarding a specific error episode (Zhao & Olivera, 2006),
not to a general stable disposition. Whereas the estimation of an error as a chance for
learning focusses on potential benefits that can be gained from an error, the tendency
to cover up an error focusses on potential costs. Such a tendency may result from the
interpretation of an error as a threat, as well as from the anticipation that the social
and organisational context will react with accusations and negative sanctions (Barach &
Small, 2000; Edmondson, 1999). Rybowiak et al. (1999) found covering up errors to be
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negatively related to action orientation and initiative. Meurier et al. (1997) indicate that
nurses who tend not to report errors are less likely to seek social support and plan a course
of action. Therefore, it is hypothesised here that the tendency to cover up errors inhibits
the engagement in learning activities after an error.
Hypothesis 3. The tendency to cover up errors predicts the engagement in learning
activities negatively.
These three variables cover cognitive, emotional, and motivational facets of the interpre-
tation of an error situation. The derived hypotheses are investigated in the empirical part
of this study in order to answer the question how the interpretation of an error situation
may shape the engagement in learning activities (Research Question 2). This reflects the
first assumption made in the literature on learning from errors that has been identified
above. In the following paragraphs the second assumption, namely that the perception of
a safe context relates to the engagement in learning activities after an error, is elaborated
and hypotheses are derived.
2.3.4. Perception of a safe social context
The second proposition identified from the literature on learning from errors is that tak-
ing a learning orientation towards errors and engaging in learning activities requires the
perception of a supportive social context (Arndt, 1996; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001;
Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). Previous
research indicates that learning at work is a social process that is shaped by the quality
of social interactions at the workplace (Billett, 2004a; Boud & Middleton, 2003; Eraut,
Alderton, Cole, & Senker, 2002; Palonen, Hakkarainen, Talvitie, & Lehtinen, 2004; Rehrl,
Gruber, & Palonen, 2006). In particular, a social climate of mutual trust is supposed
to support individual learning and learning in social exchange (Bauer, Rehrl, & Harteis,
2007; Edmondson, 1999; Thompson & Kahnweiler, 2002). Applied works on errors and
safety management have claimed that learning from errors requires the establishment of
a learning oriented “error culture” in organisations (e.g., Glazinski & Wiedensohler, 2004;
Glendon et al., 2006; Holzer et al., 2005). Because contextual characteristics work pri-
marily through their effects on individual cognition (Billett, 2006; Zhao & Olivera, 2006),
a supportive context concerns the individual perception of whether it is possible and safe
to admit an error to colleagues or to a supervisor and to analyse potential causes and
prevention strategies. Therefore, this study investigates whether the perception of a safe
team climate predicts the engagement in error-related learning activities (Research Ques-
tion 3). Below, the conception of a safe team climate and its hypothesised relation with
the engagement in learning are elaborated.
A safe team climate. Edmondson (1999) investigated how a safe and trustful team
climate (’psychological safety’) supports sharing knowledge and engaging in learning be-
haviour (including learning from errors) in organisations. The term ’safety’ refers to the
belief that a team is safe for interpersonal risk taking (cf. N. R. Anderson & West, 1994).
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Hence, a safe team climate is characterised by interpersonal trust, mutual respect and
support, the possibility to come up with critical problems, and to openly address errors
(Edmondson, 1999). Trust can be defined as a psychological state concerning “. . . one’s
expectations, assumptions, or beliefs about the likelihood that another’s future actions
will be beneficial, favorable, or at least not detrimental to one’s interests.” (Robinson,
1996, p. 576). Hence, trust implies the willingness of a party to take the risk to be
vulnerable to the actions of another party, based on positive expectations of the other
party’s collaboration (Kramer, 2006; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Palonen, 2003).
However, a safe team climate goes beyond trust in that a safe climate includes concrete
instants of trust, such as the perception of a fair handling of errors that is oriented towards
problem-solving and learning instead of focussing on blame assignment and prosecution
(Edmondson, 1999). Other authors conceptualised this as a problem solving or learning
orientation towards errors versus a blame or error-aversion orientation (Kriegesmann et
al., 2005; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Van Dyck et al., 2005).
Hence, a safe team climate is conceptualised here as an individual perception of the so-
cial context of a team – including both peers and supervisors – that comprises two related
facets: the perceived trustworthiness of team members and the perception of a non-punitive
orientation towards errors within the team. Whereas Edmondson (1999) conceptualises
psychological safety on the team level, the focus here is on the individual’s interpretation
of the social context because this study aims to identify conditions that motivate indi-
viduals to engage in learning activities. Hence, interindividual differences are in focus,
not intergroup differences. This focus is conceptually legitimate because trust as well as
climate variables are meaningful on both the individual and the collective level (Kramer,
1999; A. B. Weinert, 2004). Below the hypothesised relation of a safe team climate with
the engagement in learning activities after an error is discussed.
Hypothesised relations between the perception of a safe team climate and the
engagement in learning from errors. One of the primary effects of a trustful cli-
mate in organisations is the provision of an ‘expectational backdrop’ that fosters manifold
forms of sociability and cooperative activities among organisational members (Kramer,
1999, 2006). For example, trust has been found to be a determinant of sharing knowledge
in organisations (Palonen, 2003). Edmondson (1999) assumes that initiating learning be-
haviour within a team – such as seeking feedback, asking for help, or talking about errors
– may be constrained by the fear of appearing incompetent or losing face. Also other
authors have argued that people in organisations will tend to defensive behaviour if they
perceive the danger of losing face or getting embarrassed, and thus relevant learning op-
portunities are missed (Argyris, 1982; Argyris & Scho¨n, 1996; Van Dyck et al., 2005). The
perception of psychological safety should alleviate such concerns about potential embar-
rassment. Indeed, Edmondson (1999) found psychological safety to be positively related
to team learning and the readiness to ask for help.
If a safe team climate has an effect on learning and knowledge exchange in teams in
general, then this should be particularly valid for communicating about errors. As men-
tioned above, learning from errors is part of Edmondson’s (1999) operationalisation of
2.3. Individual and contextual conditions for learning from errors 44
team learning behaviour. Furthermore, this line of argument is consistent with Zhao and
Olivera’s (2006) cost-benefit-calculation framework of error-reporting: whereas fear con-
cerning reprisal, loss of personal image, blame, or embarrassment are costs that may hinder
an actor from communicating an error to others, the perception of a safe team climate
may be a resource that mitigates these fears and reduces the anticipated costs. Especially
the engagement in social learning activities should depend on the overall level of trust in
the team and on the generalised perception of non-punitive reactions of the team members
towards admitting errors.
There is some evidence for these assumed relations. In studies on error reporting and
the use of reporting systems in medical professions it was found that scepticism, lack of
trust, fear of reprisals, and a potential loss of professional image were disincentives to error
reporting (Barach & Small, 2000; Uribe et al., 2002). Edmondson (1996) found positive
correlations between unit characteristics (i.e., supervisors leading qualities and quality of
unit relationships) and detected medication error rates. Studies in nursing found that when
others’ reactions to errors were perceived as insensitive, unsupportive, or unjust, nurses
would be more likely not to communicate errors (Arndt, 1996; Meurier et al., 1997). Con-
versely, nurses took a learning oriented orientation, if supervisors tended to treat incidents
openly in the team and protected the nurse in charge. In non-medical work domains,
Harteis et al. (2007) found that employees from different types of enterprises consistently
named a lack of trust and a prevailing intolerance for errors to inhibit learning from errors.
A problem of these studies is that they either focus primarily on error reporting – which
itself is a helpful but not sufficient condition for learning – or do not relate the perception
of the context systematically to learning activities derived from a theoretical framework.
Although there is some evidence that psychological safety predicts error reporting, there
is hardly any about the degree to which it affects other learning activities.
Drawn together, for the purpose of this study the perception of a perceived safe climate
in the work team is assumed to be a facilitating condition for the engagement in learning
activities.
Hypothesis 4. The perception of a safe team climate predicts the engagement in learning
activities positively.
Interrelation between the interpretation of errors and the perception of a safe
team climate. The hypotheses stated above addressed the main focus of this study,
namely to answer the questions how the individual interpretation of errors and the per-
ception of the social context at work predict learning from errors (Research Questions 2
and 3). However, individual and contextual variables that provide a framework for learn-
ing at work are typically assumed to be intertwined (Billett, 2001c; Eraut et al., 1998).
Therefore the question how the three error orientation variables and the perception of a
safe team climate are interrelated must be addressed (Research Question 4).
Concerning the interrelation of the error orientation variables, initial evidence exists for
their interrelation from Rybowiak et al. (1999). However, it has to be checked, whether
these findings replicate under the situational interpretation of the error orientation vari-
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ables proposed above and in the domain of nursing. Rybowiak et al. (1999) found a medium
positive correlation between covering up errors and error strain, and a small negative cor-
relation between covering up errors and the estimation of errors as a chance for learning.
Furthermore, small to medium negative correlations between the estimation of errors as
chance for learning and error strain have been found (Keith & Frese, 2005; Rybowiak et
al., 1999). These results are consistent with the argument above that the tendency to
cover up an error may be associated to feelings of being inadequate or fear of reprisals and
prevent a subject from taking a learning orientation towards an error. Similar relations
are expected for this study.
Hypothesis 5. The estimation of errors as chance for learning is negatively correlated
with the tendency to cover up errors.
Hypothesis 6. The estimation of errors as chance for learning is negatively correlated
with error strain.
Hypothesis 7. The tendency to cover up errors is positively correlated with error strain.
Whereas the error orientation variables have been conceptualised as situationally depen-
dent here, the perception of the social context is the result of a cumulated experience, that
is, it is built through individual codings of a common interaction history (Kramer, 2006).
Hence, it is assumed that the perception of the social context is related to the situational
interpretation of errors within this context as well as resulting emotions and the tendency
to cover up errors. This implies that there may be also an indirect effect of the percep-
tion of a safe team climate on the engagement in learning activities, mediated by error
orientation variables. The following relations are expected between the error orientation
variables and the psychological safety variables.
If an individual generally perceives a safe climate for communicating about errors and a
non-punitive, learning oriented way of handling them, there may be an increased likelihood
that an error episode is interpreted as a chance for learning. Cannon and Edmondson
(2001) found team members to share beliefs and attitudes towards errors, that is, there
seems to be a socialisation effect between team and individual reactions and attitudes
towards errors. Therefore, a positive relation between the perception of a safe team climate
and the estimation of an error as a chance for learning is hypothesised, here. Furthermore
a safe team climate should mitigate potential fears of having committed an error and
anticipated risks of admitting the error to others (cf. Edmondson, 1999). Therefore a safe
team climate should reduce negative emotions related with errors as well as the individual
tendency to cover up an error.
Hypothesis 8. The perception of a safe team climate is positively correlated with the
individual estimation of errors as a chance for learning.
Hypothesis 9. The perception of a safe team climate is team negatively correlated with
the individual tendency to cover up errors.
Hypothesis 10. The perception of a safe team climate is negatively correlated with error
strain.
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2.4. Summary of the theoretical framework
In this chapter a theoretical framework of individual learning from errors at work has
been developed that is based on established learning theories and that can guide further
empirical analyses. The framework addressed the questions (a) how ’error’ can be concep-
tualised, (b) how errors that emerge in daily work processes can contribute to individual
learning, and (c) what individual and contextual variables may foster or constrain learning
from errors at work. These three components of the conceptual framework build the basis
for answering the stated research questions. The conceptualisations of ’error’ and ’learn-
ing from errors at work’ are required for operationalising learning from errors (Research
Question 1). The discussion of individual and contextual variables that are hypothesised
to affect learning from errors guides the investigations to answer Research Questions 2—4.
This section provides a summary of the conceptual positions taken so far and gives an
outlook on tasks for the empirical part.
Errors have been defined as individual actions that fail to reach a goal and endanger
the attainment of higher order goals (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Rasmussen, 1987b; Reason,
1990; Senders & Moray, 1991). The evaluation of actions as errors implies judgements of
knowledgeable members of a community on the basis of socially negotiated norms (Meurier
et al., 1997; Senders & Moray, 1991; Wehner & Mehl, 2003). It has been argued that
especially knowledge- and rule-based errors bear a potential for individual experiential
learning (Bauer & Mulder, 2007; Glendon et al., 2006; Keith & Frese, 2005). Therefore,
this study will focus on the engagement in learning activities that are grounded in concrete
situations of this type of error. This proposition involves the task to develop research
instruments that achieve such a grounding in authentic error cases for the domain of
nursing.
While learning from errors has been explained by drawing on cognitive theories of dynamic
memory and case based reasoning (Kolodner, 1983, 1997; Schank, 1999; Schank & Abel-
son, 1977), the case has been made that learning from errors can be operationalised and
measured in terms of the process of engagement in learning activities. The rationale behind
this proposition is that in contrast to cognitive structures, concrete activities can either
be observed directly or are easier for participants to explicate (Eraut et al., 1998; Simons
& Ruijters, 2004). A framework of learning activities has been derived from conceptions
of experiential learning cycles and learning at work (Billett, 2004a; Eraut et al., 1998;
Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984). Whereas this framework provides a systematic heuristic for
operationalising learning from errors, yet a concrete operationalisation must be developed
that is contextualised to the requirements of the specific domain of nursing. This implies
identifying which learning activities from the framework are particularly relevant for this
domain. Hence, a further selection of learning activities has to be made that will be fo-
cussed upon in the empirical investigations, because different kinds of learning activities
may be of different relevance for nursing and for specific error situations. A further reason
for making a selection of learning activities is that a given set of predictors may not be
equally relevant for all kinds of learning activities . Hence, a task of exploratory research
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as precursor to further studies will be to contextualise the framework of learning activities
and to select those learning activities that will be focussed upon in further studies.
Concerning the conditions that may foster or constrain learning from errors at work,
the position has been advanced that learning from errors results from an interaction of
individual and contextual variables (cf. Billett, 2001c, 2004b). An error situation as well
as contextual factors that may shape responses to errors are primarily relevant in terms of
their individual perception, because these perceptions affect the motivation for engaging in
learning activities through a cost-benefit-evaluation (Billett, 2004b, 2006; Ellstro¨m, 2001;
Jørgensen & Warring, 2002; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). In existing studies, the interpretation
of an error situation as a chance for learning and the perception of a safe and learning
oriented climate in the social context have been especially emphasised as relevant for
learning from errors (Arndt, 1996; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1996, 1999;
Meurier et al., 1997; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Van Woerkom,
2003). However, there is a need for more evidence about these assumptions (Bauer &
Mulder, in press). For this purpose, a theoretical framework about the potential interplay
of (a) the cognitive, emotional, and motivational interpretation of an error situation (i.e.,
error as a chance for learning, negative emotions resulting from an error, tendency to cover
up an error; Rybowiak et al., 1999), (b) the perception of a safe team climate (Edmondson,
1999), and (c) learning from errors has been derived. From this theoretical framework, the
research model shown in Figure 1 can be build. This model comprises the three variables
concerning the interpretation of an error and the perception of a safe team climate as
predictors for the engagement in learning activities (Hypotheses 1—4). These predictors
are assumed to be interrelated with each other (Hypotheses 5—10). In the empirical
studies, this model will be tested and advanced in order to answer Research Questions
2—4. The following chapter will provide an overview of the empirical procedure.





Estimation of an error 
as chance for learning
Error strain
Figure 1: Research model
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3. Overview of the empirical studies
In the empirical part of this thesis, the developed framework of learning from errors is
applied in order to answer the research questions that were stated in the introduction.
For this purpose, a research model has been derived in the previous chapter, that implies
hypotheses about the relations among the individual interpretation of an error, the per-
ception of a safe team climate, and the engagement in learning activities after an error.
This chapter will summarise the developed hypotheses and provide an overview of how
the research questions are answered in the empirical studies. This overview will pick up
the discussion of the studies from the introduction and elaborate on them in more detail.
3.1. Summary of the hypotheses
Below, the hypotheses about the relations among the individual interpretation of an er-
ror, the perception of a safe team climate, and the engagement in learning activities
after an error are summarised in relation to the stated Research Questions 2—4. (For
Research Question 1 there are no hypotheses, because it concerns the conceptualisation
and measurement of learning from errors as precondition for answering the other research
questions.)
Research Question 2: To what degree does the individual interpretation of an
error situation foster or constrain the engagement in learning from errors at
work?
Hypothesis 1. The estimation of an error as a chance for learning predicts
the engagement in learning activities positively.
Hypothesis 2. Error strain predicts the engagement in learning activities
negatively.
Hypothesis 3. The tendency to cover up errors predicts the engagement in
learning activities negatively.
Research Question 3: To what degree does the perception of the social context
at work foster or constrain the engagement in learning from errors at work?
Hypothesis 4. The perception of a safe team climate predicts the engagement
in learning activities positively.
Research Question 4: How are the variables regarding the individual interpre-
tation of an error and the perception of the social context at work interrelated?
Hypothesis 5. The estimation of errors as a chance for learning is negatively
correlated with the tendency to cover up errors.
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Hypothesis 6. The estimation of errors as a chance for learning is negatively
correlated with error strain.
Hypothesis 7. The tendency to cover up errors is positively correlated with
error strain.
Hypothesis 8. The perception of a safe team climate is positively correlated
with the individual estimation of errors as a chance for learning.
Hypothesis 9. The perception of a safe team climate is team negatively cor-
related with the individual tendency to cover up errors.
Hypothesis 10. The perception of a safe team climate is negatively correlated
with error strain.
3.2. Procedure and overview of the studies
This section provides an overview of the empirical process that addresses the research
questions. Firstly, it will be argued that hospital nursing is an adequate domain for
conducting research on learning from errors. Secondly, an overview of the empirical studies
and their contribution to answering the research questions will be given.
Domain of work under study. All studies are conducted in the domain of hospital
nursing. This domain is selected for two reasons. Firstly, learning from errors is particu-
larly relevant in nursing. Quality management and patient safety are key issues in health
care, because services in health care are supposed to be delivered by upholding the highest
degree of quality and professional state of the art (Bogner, 1994; Kela & Kela, 2006; Kohn
et al., 1999; Meurier et al., 1997; Meurier, 2000; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). Errors
are a delicate issue in this context because they may lead to serious adverse effects on a
patient’s health (Bogner, 1994; Kohn et al., 1999). On the other hand, nurses are faced
with a dynamic field of work, thus having to adapt continuously to frequent changes in
relevant knowledge, procedures, and methods that are driven by developments in medical
science, technology, and policy (Bu¨ssing & Glaser, 2003; Eraut et al., 1998). Under such
conditions, there is an increased likelihood of errors occurring (Rybowiak et al., 1999;
Wehner & Mehl, 2003; Zapf et al., 1999), making error management and learning from
errors particularly relevant. Hence, there is a strong tradition of research and applied
works on human factors, safety, and risk management in health care (Bogner, 1994; Kohn
et al., 1999). Recently, the politically driven demand has been advanced to create a learn-
ing oriented ‘error culture’ in hospitals that allows for open discussions and analyses of
occurring errors (Glazinski & Wiedensohler, 2004; Holzer et al., 2005; Kela & Kela, 2006).
These conditions make nursing to a relevant domain for conducting research on learning
from errors and should ensure the field’s interest in the findings.
A second reason for focussing on nursing is that the highly standardised nature of work
processes in nursing facilitates the identification of errors and provides transparent criteria
for judging actions as errors. In research on learning from errors it is helpful to select a
domain in which the criteria for error judgements are as transparent, codified, and ac-
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cepted inter-subjectively as possible. As mentioned before, nurses’ work is shaped largely
by guidelines and standardised procedures that are supposed to reflect national ’expert-
standards’ based on the state of the art in medical care (Bu¨ssing & Glaser, 2002; Deutsches
Netzwerk fu¨r Qualita¨tsentwicklung in der Pflege, 2007). These standards provide transpar-
ent criteria for errors with the underlying norm that a patient’s health or healing process
must not be affected in a negative way by medical mismanagement (Bogner, 1994; Kohn
et al., 1999).
For these reasons nursing is a domain that provides adequate conditions for answering
the stated research questions. Learning from errors is relevant in this domain and its
characteristics facilitate research on learning from errors.
Overview of the studies. The research questions stated in the introduction are ad-
dressed in a series of three studies. The first two studies aim to develop an operationali-
sation and a research instrument for measuring learning from errors in nursing (Research
Question 1). These studies build the basis for testing and advancing the hypothesised
model for learning from errors in a third study (Research Questions 2—4). A short
overview of these studies and their contribution to answer the research questions is pro-
vided here, before presenting each study in detail in the following sections.
Research Question 1 concerns the development of a measurement instrument for learning
from errors that is based on the conceptual framework of learning from errors developed
above. In this framework, two propositions have been advanced: first, to conceptualise
and operationalise learning from errors as engagement in experiential learning activities
after a given episode of a knowledge- and rule-based error. This learning activity approach
provides a fruitful perspective because it focusses on concrete behaviour in everyday work
(Simons & Ruijters, 2004) and is consistent with theories of experiential and workplace
learning (Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999). Secondly, the mea-
surement of error-related learning activities should be grounded in concrete error episodes
that represent a specific type of error. Asking questions about whether subjects engage
in learning activities after errors in general is inappropriate, because this requires the
subjects to generalise over a number of situations that may not be comparable (cf. Erics-
son, 2006b). As indicated above, errors differ in the underlying level of action regulation
(Reason, 1995) and in the learning potential they imply (Glendon et al., 2006; Keith &
Frese, 2005). Furthermore, it remains uncertain what kind of situations and errors the
subjects refer to (Harteis et al., 2007) so that it is impossible to argue why these errors
are relevant for learning, what can be learned from them, and what kind of learning ac-
tivities are relevant. Both problems can be addressed by grounding questions on learning
activities in concrete error episodes.
Translating these propositions in a research instrument requires performing the following
tasks.
1. To decide on a data gathering technique.
2. To develop a way to ground questions on learning activities in concrete episodes of
knowledge- and rule-based errors.
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3. To adjust the framework of learning activities (Tab. 1) to the domain of nursing, to
select relevant learning activities for the further research process, and to develop a
instrument on this basis.
Concerning the data gathering technique, a decision between observations and self-reports
has to be made. Given that errors are rare and unpredictable events at work (Wehner &
Stadler, 1996; Wehner & Mehl, 2001), participating observations are impractical over a
number of workplaces and extended periods of time (cf. Billett, 2000). Instead, self-reports
can be used, if two already mentioned precautions are taken to enhance their validity.
Firstly, the term ’learning’ should be avoided in the questions because employees have
been found to react strongly to the notion of formalised, classroom based learning if they
are asked for ’learning’ at work (Simons & Ruijters, 2004). Secondly, it has been indicated
that employees are better able to explicate knowledge or learning activities when questions
refer to concrete events at work (Billett, 2000; Eraut et al., 1998; Ericsson, 2006b; Ericsson
& Simon, 1984; Simons, 2005). Hence, in order to enhance the validity of self-reports about
learning at work, questions on activities in concrete workplace episodes have to be asked.
This is accomplished here by grounding questions on learning activities in concrete error
cases that are judged as errors, either by the participants themselves or by knowledgeable
members of their domain. Because testing and advancing the research model requires a
large sample, as discussed below (Study 3), a questionnaire is an adequate and efficient
research instrument for measuring self-reports about the engagement in learning activities
(Bortz & Do¨ring, 2006).
Grounding questions on the engagement in learning activities in concrete error situations
can be accomplished by two approaches: first, by applying the Critical Incident Technique
(CIT; Flanagan, 1954; Fivars & Fitzpatrick, 2001). Essentially, the CIT aims to identify
what people do or have done in order to respond to a specific situation. The CIT can be
applied to measure learning from errors by asking subjects to describe a concrete error
situation and the subsequent engagement in learning activities (Meurier et al., 1997). The
second approach is to present vignettes of authentic error cases to the subjects and to
ask them to identify with these cases. Subsequently, the subjects are asked about their
anticipated engagement in learning activities in such a situation (Cases Approach). For
this approach, authentic cases for knowledge- and rule based errors have to be developed.
Authenticity concerns the case-domain relationship as well as the subjects’ interpretation
of the cases (Honebein, Duffy, & Fishman, 1993). Both approaches have their particular
strengths and weaknesses.
CIT. Advantages of the CIT are that the participants’ experience is directly involved and
that real cases are used so that the participants can be asked how they actually
reacted to the given incident. The problems are (a) that it is more demanding for
the subjects and requires more disclosure, (b) that the researcher depends on the
participants’ readiness and ability to provide relevant error examples, and (c) that
the incident may have happened a long time ago, making reconstruction difficult and
leaving an opportunity for self-serving biases.
Cases Approach. Advantages of the Cases Approach are that it requires less disclosure
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from the participants and thus should facilitate their readiness to participate. In
addition, the used cases are standardised, ensuring that the chosen type of error is
met. This increases the comparability of the answers. Problems are (a) that valid
cases have to be constructed, (b) that the subjects need to be able to identify with
the case, and (c) that it is unsure whether the answers about the engagement in
learning activities are valid for actual behaviour.
Hence, it is inadvisable to decide on one on the basis of theoretical arguments. Both
approaches will be explored in practical application and checked for their psychometric
quality in order to make an informed decision.
The contextualisation of the framework of learning activities to the domain of hospital
nursing requires to identify which learning activities are particularly relevant for this do-
main and to make a selection of those learning activities that will be further investigated.
As mentioned above, this selection is necessary because different kinds of learning activ-
ities may be of different relevance for nursing and for specific error situations. On this
basis, the selected learning activities can be operationalised and scales for a questionnaire
can be developed and tested.
The described tasks for the development of a measurement method for learning from errors
are addressed in two studies:
Study 1. In an exploratory study, experts in nursing (extensive work experience, supervi-
sory position) are interviewed about concrete knowledge- and rule-based errors that
occur in nurses’ everyday work and about learning activities that enable nurses to
learn from these errors. This study contributes to attaining the tasks of collect-
ing concrete examples of errors from which authentic cases can be constructed as
stimulus material (Cases Approach), to contextualise the framework of learning ac-
tivities to the domain of nursing, and to select concrete learning activities for an
operationalisation of learning from errors for the further studies.
Study 2. In a cross-sectional field study, two questionnaires for measuring learning from
errors at work are developed on the basis of the findings from Study 1, applied, and
compared. The questionnaires differ in the way in which they ground the questions
on error-related learning activities in concrete error episodes. The first instrument
applies the Cases Approach and presents vignettes of error cases that are developed
from the interviews. In the second instrument, the CIT is applied by asking the
participants to describe self-experienced error episodes. Study 2 provides an initial
test of the psychometric properties of the developed operationalisation (i.e., ques-
tionnaire scales on error-related learning activities) and informs the decision to apply
either the CIT or the Cases Approach for testing the research model in Study 3.
Research Questions 2—4 concern the relations among the individual interpretation of an
error, the perception of a safe team climate, and the engagement in learning activities
after an error. These questions are addressed in combination, because they are integrated
in the research model presented above (Fig. 1). For the purpose of answering them,
firstly, measures for the three variables concerning the interpretation of an error (i.e., the
estimation of an error as chance for learning, error strain, and the tendency to cover up
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an error) as well as the perception of a safe team climate have to be selected or developed.
This task is performed in Study 2. Secondly, the research questions are addressed in a
third study, by (a) testing the research model, and (b) advancing this model on the basis of
the data in order to create more differentiated hypotheses for further research. Both steps
are required to address the research questions adequately. In the first step the hypotheses
are tested that were stated above on the basis of current theory and evidence in research
on individual learning from errors at work. The second exploratory step is appropriate for
fields of research where only tentative models can be specified due to a lack of cumulative
prior research (Jo¨reskog, 1993). As has been argued above, this characterises the existing
research on individual learning from errors at work, which has largely been conducted in
a non-cumulative or normative fashion (Bauer & Mulder, in press; Ohlsson, 1996; Sitkin,
1992). As a consequence, the current state of theory has a rough grain size, that is, it allows
us to identify potentially relevant conditions for learning from errors, but provides little
information about how the interplay of the respective variables fosters or constrains such
learning. Therefore, to explore how the stated model may be advanced or differentiated
on the basis of the findings contributes to answering the research questions regarding the
nature of the relation between the investigated variables and provides an improved basis
for conducting further research. These steps are performed in Study 3 as follows.
Study 3. In a cross-sectional field study nurses from several hospitals are surveyed with the
research instrument developed from Studies 1 and 2. In order to test and advance
the model, the gathered data are analysed in a model generating structural equation
modelling process (Jo¨reskog, 1993) in which an initial model is specified on the basis
of substantive hypotheses, tested, and advanced both on the basis of the findings
and substantive considerations.
The decision for a field-study design results from the objective to investigate under what
conditions individual learning from errors occurs in a natural work context. For attain-
ing this goal, the field study design is prone to deliver ecologically valid findings about
learning behaviour in real organisations (cf. Edmondson, 1999). It is acknowledged that
the conclusiveness of the study is limited because no causal inferences can be made from
non-experimental, cross-sectional data. However, introducing a longitudinal component is
beyond the scope of this thesis, because of the required amount of exploratory research
(Studies 1 and 2) and the prerequisite to test the hypotheses in a large sample drawn
from multiple hospitals. In the present design, statements about the direction of causality
between predictors and criterion variable are made solely on the basis of the theoretical
considerations presented above and have to be interpreted as such. Still, the study provides
evidence about the association between the investigated variables as a elementary precon-
dition for causality (Bollen, 1989; Hoyle, 1995; Urban & Mayerl, 2006) and contributes to
answering the research questions about the relations between these variables. The find-
ings of this study can guide the selection of variables for more in-depth investigations in
experimental studies.
The three described studies build upon each other: An initial, theoretically founded con-
ceptualisation of learning from errors is contextualised to the domain of nursing and op-
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erationalised (Study 1). Research instruments are developed, tested, and improved on
this basis (Study 2). The developed instrument is applied in order to test and advance
hypotheses about learning from errors that are derived from theory and existing findings
(Study 3). Together, the studies enhance our understanding of how learning from errors
at work can be conceptualised and investigated (Research Question 1), and of how the in-
dividual interpretation of an error situation as well as the perception of the social context
at work are related to the engagement in learning after an error (Research Question 2—4).
In combination, the studies begin a process of answering the broader question of what in-
dividual and contextual variables foster or constrain nurses’ engagement in learning after
the experience of an error at work, and help to ask more precise questions about learning
from errors in further research.
4. Study 1: Collecting error cases and contextualising the
framework of learning activities
The study presented in this chapter6 contributes to the development of an operationali-
sation and a measurement instrument for learning from errors in nursing (Research Ques-
tion 1) by addressing two goals. (a) Since the case has been made above that the mea-
surement of learning from errors should be grounded in concrete error cases, the first goal
of Study 1 is to collect exemplary knowledge- and rule-based errors for the domain of
nursing. These examples are needed for the development of authentic cases that can be
used as stimulus material for the implementation of the Cases Approach. The term ’au-
thentic’ refers to the fact that the cases are based on actual incidents collected from the
field. Furthermore, the cases should be subjectively relevant to the subjects (Honebein et
al., 1993), and refer to the category of error which is in the focus of the research. (b) The
second goal is to contextualise the framework of learning activities to the domain of nurs-
ing. This implies finding out which kind of learning activities are particularly relevant
and to make a selection of learning activities for further studies. It is assumed that the
learning activities identified in the developed framework (cf. Tab. 1; reflection and analy-
sis, development of a new action strategy, experimenting with and implementing the new
strategy) are of importance, and that these activities can be performed both individually
and cooperatively.
To attain these goals, an exploratory interview study with experts in nursing (extensive
work experience, supervisory position) was conducted. Below, firstly a description of the
sample, the interview procedure, and the analysis of the interviews is provided. Secondly,
the findings regarding the error cases and the learning activities are presented and dis-
cussed. The final discussion summarises the results and elaborates conclusions for the
further research process in Studies 2 and 3.
6This chapter is based on the article: Bauer, J., & Mulder, R. H. (2007). Modelling learning from errors




Eleven experts from three hospitals were approached to participate in the study. The pro-
cedure focussed more on finding experienced people than on a large number of subjects.
In this perspective experts are defined as professionals with a longtime professional expe-
rience who achieve at least a moderate degree of success in their occupation (Boshuizen et
al., 2004a). The applied criteria for expertise were that the participants had substantial
and broad professional experience in nursing (longtime experience, experiences from dif-
ferent types of wards) and a supervisory function. The supervisory function was chosen,
first, because it is part of supervisors’ role to have a critical perspective and distance to-
wards their department. Secondly, a supervisory role often implies a central and powerful
position, including an increased power to define what constitutes an acceptable practice
(Hakkarainen et al., 2004; Heid, 1999). Hence, this group can be assumed to be able to
provide valid answers about what constitutes an error in nursing and where errors appear.
Ten out of the eleven addressed experts agreed to participate in the study (5 female;
5 male). The subjects had a supervisory function at different levels: five subjects were
supervisors in their wards. Another five were either at the CEO level for nursing in their
hospital, or worked in quality management and vocational education and training. The
average occupational experience was 27 years (SD = 4 years). All had started their career
as nurses and participated in continuing professional development. In addition, all subjects
had experience in different kinds of wards or specific domains of the hospital. Thus, they
had substantial knowledge about the conditions in different units of a hospital.
4.1.2. Interview procedure
The interviews were conducted by the author in the period from September to October
2005. They took about one hour’s time on average and were conducted at the subjects’
workplaces. A semistructured interview guideline was used. It started with several opening
questions about the subject’s experiences as a nurse. Next, the subjects were introduced to
the distinction between knowledge- and rule-based errors (KRE) and slips and lapses (SL).
They were provided with a definition in everyday terms and some generic examples (e.g.,
SL: ‘mixing things up’, ‘forgetting things’; KRE ‘applying an inappropriate procedure’).
All subjects could give short, concrete examples for either type of errors, as a test that
they understood the distinction. In the following part of the interview, the subjects were
asked to describe concrete cases for KRE which occur in nursing practice according to
their experience. This part of the interview was mostly non-directive and narrative. No
constraints were set concerning the frequency in which these errors occur or the severity
of the consequences they imply. Next, the subjects were asked to identify activities that
a nurse would have to engage in after an error episode, such as the one(s) they had just
described, in order not to repeat a similar error again. Although it was impossible to avoid
the term ‘learning’ completely in the interviews, the question was explicitly not what a
person would have to do in order to learn from the error (cf. Simons & Ruijters, 2004).
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4.1.3. Analysis
The interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analysed. For the error examples,
a deductive strategy to categorisation was followed, using Reason’s (1995) subcategories
of KRE ‘wrong application of a good rule’, ‘non-application of a good rule’, ‘application
of a bad rule’, ‘wrong interpretation of a situation’ and ‘deficiencies in knowledge’ as
an initial category system. Firstly, all verbatim error examples provided by a subject
were classified in SL and KRE. Only KRE were further analysed. Secondly, the KRE
were allocated to the respective subcategory while keeping the information about which
subject had provided the example. Thirdly, examples with common themes were grouped
together within the categories while keeping the information about how many subjects
had provided examples grouped to a theme. During this process, the categories were re-
labelled in a more concrete way (e.g., ‘deficiencies in knowledge’ was re-labelled to ‘lack of
knowledge about current guidelines and standards’). Furthermore, three new categories
were introduced for themes that could not be integrated in the existing system. For each
category, the descriptive information was saved about how many subjects had provided
examples within it and how many examples it contained. These data provide information
about the degree to which errors from a given category are salient and subjectively relevant
for the subjects. This is a relevant indicator for the development of authentic cases. In
a last step of the analysis, the codings and categorisation were re-analysed systematically
with a second researcher, and discussed until inter-subjective agreement was achieved.
The classifications could be made clearly and no severe disagreements were encountered
during this process.
For the learning activities, it was planned to use the framework in Table 1 as a category
system. However, during the interviews, it became apparent that the subjects did not an-
swer according to the notion of a sequential process, but named different possible learning
activities. Thus, it was decided to employ an inductive mode of analysis by developing the
categories from the data. Firstly, all expressions concerning learning from an error or steps
to avoid it in future were collected verbatim per subject. Secondly, common themes were
identified, coded, and grouped together. Thirdly, the resulting categories were grouped
together to higher stratum constructs by focusing on the kinds of activity encompassed
(e.g., social exchange). Here, the data-driven approach was broken up and theory-related
constructs from the framework and from research on learning at work entered the anal-
ysis (e.g., ‘reflection’, ‘self-regulated learning’). Most of these constructs could again be
grouped on a third stratum in the distinction between formal and non-formal learning
(Eraut, 2000). In learning from errors, non-formal learning activities mean self-initiated
and self-regulated learning activities in which a subject engages either intentionally, with
time being especially set aside for it (i.e., deliberative) or as immediate reaction to an error
(i.e., reactive) (cf. Chapter 2.2). In contrast, formal learning refers to learning in exter-
nally organised learning environments with a prescribed learning framework (Eraut, 2000).
As in the analysis of the error examples, information was saved about how many subjects
had given examples within the categories (only valid for the first stratum), how many
subjects had named a common theme, and how many examples a category contains (valid
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for all three strata). Since the given learning activities were related to the error situations
presented by the subjects, these frequencies can be interpreted as indicators of the degree
to which the learning activities are perceived as relevant by the sample in a variety of error
situations. After this preliminary analysis, the codings and categorisation were re-analysed
systematically with the second researcher and discussed until inter-subjective agreement
was achieved. The classifications were mostly unequivocal and no severe disagreements
were encountered.
4.2. Findings and discussion
The following paragraphs report on the findings regarding the collection of examples for
knowledge- and rule-based errors and relevant learning activities.
4.2.1. Examples of knowledge- and rule-based errors
The goal was to work out concrete, authentic cases, and to check whether the differentiation
in different types of KRE can serve as a heuristic to structure the cases. Nine out of
ten subjects gave one or more examples. One person claimed to have too little recent
experience, because the focus of work was now on the organisation of nurses’ vocational
education and training.
The findings can be obtained from Table 3. The left hand column of Table 3 contains the
categorised cases. Numbers in parentheses indicate that an example was named unani-
mously by several subjects. The frequencies in the right hand column refer to the number
of subjects who named a case within the specific category (n) and the number of examples
within the category (ex ). Since each person could give more than one example, the number
of examples can be larger than the number of subjects. Where adequate, Reason’s (1995)
subcategories are indicated.
Although the cases described by the subjects vary in their level of abstraction, they provide
a rich picture of concrete errors in nursing. Most of them address professional issues
of nursing. The category ‘inadequate interpretation of a situation’ was the largest one.
The categories ‘non-application of a new or up-to-date method’, ‘application of out-of-
date methods’ and ‘lack of knowledge about current guidelines and standards’ mirror the
problem of adapting to continuous changes (Bu¨ssing & Glaser, 2003; Eraut et al., 1998).
The subjects named frequency of changes and lack of motivation as barriers for adapting
to changes and adopting innovations. Another category addressing professional issues is
the wrong application of nursing methods, which was attributed to a lack of knowledge,
competence and experience by the subjects. Also ‘not asking experienced colleagues for
help’ in case of an uncertain situation was related to a lack of experience. Such errors were
associated especially with younger colleagues. A related issue is ‘not to challenge orders
from supervisors’ on the basis of one’s knowledge and experience. Both issues address the
topic of low confidence and self-efficacy. Two subjects mentioned errors that address social
relationships at the workplace. This is noteworthy, as typologies of errors like the one of
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Table 3: Examples of knowledge- and rule-based errors in nursing.
Category and examples n/ex
Inadequate interpretation of a situation 6/7
Critical values on a medical instrument are misinterpreted or not cross-checked with the
overall physical state of the patient, so that a required intervention is omitted or an
inadequate or unnecessary intervention is applied. (2)
The risk of bedsore is inadequately evaluated, so that prophylaxis is applied too late or
insufficiently. (2)
Complications are not recognised, misjudged, or wrong conclusions are drawn. (2)
Relying too heavily on one’s own judgement about a patient’s level of pain or about how
much a pain a patient can bear, and paying too little attention to what the patient says.
Non-application of a new or up-to-date method (i.e., non-application of a good rule) 4/4
Not applying the Braden-Scales for evaluating the risk of bedsore. (2)
Instead of a new or up-to-date method an old one is applied, because the nurse is not used
to the new one, or does not feel confident enough in the application, and also does not
dare to ask.
Not applying the expert-standard for the administration of analgesics.
Application of out-of-date ‘rituals’ and methods, although they have been proven to have
adverse effects (i.e., application of a bad rule)
3/5
Wrong treatment of bedsore: applying ice and blowing dry. (2)
Application of rubbing alcohol. (2)
Application of an outdated disinfectant.
Lack of knowledge about current guidelines and standards (i.e., deficient knowledge) 3/4
Lack of knowledge that there are standards for certain treatments or procedures. (2)
Wrong preparation of a patient for an operation because the nurse has insufficient knowl-
edge about current standards.
Deficient knowledge about standard methods for the evaluation and prophylaxis of bedsore.
Wrong application of a method because of lack of knowledge (i.e., wrong application of a good
rule)
3/5
A patient falls down, because the nurse has insufficient knowledge and skills about mobil-
isation or supporting techniques and applies them deficiently. (2)
Errors in the preparation of a colonoscopy may mean that the patient’s bowel is not entirely
empty and the examination cannot take place. This results from a lack of knowledge in
the individual dosage of laxative for a specific patient.
A patient gets an infection after the application of a catheter because the nurse has
insufficient knowledge about how to apply it under sterile conditions.
Getting out of the prescribed routine in an emergency situation, because one has too little
experience with it.
Not asking someone experienced in case of uncertainness 3/3
Wrong estimation of the danger of a situation and not asking more experienced colleagues
for help. (3)
Errors in interpersonal relationships 2/2
Giving up the professional distance from patients. (2)
Not to challenge orders from a supervisor or a physician 1/1
Note. n = number of subjects; ex = number of given examples.
Reason (1995) do not take social aspects into account but focus only on professional and
task issues.
Concerning the differentiation, the categories derived from Reason (1995) proved to be
useful, although the framework was extended in certain respects (e.g., ‘not asking’; ‘errors
in interpersonal relations’). One constraint is that Reason’s (1995) category ‘deficiencies
in knowledge’ could not be separated consequently from the other forms of KRE. This was
to be expected, because all rule-based decisions and actions are performed on the basis of
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relevant knowledge. Additionally, sometimes multiple causes were present. In these cases,
the procedure of analysis was to stick as closely as possible to the subjects’ interpretation
of the cause.
From the error examples, authentic cases can be developed which can be located to an
error category or theme (e.g., treatment of a bedsore) under interest. It is important to
note that authenticity is not a general feature of a case but depends on the specific sample
under study. Thus, if cases are used, whether the subjects regard them as authentic or
are able to identify with them needs to be checked.
4.2.2. Learning Activities
A second goal of the interviews was to adjust the model of learning activities to the
domain of hospital nursing. The experts were asked what a nurse could or should do after
a KRE, in order to avoid a similar error in future. The left column of Table 4 depicts
the categorised learning activities named by the subjects (numbers in parentheses indicate
that the specific activity was named unanimously by several subjects). The frequencies
in the right hand column refer to the number of subjects who named a case within the
specific category (n) and the number of examples within the category (ex ). (For the
higher order categories, n is not meaningful because the contributions of the subjects in
the lower order categories, from which the higher order categories are aggregated, are not
independent from each other.)
The answers were categorised under three major headings: (a) The first category contains
deliberative and reactive non-formal learning activities (Eraut, 2000). These activities
appear here in three subcategories: (i) Most answers concerned socially orientated learning
activities, like exchange with more experienced persons, joint root cause analysis and
search for a new solution. The subjects emphasised the exchange with colleagues and
supervisors, as well as open discussions in team meetings. (ii) On an individual level,
reflection on possible causes was mentioned. As examples, deficiencies in the knowledge
and action process of the responsible person, contextual issues at the workplace, and
available resources were considered. Furthermore, reflection on alternative strategies for
future action was mentioned. (iii) The underlying goal of the activities under the first two
subcategories is not explicitly learning, but dealing with the error and on finding strategies
to prevent its future occurrence. In contrast, the third subcategory explicitly deals with
deliberative, self-regulated learning (Eraut, 2000). In this category, professional learning
activities were mentioned such as reading professional journals and recent documented
standards (cf. Berings et al., 2005; Eraut et al., 1998; Kwakman, 2003). They involve the
goal of updating one’s own professional knowledge. The categorisation of self-regulated
learning into non-formal learning activities might be debatable, because it shares common
features with formal learning (e.g., intentionality, time being especially set aside for it).
It was categorised this way, because the subjects clearly indicated the self-initiated, -
motivated and -regulated nature of these activities, which according to them should be
performed at home and in spare time.
(b) The second main category concerns formal learning in externally organised learning
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Table 4: Learning activities
Category and examples n/ex
(1) Non-formal learning n.a./28
(a) Learning in social exchange n.a./16
Exchange with colleagues 7/8
Exchange with more experienced colleagues (6)
Asking colleagues for advice or help
Mutual control and critique
Exchange with the supervisor 4/5
Discussing the issue with the supervisor (2)
Asking the supervisor for help (2)
Root cause analysis together with the supervisor
Open discussion within the team 3/3
Open discussion in team meetings, so that all team members have the opportunity
to learn from the error (3)
(b) Individual reflection n.a./6
Root cause analysis 4/4
(Self-)reflection about possible causes of the error (4)
Reflection on alternative action strategies 2/2
Reflection on what has do be done differently the next time (2)
(c) Deliberative self-regulated learning 4/6
Closing gaps in one’s professional knowledge by oneself and taking care that one is
up-to date (3)
Reading professional journals (2)
Updating one’s knowledge about current standards
(2) Formal learning 5/6
Attending training and professional development courses (5)
Identifying one’s need for further training
(3) Emotional reaction 4/4
Emotional conditioning through the error (2)
Remaining in a state of brooding
Talking to colleagues in order to salve one’s conscience
Note. n = number of subjects; ex = number of given examples; n.a. = not applicable.
environments, such as attending professional training related to methods and skills. This
form of learning was mentioned by five subjects. In contrast to self-regulated learning, the
subjects’ statements implied the notion of classroom-type training.
(c) A last aspect concerns emotionally based reactions to the error situation. This category
does not represent learning activities in the sense of the theoretical framework provided
above. However, the interplay between errors, negative emotions and learning has been
addressed frequently in the literature about learning from errors (Keith & Frese, 2005;
Mehl, 1993; Meurier et al., 1997; Oser & Spychiger, 2005; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zapf,
1991; Zhao & Olivera, 2006).
Compared with the original framework of learning activities (Tab. 1), the experts’ answers
covered individual as well as socially orientated learning activities in the categories ‘reflec-
tion’ and ‘development of a new action strategy’. In social learning activities, the subjects
did not differentiate between the process of cause analysis and the development of a new
strategy. Both aspects are contained in the same category ‘learning in social exchange’, for
example, by seeking help and advice, discussing and analysing the error jointly, and pro-
viding mutual control and feedback. However, the subjects differentiated between social
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exchange that consists mainly of informal discussions with colleagues or with a supervisor,
and discussions in formal team meetings. This extended the original framework. Con-
cerning individual reflection, both processes of cause analysis and development of a new
action strategy were present, and closely related to each other.
The ideas of deliberate self-regulated learning and formal learning are only implicitly
present in the original framework. Both suggest that in order to learn from an error, it
may be important to collect new information in order to change the underlying knowledge
base (cf. ’allocation of information and resources’ in Tab. 1). The subjects’ answers made
it explicit, that both formal and self-regulated learning can contribute to this.
Experimentation with and evaluation of a new action strategy were not mentioned in the
interviews. From the perspective of learning theory, experimentation and evaluation are
important steps in the learning process (Kolb, 1984; Kwakman, 2003). One reason for this
gap might be that the subjects attributed these activities not to the learning process, but
to its result, the subsequent changed behaviour.
Another extension of the original framework was the fact that the subjects addressed
cognitive issues as well as negative emotions that are related to errors. Usually, negative
emotions such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, fear or the feeling of incompetence are
assumed to be inhibiting for open-error communication and learning from errors (e.g.
Keith & Frese, 2005; Rybowiak et al., 1999). However, several subjects in the study
claimed that negative emotions can have fostering as well as inhibiting effects for learning:
negative emotions (e.g., guilt, fear of punishment) can lead to conditioning, so that the
error episode is remembered in similar situations and one has the opportunity to avoid
the error. In contrast, the subjects claimed that an inhibiting effect of negative emotions
can be to remain in a state of ruminative ‘brooding’ (Leonard & Tesser, 1996) and not to
develop a problem solving or action orientation. As such, the role of negative emotions is
ambiguous, as discussed above.
4.3. Conclusions for the further research process
The study succeeded in collecting error examples that can be used to construct authentic
cases for KRE, and in contextualising the framework of error-related learning activities in
nursing practice. The results are used here to make further decisions about the concep-
tualisation of the follow-up studies. In summary, the following two conclusions are made.
Firstly, error situations regarding the misinterpretation of a situation and subsequently
making a wrong decision are focussed upon. Vignettes of error cases for this type of error
are constructed from the data. Secondly, social learning activities regarding joint root-
cause analysis and joint development of a new strategies to avoid the error in future are
selected and focussed upon in the further studies. A rationale for both decisions is given
below.
Error examples. A rich range of error types was reported by the participants, even
though the focus of the interviews had been restricted to KRE. This was to be expected
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because Reason’s (1995) taxonomy subsumes several subclasses of errors under this cat-
egory, as discussed in the section on errors. Therefore, it seems appropriate to make a
further selection among the types of KRE to focus on in the further studies. For the
following reasons, the decision is made for errors regarding the misinterpretation of a sit-
uation and subsequently making a wrong decision. First, this was the largest category
in the interviews. Admittedly, this does not yet provide evidence that this type of errors
is especially frequent or significant in terms of its practical impact. However, at least
for the interviewed experts these errors seemed to be particularly salient and subjectively
relevant. A practical consequence is that within this category there is the richest mate-
rial for the construction of authentic error cases. Secondly, errors of this type are rather
prototypical for KRE. As Reason (1995) states, almost all types of KRE involve the mis-
interpretation of a situation, for example, regarding what knowledge or rules to apply (cf.
Wehner & Mehl, 2003). Thirdly, these errors concern practitioners’ ‘knowing in action’
and therefore are particularly relevant for the engagement in learning activities such as
reflection on causes and the identification of required changes in action strategies (Scho¨n,
1983). In contrast, errors that are based solely on deficient knowledge and involve no
situational judgement may also profit from reflection and social exchange, but seem more
prone for the engagement in self-regulated learning or attending formal training in order
to consolidate the knowledge base. Since it is decided to focus in the further studies on
social learning activities regarding cause analysis and strategy development, as explained
below, it seems consistent to select the above mentioned type of error.
The following vignettes of error cases were constructed from the KRE examples provided
by the experts (the orignial German versions are available from Appendix A.1).
Case 1: Misinterpreting values from a medical instrument. While attending to a young,
artificially respirated female patient, you are reading the value for the concentration
of blood oxygen from a screen. You realise that it is at only 70%. Considering this to
be an emergency situation, first you increase the induction of oxygen at the oxygen
resuscitation apparatus. Next, you call a colleague for help, in order to apply further
measures. As she arrives, it becomes obvious that the sensor on the patient’s finger
is misplaced so that the measurement has been unreliable. Initiating an emergency
procedure has been inappropriate . . .
Case 2: Inadequate interpretation of complications. During a night shift, you are called
by a patient who has been operated on his knee. He claims to suffer from heavy pain
in his leg and that he could not sleep because of it. Since currently no physician is
available, you decide to apply an analgesic and document it in his file. As some time
later a physician comes by, you ask her to look after the patient. She diagnoses that
the patient has a thrombosis and intervenes immediately . . .
Case 3: Misjudging the risk of bedsore. You are evaluating the risk of bedsore of an el-
derly, bedfast patient. Using the Braden-Scale, you are judging the risk at 18 points
as medium. However, the patient’s skin appears to be in an OK state to you. Hence,
you do not initiate additional measures of prophylaxis or treatment. At the next
evaluation of the same patient a short while afterwards, she already shows initial
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symptoms of bedsore. In this light, the increased risk should have been recognised
at the earlier evaluation . . .
Case 1 concerns the misinterpretation of critical values on a medical instrument. According
to the participant who had given this example, this was an error because the nurse inter-
preted the situation as an emergency, without considering additional inconsistent context
information (i.e., the overall state of the patient). Case 2 is about the wrong interpretation
of a patient’s complications. The error was that the nurse interpreted pain in the leg as a
consequence of a surgery, when in fact it was caused by a thrombosis. According to the
interview participant who had provided the example, the nurse should have recognised the
thrombosis. Case 3 concerns the wrong judgement of the patent’s risk of bedsore. The
error is that the nurse, when confronted with borderline values for the risk of bedsore on
a standardised instrument, made a personal judgement that proved wrong in the end.
These examples were chosen for case construction, because there was rich information for
them in the interviews and they implied not too severe consequences for the patient (i.e.,
no one died or suffered irreparable damage). The latter might cause problems for the
subjects to identify with the cases. After the construction of the cases two experts from
the interview study revised the cases and judged them to be valid in medical terms.
Learning activities. About the findings concerning learning activities, two points are
apparent. Firstly, non-formal learning activities were described in rich detail. Hence, the
subjects did not associate learning from errors only with formal learning, although it was
not possible to avoid the term ‘learning’ completely in the interviews (Simons & Ruijters,
2004). At least in the experts’ point of view, a rich repertoire of learning activities is
possible in daily nursing practice (cf. Berings et al., 2005; Eraut et al., 1998). A drawback
of the new categorisation is the abolition of a sequential order, which would describe a
complete process. Rather, the categorisation presents a picture of different possible ac-
tivities that an individual may engage in. In this case, I prefer the contextualisation of
the learning activities over conceptual completeness. The second point is the dominant
role of social learning activities. As argued above, social exchange is stressed in research
on learning at work and professional development: The interaction with other people at
work constitutes one of the most significant sources of learning next to the engagement
in the work itself (Billett, 2004a; Eraut et al., 1998; Lehtinen, Hakkarainen, & Palonen,
2004; Smith, 2003). This relates to the issue of how learning from errors can contribute
to the learning of a team, a unit or the whole organisation (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001;
Edmondson, 2004; Van Dyck et al., 2005). From a quality and patient-safety perspective
it seems desirable, that not only one specific individual learns from an error. The cat-
egory ‘open discussion in team meetings’ explicitly suggests that others should have the
opportunity to learn from an error that happened to one specific person.
On the basis of these findings it was decided to focus in the subsequent studies on social
learning activities in the form of joint root cause analysis, and joint development of a
new strategy for action. Both learning activities are considered to be related positively,
because both involve social interaction and imply making one’s mistake public. Note that
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this decision does not imply a shift to the level of team learning. The focus is still on
individual learning from errors, but the activities through which this learning is achieved
are performed in social interaction. As has been argued in Chapter 3, investigating a
more narrow selection of learning activities is appropriate because it cannot be taken
for granted, that all individually or socially performed learning activities follow the same
model of action and are driven by the same individual and contextual factors. This caution
seems even more relevant in the light of the revision of the learning cycle to a collection of
several relevant learning activities. The rationale for selecting joint root cause analysis and
joint development of a new strategy for further investigation is as follows. (a) The decision
for focussing on the social aspect was made due to its discussed theoretical relevance and
its practical significance assigned by the interview participants. The latter neither implies
that individuals can only learn from errors in social exchange nor that the interviews
provide evidence that this form of learning is superior to individual learning. However,
the finding is useful to guide the necessary decision about the selection of learning activities
for further studies. (b) The decision for joint cause analysis and joint development of new
action strategies was made because both learning activities address core issues of learning
from errors, that is, analysing what went wrong, and why, and what can potentially be
done about it. Although analytically they represent different steps in the learning cycle,
it is likely that both aspects will be addressed at the same time in joint conversations.
Hence, they represent conceptually different types of learning activities that, however,
should be closely related and follow similar models of action. The implementation of
results from such an analytic process (i.e., the last step in the learning cycle) is not of
minor relevance, but may follow a rather different rationale because, constraints in the
work context and the distribution of power issues have to be taken into account that may
inhibit implementing changes. Therefore learning activities regarding the implementation
of new action strategies are not further considered, here.
A question is whether constraining the further analysis to the mentioned social learning
activities requires a revision of the stated hypotheses. This does not seem to be the case.
As for social learning activities, the individual’s perception of whether it is safe and appro-
priate to approach others as well as others’ readiness to provide support and participate
in such activities seems to be influential. Engaging in social learning activities involves
admitting an error to others and as such encountering interpersonal risk. This depends on
the individual’s perception of the team members’ trustworthiness and readiness to provide
support in critical situations (Edmondson, 1999). Likewise, the argument that engaging
in learning requires the individual to interpret the error situation as a chance for learning,
to regulate negative emotions and to perceive a positive cost-benefit relationship seems
especially relevant for potentially precarious learning activities (Cannon & Edmondson,
2001; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). The mentioned ambiguous finding
concerning the role of negative emotions might cast doubt on the hypothesis regarding
a straightforward negative relation between negative emotions and the engagement in
learning (Hypothesis 2). This negative relation has been hypothesised, because negative
emotions such as shame, embarrassment, fear, guilt may interfere with cognitive learning
processes (Greif, 1996; Keith & Frese, 2005), may inhibit taking an action or learning ori-
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entation after an error (Boud, 1999; Greif, 1996; Rybowiak et al., 1999), and may cause an
individual to focus on potential costs of making an error public (Edmondson, 1999; Zhao
& Olivera, 2006). In contrast, it has been argued that negative emotions also can have
a positive effect by creating a feeling of subjective relevance (Oser & Spychiger, 2005).
However, the evidence from the interviews is not strong enough to provide yet a reason
to revise the stated hypothesis. Therefore, the hypotheses about the relations among the
interpretation of an error, the perception of a safe team-climate, and the engagement in
learning activities are upheld and subject to investigation in further studies.
The present study provided information (a) for the development of error vignettes for the
Cases Approach and (b) for the contextualisation and selection of learning activities that
are needed for the development of ecologically valid measures of learning from errors in
nursing (Research Question 1). Open tasks are the development of concrete questionnaires
and making a decision between the Critical Incident Technique and the Cases Approach.
These tasks are addressed in Study 2, that is presented in the following chapter.
5. Study 2: Development of research instruments and
decision between the Critical Incident Technique and the
Cases Approach
In Study 2, two questionnaires for measuring learning from errors at work are developed on
the basis of the findings from Study 1, applied, and compared (Research Question 1). Its
objectives are to inform the decision about how to ground the measurement of the engage-
ment in learning activities in concrete error situations and to provide initial evidence of
how the developed scales meet psychometric quality standards regarding reliability (inter-
nal consistency) and construct validity. For the comparison, two approaches of grounding
were considered for application, as described above. In the Critical Incident Technique
(CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) the participants are asked to describe an error situation of their
own. In the Cases Approach vignettes of error cases are presented and the participants
are asked to identify themselves with one of these examples. Both approaches have in
common that subsequent questions on learning activities are grounded in the specific case
or incident.
Two criteria are set for the comparison of the approaches. The first criterion is the
participation rate. Although this does not guarantee the quality of the measurement, it
has to be regarded that errors are a delicate issue and that the readiness of the addressed
subjects to participate cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, a method should be applied
that reduces this problem. This can be considered to be a prerequisite for the establishment
of more rigorous psychometric quality standards. The second criterion is whether the scales
used function in the intended way under each condition, that is, produce reliable scores
and lead to theoretically plausible and consistent results in testing for relationships with
scales on a perceived safe team climate and individual error orientation (cf. the hypotheses
stated above). This is supposed to be a preliminary indicator of construct validity and
provides a pretest for the main study.
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This study contributes to making a decision between the approaches by exploring the
viability of two versions of a research instrument and delivering initial evidence for reli-
ability and construct validity of the developed scales. The more promising approach can
be applied in further studies. However, it cannot clarify which approach is preferable in
terms of criterion-related validity. Evaluating criterion-oriented validity would have re-
quired having an established criterion – i.e., an established criterion measure of learning
from errors at work – as well as known relationships between this criterion and given pre-
dictors at hand, in order to analyse which method is better capable of reproducing these
relationships. As argued in Chapter 2.2, such an established measure of learning from
errors currently does not exist (Bauer & Mulder, in press).
The following section will provide a description of the sample and the instrument devel-
opment. Secondly, the findings regarding the participation (Criterion 1), reliability of the
scales, and the assumed network of relationships (Criterion 2) are presented. The final dis-
cussion summarises the results in relation to the stated criteria and elaborates conclusions
for how to measure learning from errors in Study 3.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Design and sampling
The study followed a cross-sectional design with two independent groups, one for the CIT,
and another one for the Cases Approach. A sample of n = 300 per group was aimed
for, in order to have sufficient power for testing potentially small correlations and for
conducting factor analyses on the items. Therefore, a sample of N = 600 was addressed
for participation in the study. The addressed persons had been selected randomly from the
nursing staff of one large hospital and were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions
(nCIT = 300; ncases = 300). The field access had been established by permission of the
hospital’s CEO for nursing. Each subject received a personal letter, the questionnaire,
and a return envelope. Anonymity and independence of the study from the hospital were
ensured. One problem was that the study was conducted shortly after a two month period
of strike in public service. It is hard to judge how this situation affected the participation.
However, since the field access had been established and the strike had already caused a
considerable delay, it was decided not to postpone the data collection further.
5.1.2. Instruments
Two questionnaires were developed, based on either the CIT or the Cases Approach. The
standardised nature of both questionnaires contributes to the objectivity of the measure-
ment. Both questionnaires started with a definition of the term ‘error’ in the context of
the study. It was emphasised, that the study dealt with wrong decisions based on the
misinterpretation of a situation, and that medication errors – belonging to the error cate-
gory of slips and lapses – were not covered in the study. This definition was illustrated by
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examples, that were derived from the interview study, in order to increase the subjects’
understanding of which type of errors were in the focus of the study.
Grounding. In the CIT Condition the nurses were asked to provide a short description
of an error situation which they had encountered at work. Subsequently, they rated their
engagement in learning activities after this incident by indicating how much time they had
spent after the error with the activities named in the items (six-point Likert scale: 1 = no
time at all; 6 = very much time).
In the Cases Condition the subjects were presented with the vignettes of error cases that
had been constructed from the examples for knowledge- and rule based errors provided
by experts in Study 1. All of them comprised the misinterpretation of a situation and a
subsequent inadequate decision. The subjects were asked to identify themselves with one of
these cases, and to imagine the situation vividly. Subsequently, they were asked to answer
questions about how likely they would be to engage in the given learning activities, after
this situation (six-point Likert scale: 1 = very unlikely; 6 = very likely). The subjects
could identify well with the cases, which is an indicator of the cases’ authenticity (cf.
Tab. 5; six-point Likert scale: 1 = low identification; 6 = high identification). A MANOVA
indicated that the engagement in learning activities is independent from the chosen case
(F (6, 74) = 1.04, n.s.).
Scales. Both instruments contained similar scales, related, however, to the specific type
of grounding. Scales on the following constructs were included in the instruments: (a) En-
gagement in social learning activities (i.e., joint cause analysis, joint development of a
new strategy), (b) interpretation of errors (i.e., errors as chance for learning, error strain,
covering up errors), (c) a safe team climate (i.e., trust, non-punitive orientation). Their
composition is described below. The complete item contents can be obtained from ap-
pendix A.2. Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for these scales can be obtained
from Table 5.
Engagement in social learning activities. Learning activities after an error were opera-
tionalised by two scales on the engagement in joint cause analysis and in the joint
development of new action strategies after the error. To attain content and ecolog-
ical validity, the items were constructed on the basis of the theoretical framework,
examples of learning activities from the interviews, and some items on construc-
tive versus defensive changes after an error provided by Meurier et al. (1997). The
scale ‘joint cause analysis’ contains facets of analysing possible causes for the error
(e.g., own competence, interaction with the patient and colleagues, workplace condi-
tions) either in informal discussions with team members or at formal team meetings
(9 items, e.g., ‘Analysing jointly with members of my team, what has led to the
error.’). The scale ‘joint development of a new action strategy’ contains facets of
considering and discussing new ways of behaviour or new guidelines either in in-
formal discussions with team members or at formal team meetings (7 items, e.g.,
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’Initiating a discussion in a team meeting, how we could prevent similar errors in
future.’).
Interpretation of errors. The interpretation of errors as chance for learning, error strain
and the tendency to cover up errors are measured by three scales from the German
version of the Error Orientation Questionnaire (Rybowiak et al., 1999) with a six-
point Likert scale as answer format (1 = low agreement; 6 = high agreement): errors
as a chance for learning (4 items, e.g., ‘Mistakes assist me to improve my work.’);
error strain (5 items, e.g., ‘I feel embarrassed when I make an error.’); covering
up errors (6 items; e.g., ‘It is disadvantageous to make one’s mistakes public.’).
The scales are assumed to be interrelated, but to represent conceptually different
aspects of an individual’s interpretation of errors. Evidence for their reliability,
unidimensionality, and construct validity exists from the original publication and
from Keith and Frese (2005).
Safe team climate. The perception of a safe team climate was operationalised by two scales
regarding the perception of the trustworthiness of the team members (Bauer et al.,
2007; Bu¨ssing & Glaser, 2002) and the perception how safe or precarious it is to
admit an error within the team (Van Dyck et al., 2005; Tjosvold et al., 2004).
Edmondson’s scale of psychological safety combines both aspects (1999). However,
the present operationalisation is appropriate given that having both aspects in one
scale may result in problems of multidimensionality and finding German equivalents
as well as a contextualisation of items to the domain of nursing were required, anyway.
The scale ’trust’ represents the general perception of the trustworthiness of the team
members (10 items, e.g., ‘There is a trustful relationship between the colleagues at my
ward.’). It contains facets of perceived mutual backup, relatedness and support, and
the opportunity to come up with critical problems. Items with similar contents could
be obtained from Edmondson (1999), a scale on the relatedness to a nursing team by
Bu¨ssing and Glaser (2002), and from a scale on the quality of social relationships at
work by Bauer et al. (2007). The scale ’non-punitive orientation to errors’ represents
the perception of how precarious it is to admit an error within the team (6 items, e.g.,
‘If you make a mistake on this team, it is often held against you.’; scored reverse;
Edmondson, 1999). Items could be obtained from scales by Edmondson (1999);
Tjosvold et al. (2004); Van Dyck et al. (2005). For both scales, a six-point Likert
scale is used as answer format (1 = low agreement; 6 = high agreement).
5.2. Findings
5.2.1. Participation
The degree of participation was calculated by the ratio between the returned and the
successfully delivered questionnaires. Eight questionnaires in the CIT and twelve ques-
tionnaires in Cases Group could not be delivered to the subjects, because the nurses no
longer worked at the ward. From the CIT Group n = 23 of 292 correctly delivered ques-
tionnaires were returned (7.9%). However, within this group only ten subjects gave an
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error example, resulting in a rate of 3.4%. From the Cases Group n = 45 of 288 delivered
questionnaires were returned (15.6%). This is in an expectable range for postal survey
(Diekmann, 2007; Porst, 2001).
The low participation inhibited further analyses. Firstly, the samples have to be regarded
as being selective. Secondly, further analyses were conducted only for the Cases Group, be-
cause of the particularly low participation in the CIT Group. The planned factor analyses
had to be postponed until Study 3.
5.2.2. Scale construction and reliability
In order to assess the reliability of the developed scales, item and scale analyses were con-
ducted. The procedure involved examining the item-discrimination (i.e., corrected item-
scale-intercorrelation) and the items’ contribution to internal consistency (Cronbach’s α).
Items were excluded from a scale if the discrimination was below .5 or the exclusion would
increase reliability; however, only if this seemed theoretically justifiable (Bortz & Do¨ring,
2006). For the learning activity scales, four items from the cause analysis scale did not
match the stated criteria and one item had to be removed from the scale ’development
of new strategies”. From the safe team climate scales, three items from the non-punitive
orientation scale did not match the criteria. In contrast, the trust scale had a high initial
internal consistency after deleting one item (α = .92). Hence, the scale could be made
more parsimonious by removing items that are redundant to the scale in terms that they
do not contribute to raise its reliability (Bu¨hner, 2006). From the error orientation scales,
one (chance for learning, error strain) and two (covering up errors) items did not match
the stated criteria, respectively. Table 5 depicts the remaining number of items, reliability,
and descriptive statistics of the scales.
The described procedure yielded sufficiently reliable scales, with the lowest reliability for
the scale ‘errors as chance for learning’. All other scales show good to very good internal
consistencies and no excessive floor or ceiling effects were to be observed. This holds also
for the newly developed learning activity scales.
5.2.3. Testing the assumed relationships
The correlations between the scales can be obtained from Table 6. Power for a medium
effect size of r = .3 is 67% for one-tailed tests, given this sample size and a significance
level of p < .05 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Significance tests for effect sizes
below .24 should not be interpreted because the power decreases below 50%. Descriptive
effect sizes and the directions of the correlations are interpreted as preliminary information,
acknowledging that it cannot be assumed that the effects would have been significant in a
larger sample.
Intercorrelation of scales within a construct. The intercorrelation of the scales
belonging to the same construct had the expected directions. (a) From the error orientation
scales, as expected, error strain and covering errors are related positively (p < .01) with
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and reliability of the scales, authenticity
of the cases.
Constructs and scales Items α M SD
Error orientation
Chance for learning 3 .65 4.05 1.04
Error strain 4 .87 3.14 1.28
Covering up errors 4 .82 2.22 0.91
Safe team climate
Trust 5 .92 4.04 1.07
Non-punitive orientation 3 .80 4.16 1.06
Engagement in social learning activities
Cause analysis 5 .83 3.50 1.12
New strategy 6 .84 3.80 0.98
Authenticity of error cases
Values on a medical instrument 4.72 1.45
Misinterpreting complications 5.36 0.67
Misjudging risk of bedsore 5.10 0.88
Note. Statistics for Cases Condition; n = 45; 6-point Likert scale,
higher numbers indicate higher agreement/engagement.
a medium effect size. Both are related negatively to the appraisal of errors as a chance
for learning, although insignificant and with small effect sizes that are similar to those
found by Rybowiak et al. (1999). (b) Both team climate scales are interrelated positively
(p < .01) with a large effect size. (c) Both learning activity scales are interrelated positively
(p < .01) with a large effect size.
Correlation between the interpretation of an error and the perception of a safe
team climate. As expected, both psychological safety scales are correlated negatively
with error strain and covering up errors (p < .01), with medium and large effect sizes,
Table 6: Correlations between the scales.
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Chance for learning —
2 Error strain −.19 —
3 Covering up errors −.12 .46∗∗ —
4 Trust .18 −.38∗∗ −.40∗∗ —
5 Non-punitive orientation .05 −.55∗∗ −.57∗∗ .72∗∗ —
6 Cause analysis .22 .03 −.20 .28∗ .12 —
7 New strategy .21 −.15 −.34∗ .40∗∗ .16 .64∗∗ —
Note. Statistics for Cases Condition; n = 45; one-tailed test, *p < .05,
**p < .01.
5.3. Discussion and conclusions for the further research process 71
respectively. The correlations of the psychological safety scales with the appraisal of errors
as a chance for learning are positive, although with small or essentially zero effect sizes
(n.s.). The signs of the correlations for both psychological safety scales are consistent with
each other.
Correlations of error orientation and safe team climate scales with learning
activities. The signs of the correlations among the learning activity scales and the other
scales are consistent and in the expected directions with one exception, as indicated below.
(a) The interpretation of errors as a chance for learning is positively related to both learning
activity scales, although not significant. (b) Covering up errors is negatively correlated
with cause analysis (n.s.) and the development of new strategies (p < .05). (c) Against
expectation, error strain had an essentially zero correlation with cause analysis. The
correlation with the development of a new strategy is negative, but fails significance.
(d) Both learning activity scales have significant positive correlations with trust in the
team members. (e) The correlations of learning activities with the perception of a non-
punitive orientation towards errors within a team are positive, but not significant.
5.3. Discussion and conclusions for the further research process
The goal of this study was to develop research instruments for learning from errors and to
decide between the CIT and the Cases Approach in measuring the engagement in learning
activities after an error. Below, the findings are discussed in relation to the stated criteria
and conclusions for the further research process in Study 3 are drawn.
5.3.1. Criterion 1: Return quote
Both approaches performed poorly in criterion one, the return quote, resulting in a con-
siderable selectivity of the samples. Further studies are needed in order to check whether
the present findings can be replicated and to what extent they are biased. Beyond the
mentioned strike that may have had a negative effect on the overall willingness to partic-
ipate, there is unfortunately little information about potential reasons for non-response.
A reason for the particularly low participation in the CIT Condition may be that the
subjects could not give an example, e.g., because they did not remember one or did not
understand the instructions in the questionnaire properly. An alternative interpretation is
that the subjects may have been unwilling to communicate an error example, e.g., because
they did not want to make the effort, or did not trust the anonymity of the study.
These possibilities cannot be further explored with the current data. In any case, the
present finding of a low participation in the CIT Condition is similar to the one of an
interview study on learning from errors, in which employees from high-technology and
service enterprises were asked to describe self-experienced error situations (Harteis et al.,
2007). In the interviews, the subjects often had problems remembering an error case – or
were reluctant to tell one. In contrast, Meurier et al. (1997) had successfully implemented
the CIT in a study on errors, using anonymous questionnaires. Therefore, the failure of this
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method in the present study was not to be expected. Next to the strike, these discrepant
findings may potentially be due also to cultural differences between Meurier’s (1997) and
the present sample (UK versus Germany, different local culture at the hospitals). For
the moment, the results for the participation rate and the fact that hardly any of the
participating subjects in the CIT Condition gave an error example are interpreted to
argue for the application of the Cases Approach in Study 3.
5.3.2. Criterion 2: Reliability and construct validity
Scrutinising Criterion 2 involved an examination of the relationships between the learning
activities and supposedly related variables. Unfortunately, this was inhibited by the low
participation rate. For the CIT Condition, no further analyses could be carried out. For
the Cases Condition, the present analysis does not yet provide a rigorous test of construct
validity, especially given the selective sample and the low statistical power. However, the
findings deliver preliminary information that the scales worked in the intended way under
the Cases Approach. Reliable scores could be established for the learning activity scales.
The initial item selection worked better in the strategy development scale, in which only
one item had to be removed. For the cause analysis scale, four items did not fulfil the
criteria, indicating requirements for revision. The overall results from the correlation tests
indicated a plausible network of expected relationships in terms of the directions of the
correlations. A task for Study 3 is to test to what extent these results can be replicated
in a larger sample.
5.3.3. Conclusions
In Study 2, two questionnaires for measuring learning from errors at work were developed
and applied in order to inform the decision between the CIT and the Cases Approach
and to provide initial evidence of the psychometric properties of the developed scales.
Although the conclusiveness of the findings is limited due to the selective sample, Study 2
was helpful for attaining these goals. The results are encouraging in that reliable scales
could be built and that theoretically expected correlations with the interpretation of an
error situation and the perception of a safe team climate could be found, at least on the
level of descriptive effect sizes. These findings legitimate further efforts to advance and
validate the operationalisation of learning from errors. Furthermore, the findings provide
sufficient information for considering the Cases Approach for application in Study 3. This
is not only because of the higher return quote, but also because of the potential problem
that only a special part of the population with a low tendency to cover up errors may
be ready to participate in the CIT Condition. In the Cases Approach, this problem is
less likely to arise, because the cases used are not directly related to the subjects and
thus participation may seem less precarious. Additional efforts to increase the return
rate in Study 3 may involve reducing the amount of personal information requested in
the questionnaire in order to mitigate potential fears of being identifiable. Furthermore,
the subjects’ ratings of the cases argue for their authenticity. The mentioned concern
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that the Cases Approach asks for hypothetical behaviour can be taken into account in
the interpretation of the data. Given the present findings and the discussed problems
of observation methods, the Cases Approach seems to be a viable method for measuring
learning from errors.
Together, Studies 1 and 2 contributed to the development of a measurement instrument for
the engagement in learning from errors in nursing (Research Question 1). An exemplary
operationalisation of learning from errors in terms of learning activities that start a process
of inquiry into root-causes and aim at changing the underlying causes has been developed.
This activity perspective on learning from errors is systematically derived from experiential
learning theory (Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Kolodner, 1983; Schank, 1999), which is a
prerequisite for content validity. Furthermore, it is contextualised to the field of nursing,
as a prerequisite for ecological validity. The developed operationalisation is restricted to
the field of nursing, to a specific type of error (i.e., misjudging a situation and subsequently
making a wrong decision), and to the special case of learning activities that are performed
in social exchange. However, this degree of specificity is required, because asking for
learning activities taken after errors in general neglects the variability of errors (Reason,
1995) and the incidental and situated nature of learning from errors and work related
learning (Billett, 2004b). Study 2 delivered initial evidence for the reliability and construct
validity of the scales. The developed instrument will be applied in Study 3, in order to
address Research Questions 2—4.
6. Study 3: Testing and advancing the research model
The study presented in this chapter contributes in two steps to answering the research
questions about the relations among the interpretation of an error, the perception of a
safe team-climate, and the engagement in learning activities (Research Questions 2—4).
In the first step, the research model presented in Figure 1 is tested. This involves a process
of building a statistical model on the basis of the substantive model, to check whether this
model adequately fits the data, and to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical
framework. The second step is to advance the model on the basis of the results and
substantive considerations. This exploratory step is relevant for answering the research
questions because it contributes to differentiate theorising about how the interplay of the
investigated variables may foster or constrain learning from errors. Therefore, it enables
us to state more differentiated hypotheses for further research that builds upon the results
of this study in a cumulative way.
Hence, the goals of Study 3 are to test and to advance the model for the engagement
in error-related learning activities in nursing. For this purpose, a sample of nurses from
several hospitals is surveyed in a cross-sectional field study with the research instrument
developed in Studies 1 and 2. The gathered data are analysed in a structural equation
model. Below, first the employed methods are elaborated, comprising a description of the
sample, the instrument, and the analytic procedure. Secondly, the results for testing the
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model, and the findings from the exploratory analyses are presented. Finally, the results
are discussed in relation to the research questions.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Sample
Participants in the study were full-time nurses from hospitals located in the German Fed-
eral State of Bavaria. The study was restricted to Bavaria, because the two prior studies
had taken place in this region and because yielding a representative sample for all of Ger-
many could not be achieved within the scope of this study. In order to test and advance
the research model employing structural equation modelling, a large sample was required.
Given the relative simplicity of the model under study, a sample size of N = 300 was
assumed to yield a stable estimation and sufficient power to test the model (Faul et al.,
2007; Kim & Bentler, 2006). In order to account for the diversity of hospitals in terms
of their sponsorship, size, and the level of medical care they supply, nurses from multi-
ple organisations had to be recruited for the sample. In Bavaria, 56.8% of the hospitals
are under public sponsorship, whereas 43.2% are run by private and charitable organisa-
tions (Bayerische Krankenhausgesellschaft e.V., 2005b). Furthermore the hospitals differ
in the level of medical care they supply, which also reflects their size (Bayerische Kranken-
hausgesellschaft e.V., 2005a; Bayerisches Staatsministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Sozialordnung,
Familie und Frauen [BSASFF], 2007). Four service levels can be distinguished: hospitals
on the lowest level (Level 1) are typically small and provide basic service in surgery and
internal medical care. Level 2 hospitals are larger and provide additional special units,
such as intensive care, ear, nose, and throat medicine, gynaecology, etc. Level 3 hospitals
are large supraregional hospitals that provide extensive and fully differentiated services in
medical care. Beyond these three levels, there is a fourth category for highly specialised
hospitals that focus on specific diseases, treatments, or age groups. Only hospitals from
Levels 1—3 were considered for inclusion in this study, because the developed cases might
not have applied to the highly specialised hospitals. From the total number of hospitals
on Levels 1—3 in Bavaria, 79.5% are Level 1, 16.0% Level 2, and 4.6% Level 3 (BSAFF,
2007). It was planned to recruit a sample that represents these distributions of sponsor-
ship and service level. Furthermore, it was planned to place the main focus on nurses in
surgical and internal medical care units, because these are core units that are present in
all hospitals in levels 1—3 (Bayerische Krankenhausgesellschaft e.V., 2005a).
Nine out of 16 addressed hospitals agreed to participate in the study, provided that they
would stay anonymous. Table 7 provides an overview of the hospitals and their charac-
teristics regarding sponsorship, service level, and nursing staff. None of the participating
hospitals had implemented an incident reporting system or quality management guidelines
concerning error management or learning from errors. Among these nine hospitals five
(55.6%) are under public and four (44.4%) under private or charitable sponsorship. Fur-
thermore, five are on Service Level 1 (55.6%), three on Level 2 (33.3%), and one on Level 3
(11.1%). Hence, the sample reflects the distribution of sponsorship in Bavaria adequately,
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whereas there is a bias in relation to the service levels: large hospitals on Level 3 are
overrepresented, Level 1 hospitals are underrepresented. However, the sample reflects at
least the order of the distribution, that is, Level 1 hospitals are the largest group, followed
by Level 2 and Level 3 hospitals. The characteristics of the non-participating hospitals
show no specific pattern, except that no hospital with over 1000 employed nurses partici-
pated. Typical arguments for non-participation were ongoing reorganisation processes in
the hospital.
A total of N = 864 nurses could be addressed with the developed questionnaire. Unlike
Study 2, no random sampling procedure could be applied, because the hospitals did not
allow access to their personnel data bases. The field access relied on the compliance of
the hospitals’ managers and therefore had to be realised according to their rules, that
is, they defined the number of nurses that could be contacted and that the nurses were
addressed via them and their immediate supervisors. For the nurses, participation in
the study was voluntary and the confidentiality of the answers was guaranteed. As a
consequence of the experiences in Study 2, hardly any personal information was requested
in the questionnaire that might have induced a feeling of being identifiable, in order to
increase the nurses’ readiness to participate. Problems of this sampling procedure are that
the representativeness of the sample cannot be ensured, that potentially only a specific part
of the population may have participated, and that the actual participation of the addressed
subjects could not be controlled. This control would not only have been impractical to
accomplish under the given conditions, but it also might have had negative effects on
the subjects’ readiness to answer the questions honestly. Presumably, employees who
complete the questionnaire involuntarily may tend to give socially desirable answers. In
order to mitigate this problem, the selectivity of the sample was accepted. Instead, the
managers were asked to administer the questionnaire to all full-time nurses on surgical
and internal medical units, and to as many nurses from other wards as possible, where the
error examples are relevant.
A total of N = 284 nurses participated in the study. Table 7 contains the sample sizes
and return quotes for the total sample and the subsamples. The overall return quote is
33%, which is above an expectable range for postal survey (Diekmann, 2007; Porst, 1998,
2001) and above both conditions in Study 2. From these nurses, 57.7% were employed
by public hospitals, 42.3% by private and charitable hospitals. As for the service levels,
45.8% of the surveyed nurses worked in Level 1 hospitals, 33.8% in Level 2 hospitals, and
20.4% in the Level 3 hospital. This reflects the distributions of the participating hospitals
given above. The mean professional age of the participants was M = 15.09 years with
a standard deviation of SD = 9.90. The majority worked in surgical (40%) and internal
medical units (33%), followed by intensive care (6%) and paediatric units (4%).
During data entry two participants were removed from the data set, because comments
they had written on the questionnaire indicated that they did not take the questions
seriously. In a first data screening, two more cases with many missing values had to be
removed. Remaining missing values were imputed in EQS using the EM-algorithm (Schafer
& Graham, 2002). These concerned one case with two, and seven cases with one missing
value and can be considered negligible. Preliminary analyses with the resulting sample
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Table 7: Composition of the sample
Hospital Sponsorship Service Nursing Addressed Returned Return
level staff nurses questionnaires quote
Participating hospitals
1 p/c 2 200− 500 100 36 36%
2 p 1 < 200 20 17 85%
3 p 1 200− 500 60 36 60%
4 p 1 < 200 60 23 38%
5 p/c 2 200− 500 60 30 50%
6 p 3 500− 1000 300 58 19%
7 p 2 500− 1000 90 30 33%
8 p/c 1 < 200 134 27 20%
9 p/c 1 200− 500 40 27 68%
Total 864 284 33%
Non-participating hospitals
10 p 1 < 200
11 p 3 > 1000
12 p/c 2 200− 500
13 p 3 200− 500
14 p 1 < 200
15 p 3 > 1000
16 p/c 2 500− 1000
Note. p = public, p/c = private/charitable sponsorship; medical service levels: 1 = ba-
sic, 2 = advanced, 3 = extensive service.
identified four further cases as multivariate outliers by means of their contribution to
Mardia’s normalised estimate of multivariate kurtosis (Bentler, 2006). They were excluded
from further analyses. This procedure left an effective sample size of N = 276 for the
analyses. Given that the hypothesised model has 37 free parameters to estimate (cf. p. 81),
this makes a ratio of 7.5 cases per estimated parameter, which is between the recommended
ratio of 10:1 and the recommended minimum ratio of 5:1 subjects per estimated parameter
in structural equation modelling (Kim & Bentler, 2006).
Despite the problems discussed above that speak to the selectivity of the sample, it can be
considered adequate for answering the stated research questions: The sample is sufficiently
large for testing the model, it reflects the distribution of sponsorship in Bavaria, and
reflects at least the order of the distribution according to the service levels of hospitals.
As intended, the majority of the participating nurses work in surgical and internal medical
units, which reflects the fact that these are the major units of hospitals and present on
all investigated service levels (Bayerische Krankenhausgesellschaft e.V., 2005a). In order
to check the degree to which the results obtained from this study are biased due to the
problems mentioned, cross-validation in future studies is required.
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Table 8: Authenticity and severity of the error cases
Error case Authenticity Severity
M SD M SD
1 Values on a medical instrument 1.98 1.05 4.04 1.13
2 Misinterpreting complications 1.85 1.01 3.42 1.39
3 Misjudging risk of bedsore 2.11 0.94 3.13 1.22
Note. N = 276; 6-point Likert scale, lower numbers indicate
higher authenticity/severity.
6.1.2. Instrument
The instrument used was almost identical to the Cases Approach questionnaire in Study 2.
Study 2 had provided initial evidence for the reliability and construct validity of the scales
(cf. Chapter 5). The following changes were made for further improvement. Firstly, the
direction of the Likert scale was inverted so that it reflected the German school-grade
system (i.e., lower numbers indicate a higher intensity). This should assist the subjects’
comprehension of the answer format. Secondly, the perceived severity of the error cases
was asked, in order to control for it. Thirdly, the items of the three error orientation
scales were modified, so that they referred more precisely to the chosen error case, in
order to increase the consistency with the Cases Approach and with the interpretation of
error orientation as a situational construct. The modification involved minor corrections
in the item wording. Finally, items from Study 2 that had not worked well in terms of
discrimination or reliability were reformulated or replaced. The revised scale ’joint cause
analysis’ consisted of eight items, ’joint development of new strategies’ of seven items. The
item contents can be obtained from appendix A.3. Descriptive statistics and reliability
estimates for the scales will be provided below.
As in Study 2, the subjects indicated that they could identify well with the cases
(cf. Tab. 8). 20.0% of the surveyed nurses chose Case 1 (misinterpretation of values on a
medical instrument), 57.5% Case 2 (misjudgement of complications), and 22.5% Case 3
(misjudgement of the risk of bedsore). Initial analyses indicated that the engagement in
learning activities was independent from the chosen example (MANOVA, F (4, 550) = 2.30,
n.s.), from the ability to identify with the example (cause analysis: r = .06, n.s.; strategy
development: r = .02, n.s.) and from how severe the subjects estimated the error case to
be (cause analysis: r = −.01, n.s.; strategy development: r = −.03, n.s.).
6.1.3. Analyses
For performing the tasks of testing and advancing the research model, structural equa-
tion modelling (SEM) was employed. Since SEM provides a blend of confirmatory and
exploratory procedures (Kline, 2005), it is appropriate for this purpose. Compared to
traditional regression analysis, SEM has the advantages of providing information about
model fit and correcting for measurement error. Testing a structural equation model is a
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process of consecutive steps: (a) to specify a statistical model on the basis of a hypothe-
sised substantive model, (b) to estimate the model with a computer program, and (c) to
test the model by evaluating its fit to the data and – given adequate fit – testing the
hypotheses upon which it is built. (d) After this confirmatory part of model testing, a
model can be advanced in post hoc analyses by respecifying it on the basis of identified
sources of misfit as well as substantive considerations, and subsequently estimating and
testing the respecified model (Byrne, 2006; Jo¨reskog, 1993; Kline, 2005; Schumacker &
Lomax, 2004). This exploratory, model generating mode of analysis is appropriate for the
goal to provide an advanced model with adequate fit to the current data as hypothesis for
further research (e.g., Jo¨reskog, 1993).
The discussion below elaborates how these steps are performed to attain the goals of testing
and advancing the research model for nurses’ engagement in social learning activities after
an error (Fig. 1), in order to answer Research Questions 2—4. Because the sample size
in Study 2 allowed to perform only preliminary item and scale analyses, first, preparatory
item analyses were required in order to specify adequately the measurement part of the
structural equation models (i.e., the part of the model that specifies the relations between
the items and the respective variables). Therefore, the discussion starts with a description
of these preparatory analyses and their results, before elaborating how the steps of the
SEM process are performed.
Preparatory item analyses and construction of scales. According to the described
theoretical structures of the variables (Chapters 2.2 and 2.3) and the findings of Study 2,
the following structure of the measurement model was planned.
Error orientation. The three variables regarding the estimation of an error chance for
learning, error strain, and covering up an error were planned to be represented by
three latent variables in the model, because they are conceptually different aspects
of interpreting an error situation.
A safe team climate. The perception of a safe team climate was planned as one latent
variable with the two scales ’trust’ and ’non-punitive orientation to errors’ as indi-
cators, because these two scales have been conceptualised as two facets of the same
construct and both were correlated highly in the Study 2 (r = .72).
Engagement in social learning activities. Given that joint cause analysis and joint strat-
egy development concern two conceptually distinct, but empirically related learning
activities (in Study 2: r = .64), it was planned to model them as two latent variables
that together build the second order latent variable ‘engagement in social learning
activities’.
Because the findings from Study 2 did not deliver sufficient evidence for the dimensionality
of the learning activity scales (i.e., no factor analyses could be conducted), the following
two steps of preparatory item and scale analyses were taken, in order to specify an adequate
measurement part of the structural equation model.
Firstly, the items of each scale were screened for their discrimination and contribution to
reliability, employing the same criteria as in Study 2. From each of the learning activity
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scales and from the scale non-punitive orientation, one item had to be removed because of
low discrimination. An overview of which items actually were used for the later analyses
can be obtained from appendix A.3.
Secondly, exploratory factor analyses with oblique rotation were applied in order to check
the dimensionality of the scales (principal axes factor analysis (PFA), direct oblimin ro-
tation). PFA is an appropriate extraction method when the goal of the analysis is to
identify latent constructs underlying measured variables, and oblique rotation is to be
preferred over orthogonal rotation, because it provides important information concerning
the relations among extracted factors (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999).
Whereas several authors reject conducting exploratory factor analyses prior to SEM based
on the same data (Byrne, 2006; Kline, 2005), others recommend this if the dimensionality
of a set of items is uncertain and the purpose of the study is not instrument development,
but testing the relations between variables (Gerbing & Hamilton, 1996; Little, Cunning-
ham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Given that this was the case in this study and that no
factor analyses could be performed in Study 2, this strategy was considered appropriate.
Single factor solutions were expected because each scale was supposed to measure one
underlying construct.
The exploratory factor analyses strengthened the assumption of unidimensionality for all
scales, except for the scale ’cause analysis’. In contrast to the expectation, the analysis
indicated a two factor solution, as judged by the Kaiser criterion, the scree test, and
Velicner’s MAP test (O’Connor, 2000). After removing one item that loaded lower than .5
on both factors and one cross-loading item, an interpretable solution with two correlated
factors (r = .32) could be obtained that explains 72.5% variance in the items. Factor 1
contains items that indicate a general readiness to address other team members in order
to communicate about the error and to analyse it (two items, e.g., “Analysing with my
colleagues why I made this error.”). The factor therefore is interpreted as ’general cause
analysis’. The items of Factor 2 address joint discussions about how specific causes may
have contributed to the error (three items, e.g., “Analysing with my colleagues whether
there was a problem in the communication with the patient.”). It therefore is interpreted
as ’specific cause analysis’.
On this basis, it was decided to split up the variable ’cause analysis’ into the two related
latent variables ‘general cause analysis’ and ‘specific cause analysis’. This implies that in-
stead of two, three latent variables (i.e., ’general cause analysis’, ’specific cause analysis’,
and ’strategy development’) build the second order variable ’engagement in social learning
activities’. A point of concern in this solution is that two and three items, respectively,
build latent variables. This flaw is resolved by the fact that these variables are combined
on the level of the second order variable and that this variable is used as the dependent
variable in the analyses on the structural level. The separation of the identified factors on
the measurement level is, however, required in order to account for the empirical structure
of the items. Otherwise, it would not be possible to know whether misfit in the model
results from misspecification on the measurement level or from misspecification on the
structural level (Jo¨reskog, 1993; Kline, 2005; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). For answering
the research questions, misfit on the structural level is relevant, that results from wrong
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substantive assumptions about the relations between the variables regarding the interpre-
tation of an error, the perception of a safe team climate, and the engagement in social
learning activities. The descriptive statistics and reliabilities for the scales built from the
factor analysis and for the other used scales can be obtained from Table 9.
Table 9: Descriptive statistics and reliability of the scales.
Constructs and scales Items α M SD
Error orientation
Chance for learning 4 .91 2.38 1.15
Error strain 5 .90 2.99 1.32
Covering up errors 5 .81 5.05 0.89
Safe team climate
Trust 5 .91 2.23 0.90
Non-punitive orientation 6 .87 2.23 0.97
Engagement in social
learning activities
General cause analysis 2 .86 2.02 0.92
Specific cause analysis 3 .68 3.48 1.16
New strategy 6 .87 2.82 1.07
Note. N = 276; 6-point Likert scale, lower numbers
indicate higher agreement/engagement.
Model specification. Model specification involves defining the structural as well as
the measurement part of the model, and to ensure the model’s overidentification. Overi-
dentification implies that the specified model has positive degrees of freedom in order to
estimate its fit to the data and to test the hypotheses (MacCallum, 1995). These tasks
are addressed, below. The resulting specified statistical model is depicted in Figure 2.
Latent variables are shown in ellipses, and observed indicators for the variables are shown
in rectangles. For clarity, the structural part is printed bold.
The structural part of the specified statistical model is identical with the stated research
model shown in Figure 1 and contains the stated hypotheses. The measurement part is
formulated on the basis of the planned structure of the variables and the item analyses,
both described in the previous paragraph. For each latent variable (except general and
specific cause analysis) two ’item parcels’ were constructed as indicators, that is, using
mean scores of scales or split-half scales as indicators for latent variables instead of single
items (Bandalos & Finney, 2001; Holt, 2004; Little et al., 2002; Schumacker & Lomax,
2004; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). Because cause analysis had to be separated into the
two variables general and specific cause analysis, there were too few items for building
item parcels. Therefore, both variables are modelled using the items of their scales as
indicators. This is no substantial problem here, because modelling on the item level
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implies an even more rigorous test of the measurement model than using parcels (Little
et al., 2002). Except for the discussed separation of cause analysis into two variables, the
described structure of the measurement model matches the planned structure discussed in
the previous paragraph. The correlation matrix and the descriptive statistics of the built
indicators can be obtained from Appendix A.3.
The following steps were taken in order to ensure the overidentification of the model,
(cf. Byrne, 2006; Kline, 2005; MacCallum, 1995; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). For each
latent variable, the loading of the first respective indicator was fixed to 1. To ensure
local overidentification of latent variables with two indicators, equality constraints were
imposed on their error variances. For the second order variable ’engagement in social
learning activities’ the loading of the latent variable ’development of new strategies’ was
fixed to 1. The resulting model contains 37 free parameters that have to be estimated and
is overidentified with 83 degrees of freedom (cf. Raykov & Marcoulides, 2006).
Model estimation. The specified model was analysed with EQS 6.1 (Bentler, 2006)
using robust Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. Robust estimation was used because
of evidence of multivariate non-normality in the data. Even after deleting the four above
mentioned multivariate outliers, Mardia’s normalised estimate of multivariate kurtosis
at 11.67 indicated that the assumption of multivariate normal distribution is not met7.
Robust ML estimation in EQS involves the use of the Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2-statistic,
robust standard errors, and corrected fit indices. Currently, this technique is considered
to be the most effective way to deal with non-normal data in SEM (Bentler, 2006; Byrne,
2006; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Mu¨ller, 2003; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).
Testing the model: Evaluation of model fit and test of the hypotheses. Testing
the specified model involves the steps of (a) evaluating the model fit for the measurement
model, (b) evaluating the model fit for the full structural equation model (c) and – provided
that the full model adequately fits the data – testing the hypotheses. This consecutive
process is required because testing the structural model – i.e., the specified theory – may
be meaningless unless it is first established that the measurement model holds (Jo¨reskog,
1993; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The following measures of model fit are relevant for
this study:
• The solution has to be checked for inadmissible estimates (i.e., negative variances,
correlations > 1.0, excessively large standard errors) and for the largest standardised
residuals. Standardised residuals > ±2.58 are indicative of misspecification (Byrne,
2006).
• A robust version of the χ2 test (i.e., Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2) is applied to evaluate
whether there is a significant difference between the model and the data. A significant
χ2 test rejects the hypothesis that the model fits the data. However, because of its
oversensitivity in large samples – particularly above N = 200 – a significant χ2 test
must be interpreted in the context of other fit indices (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004).






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• In accordance with the recommendations in the recent SEM literature, the combina-
tion of fit indices and cut-off values depicted in Table 10 is used to evaluate model fit
(Bu¨hner, 2006; Byrne, 2006; Kline, 2005; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). In the left
column the fit indices are listed, where asterisks printed before fit indices indicate
robust versions. The following three columns list for each index the possible range
and the cut-off values for good and acceptable fit, respectively.
Table 10: Goodness of fit indices and cut-off values.
Fit index Range Good fit Acceptable fit
*S-Bχ2/df 0 − 0 ≤ 2 2 < 3
SRMR 0 − 1 0 ≤ .05 .05 < .1
*CFI 0 − 1 .95 ≤ 1 .90 < .95
*RMSEA 0 − 1 0 ≤ .05 .05 < .08
*RMSEA 90% C.I. close to RMSEA, close to RMSEA
left boundary 0 ≤ .05
Note. * = robust version; S-Bχ2 = Satorra Bentler scaled χ2; df = degrees
of freedom; SRMR = standardised root mean square residual; CFI = com-
parative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation;
C.I. = confidence interval.
Advancing the model. ’Advancing’ means to develop a respecified model that provides
an equal or improved fit to the data, that is more parsimonious, or that provides a more
differentiated substantive interpretation of the relations among the investigated variables
(Jo¨reskog, 1993). Possibilities to advance the model are considered on a twofold basis.
Firstly, empirical modification indices are inspected that are provided by EQS (Bentler,
2006; Byrne, 2006). These indices inform us about sources of empirical misspecification
in the model, that is, whether there are omitted paths or specified paths that are inap-
propriate. The LM-test is used to check whether adding paths to the model results in a
significant improvement of fit. As a general rule, only paths that can be interpreted sub-
stantively are eligible for inclusion in the model (Byrne, 2006; Jo¨reskog, 1993; Kline, 2005;
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The W-test is used to check whether paths can be removed
without a significant loss of model fit. Secondly, the pattern of results from testing the
hypothesised model can be interpreted substantively to suggest changes in the model.
Because these ways of advancing the model are exploratory, their findings constitute new
hypotheses about the relations between the interpretation of an error, the perception
of a safe team climate, and learning from errors, that have to be validated in further
studies. Nevertheless, only such model modifications are appropriate that – beyond having
a substantive interpretation – provide adequate fit and are statistically significant in the
current sample (Jo¨reskog, 1993; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). This model generating
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approach of model modification is appropriate to deliver more differentiated hypotheses
as a basis for further research on learning from errors.
6.2. Results
This section presents in two parts the results from the analyses. The first part starts with
the results from testing the stated research model (Fig. 2). In the second part possibilities
to advance the model will be identified and findings from the exploratory analyses are
reported that suggest hypotheses for further research.
6.2.1. Results from testing the research model
Testing the model involved evaluating the model fit of (a) the measurement model, (b) the
full structural equation model, and (c) testing the stated hypotheses. The results of these
steps are reported, below.
Evaluation of the model fit of the measurement model. The measurement
model was evaluated by estimating a model with all latent variables as correlated fac-
tors (Jo¨reskog, 1993; Kline, 2005). No problems were encountered during the estimation
and all estimates appeared in order. The fit indices indicate a well fitting model, though
the χ2 test is significant (S-Bχ2(75) = 127.04, p = .000, S-Bχ
2/df = 1.69, SRMR = .05,
*CFI = .97, *RMSEA = .05 with 90% C.I. .04−.07). No standardised residuals larger than
±2.58 were present. All factor loadings were statistically significant and had a substantial
size (lowest loading of item SCA3 on ’specific cause analysis’ at .47, all other loadings
above .5). Estimates for all factor loadings are depicted below for the full structural equa-
tion model (Fig. 3). Given this evidence of a well established measurement model, the full
structural equation model could be tested.
Evaluation of the model fit of the full structural equation model. No problems
were encountered during the estimation for the hypothesised model and all estimates
appeared in order. The fit indices indicate adequate model fit (S-Bχ2(83) = 170.60, p =
.000, S-Bχ2/df = 2.06, SRMR = .07, *CFI = .96, *RMSEA = .06 with 90% C.I. .05 −
.08). An examination of the standardised residuals revealed one residual larger than
±2.58 associated with the covariance between item GCA1 and the item parcel CE2. The
second largest standardised residual was close below the recommended cut-off value and
concerned the covariance between item GCA2 and item parcel CE2. This indicates that the
hypothesised model underestimates the covariances between items associated to general
cause analysis and to covering errors. Despite of these residuals, the hypothesised model
provides an adequate overall fit to the data, so that the stated hypotheses can be tested.
Test of the hypotheses. Figure 3 presents the standardised estimates for the hypoth-
esised model. Statistically insignificant paths are indicated by dashed lines. All other
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estimates are statistically significant. The total explained variance for the engagement in
social learning activities is 29%. Concerning the hypotheses about the relation between
the interpretation of an error and the engagement in social learning activities (Research
Question 2), the following can be stated.
Hypothesis 1. The hypothesis is confirmed. As expected, the estimation of an error as a
chance for learning predicts the engagement in social learning activities positively,
with a medium effect size.
Hypothesis 2. The hypothesis is rejected. In contrast to the expectation, error strain did
not significantly predict the engagement in social learning activities.
Hypothesis 3. The hypothesis is confirmed. As expected, the tendency to cover up an
error predicts the engagement in social learning activities negatively, with a medium
effect size.
Concerning the hypothesis about the relation between the perception of the social context
and the engagement in social learning activities (Research Question 3), the following can
be stated.
Hypothesis 4. The hypothesis is rejected. In contrast to the expectation, the perception
of a safe team climate did not significantly predict the engagement in social learning
activities.
Concerning the hypotheses about the interrelation between the interpretation of an error
and the perception of a safe team climate (Research Question 4), the following can be
stated.
Hypothesis 5. The hypothesis is rejected. In contrast to the expectation, the estimation
of an error as a chance for learning is not significantly correlated with the tendency
to cover up an error.
Hypothesis 6. The hypothesis is rejected. In contrast to the expectation, the estimation
of an error as a chance for learning is positively correlated with error strain. The
correlation is large and statistically significant, but opposite to the expected direc-
tion.
Hypothesis 7. The hypothesis is rejected. In contrast to the expectation, the tendency to
cover up an error is not significantly correlated with error strain.
Hypothesis 8. The hypothesis is rejected. In contrast to the expectation, the perception
of a safe team climate is not significantly correlated with the individual estimation
of errors as a chance for learning.
Hypothesis 9. The hypothesis is confirmed. As expected, the perception of a safe team
climate is team negatively correlated with the individual tendency to cover up errors,
with a medium to large effect size.
Hypothesis 10. The hypothesis is rejected. In contrast to the expectation, the perception
of a safe team climate is not significantly correlated with error strain.
These results represent the final step of testing the stated research model and its hypotheses
in a confirmatory mode of analysis. In summary, the results indicate that the estimation of




























































































































































































































































































































































































































nurses’ engagement in social learning activities after an error, whereas negative emotions
resulting from an error and the perception of a safe team climate do not. Furthermore,
there are large correlations (a) between the estimation of an error as a chance for learning
and error strain, and (b) between the tendency to cover the error and a safe team climate,
whereas the other hypothesised correlations are insignificant. Interpretations of the results
will be given in the discussion. The section below will explore possibilities to advance the
model, based on these findings.
6.2.2. Advancing the research model
Based on the results from testing the research model, tasks to explore possibilities of
advancing the model are identified below.
1. Given that the hypothesised model provided an adequate fit to the data, no paths
have to be added to the model on the basis of the LM-test in order to achieve a better
model fit. As MacCallum, Roznowski, and Necowitz (1992) caution, “(. . . ) when an
initial model fits well, it is probably unwise to modify it to achieve even better fit
because the modifications may simply be fitting small idiosyncratic characteristics
of the sample” (p. 501). In order to provide information for potential replication
studies, LM-test findings are reported below, but not considered for inclusion in the
model until replication in further studies.
2. It has to be checked whether there are redundant paths that can be removed from
the model without a substantial loss of model fit and explained variance in the en-
gagement in social learning activities (W-Test). This would contribute to advancing
the model by providing a more parsimonious explanation for the relations among the
investigated variables (i.e., a model with fewer paths). According to the parsimony
principle, from two different models with similar explanatory power for the same
data, the simpler model is to be preferred (Kline, 2005; MacCallum, 1995).
3. An emerging question from the pattern of findings discussed above is whether error
strain and a safe team climate are indeed unrelated to the engagement in learning
activities or whether their statistical insignificance is an effect of the mentioned large
correlations (Urban & Mayerl, 2006). Hence, it has to be checked whether error strain
and a safe team climate significantly predict the engagement in social learning activ-
ities, when analysed alone. A significant finding would be indicative of a mediation
model in which (a) the estimation of an error as a chance for learning is dependent
on the amount of strain suffered from an error and, in turn, predicts the engagement
in social learning activities, and (b) the tendency to cover errors is dependent on
the perception of a safe team climate and, in turn, predicts the engagement in social
learning activities. For exploring this potential mediation model, firstly, direct rela-
tions are hypothesised between error strain and chance for learning, and between a
safe team climate and the tendency to cover up an error. A substantive rationale for
this is provided below. Secondly, it has to be checked, whether the indirect relations
of error strain and safe team climate with the engagement in learning activities are
significant (Kline, 2005). In this case, it would be legitimate to suggest the mediation
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model as a hypothesis for further research. This would advance the originally stated
research model by contributing to differentiate the assumptions about the interplay
of the investigated predictors (Research Question 4) and about how they relate to
the engagement in learning activities (Research Questions 2 and 3).
The findings from these three steps are reported below. Required substantive rationales
are provided shortly and are elaborated in the discussion. For clarity, the originally spec-
ified model (Fig. 2) will be referred to as Model 1 and subsequent models are numbered
consecutively.
Findings from the LM-test: Information about potentially omitted paths. The
findings of the LM-test performed on Model 1 identified one path whose contribution to
improve the model fit (i.e., a reduction the χ2 for 36.63) stands apart from the rest (Bentler,
2006; Byrne, 2006). This finding indicates adding a structural path to the model, flowing
from covering up an error to general cause analysis (in Fig. 2: f7→f1), with an expected
effect size of -.47. This path addresses exactly the residuals mentioned in the test of
Model 1 and indicates that there is a substantial amount of covariation between covering
up an error and the engagement in general cause analysis that is not captured by the second
order variable engagement in social learning activities. A substantive interpretation of this
path can be obtained from reviewing the item contents. The items of the scale ’covering up
errors’ refer to expected disadvantages from communicating an error to others. The items
of ’general cause analysis’ contain a general readiness to communicate with other team
members about the error. Furthermore, especially item GCA1 is directed towards the
self (“. . . why I made this mistake.”). Hence, a substantive interpretation of the suggested
path may be that nurses with an especially defensive orientation towards an error – as
expressed by the tendency to cover it up – may particularly fear to make an initial step of
communicating an error to others and to analyse their own contribution to the error. In
this interpretation, general cause analysis may serve as a gate keeper that has to be passed
before more specific causes or strategies to deal with the error in future can be addressed.
Despite of the possibility of finding a substantive interpretation for this path, it is not
considered for inclusion in the model here, because Model 1 provided sufficient model
fit and because paths indicated by the LM-test are often instable (MacCallum et al.,
1992). Caution is also required because of the problem discussed above that ’specific
cause analysis’ is represented by only two items. The indicated path is reported here
in order to provide information for potential replication studies. If the finding should
replicate, the path should be included in the model (MacCallum et al., 1992; Schumacker
& Lomax, 2004).
Findings from the W-test: Dropping redundant paths. Performing the W-Test on
Model 1 indicated exactly the six insignificant paths identified above as being redundant
to the model. No paths that were statistically significant in Model 1 were suggested
for exclusion by the test. Removing the insignificant paths from the model yielded a
largely unaffected and still adequate model fit (Model 2: S-Bχ2(89) = 178.66, p = .000,
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S-Bχ2/df = 2.01, SRMR = .08, *CFI = .96, *RMSEA = .06 with 90% C.I. .05− .07) with
a statistically insignificant increase of the χ2 (scaled difference: ∆S-Bχ2(6) = 7.76; n.s.).
Furthermore, removing the paths resulted only in a minor reduction of the explained
variance in the engagement in social learning activities from 29% to 28%. Hence, the
insignificant paths can be removed from the model without a substantial loss of model fit
and explained variance in the engagement in social learning activities. The fact that no
other requirements for modification were identified by the W-test strengthens the findings
from Model 1 by indicating that all statistically significant paths are also important for
the model in terms of their contribution to model fit.
Although removing the insignificant paths could contribute to making Model 1 more par-
simonious, a substantive problem is that error strain and the perception of a safe team
climate are only indirectly connected to the engagement in learning activities via their
correlations with a chance for learning and the tendency to cover up an error, respec-
tively (cf. Fig. 3). Hence, they have currently no substantive function in the model. This
provides a further reason to proceed with analysing a potential indirect relation of these
variables with the engagement in learning activities.
Exploring a potential mediation model. Checking a potential indirect relation of
error strain and covering up errors with the engagement in learning activities involved two
steps. Firstly, it had to be checked whether error strain and covering up errors are indeed
unrelated to the engagement in learning activities, or whether the finding from Model 1 is
an effect of the shared variance with the interpretation of an error as a chance for learning
and the tendency to cover up an error, respectively. In the former case, the findings
would indicate removing error strain and a safe team climate completely from the model
because they are irrelevant for explaining the engagement in social learning activities. In
the latter case, the pattern of findings would be indicative of an indirect relation (i.e.,
a mediation model), to be explored in a second step. Demonstrating a mediation effect
requires significant indirect but not direct relations of error strain and a safe team climate
with the engagement in learning activities when analysed together with chance for learning
and covering errors (Kline, 2005).
Hence, first, a model with only error strain and the perception of a safe team climate
as uncorrelated predictors for the engagement in social learning activities was estimated
(Model 3). The solution for this model resulted in a well fitting model (S-Bχ2(43) = 72.23,
p = .003, S-Bχ2/df = 1.68, SRMR = .08, *CFI = .98, *RMSEA = .05 with 90% C.I.
.03− .07). Unlike Model 1, the engagement in social learning activities was predicted sig-
nificantly by error strain (.23) and a safe team climate (.29), with 14% explained variance.
These findings support the conjecture that the insignificant contribution of these variables
in Model 1 is an effect of the large correlations with the estimation of an error as a chance
for learning and the tendency to cover up an error. When analysed together, error strain
and a safe team climate have too little independent predictive variance.
The findings so far indicate that error strain and safe team climate are significantly related
with the engagement in social learning activities when analysed alone (Model 3 ), and that
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this relation disappears when analysed together with chance for learning and covering up
an error (Model 1). This pattern of results argues for a model with the discussed indirect
relations (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kline, 2005). In this potential model the estimation of
an error as a chance for learning is an mediating variable between error strain and the
engagement in social learning activities, and the tendency to cover errors is a mediating
variable between the perception of a safe team climate and the engagement in social learn-
ing activities. However, suggesting such a model for further research requires answering
the question whether the hypotheses (a) that error strain predicts the estimation of an
error as a chance for learning and (b) that the perception of a safe team climate predicts
the tendency to cover up an error, are substantively meaningful. The position taken here
is that these hypotheses are consistent with the theory provided above (cf. Chapter 2.3).
Concerning (a) it can be argued that the emotions experienced after an error have an im-
pact on whether it is perceived as a relevant learning situation. This can be explained with
the argument from research on experiential learning that episodes need to be experienced
as personally salient in order to become relevant for the engagement in learning activities
(Gruber, 1999a). Concerning (b) it has been stated above that a perceived safe social
environment at work may reduce fears of being accused and therefore mitigate expected
disadvantages of communicating an error to colleagues (Edmondson, 1999). Hence, the
tendency to cover up an error in a specific situation may be dependent on the general per-
ception of the social context, and in turn affect the decision to address others for learning
activities. Although the mediation model and Model 2 are statistically equivalent (i.e.,
they produce the same model fit; Hershberger, 2006; MacCallum, 1995), the mediation
model is substantively more meaningful than Model 2, because error strain and a safe
team climate contribute indirectly to explaining the engagement in learning activities.
In order to check whether the current data support hypothesising this mediation model
for further studies, it was specified, estimated, and the indirect relations of error strain
and a safe team climate with the engagement in social learning activities were tested for
significance (Model 4; Fig. 4). The findings indicate small but statistically significant
indirect paths from error strain and a safe team climate to the engagement in social
learning activities (strain = .18, climate = .18), together with no direct paths from these
variables on the engagement in social learning activities present in the model. This is
indicative of a full mediation status (Kline, 2005).
6.3. Discussion
The goals of this study were to test and to advance the developed research model in order
to answer the research questions about the relations among the interpretation of an error,
the perception of a safe team-climate, and nurses’ engagement in social learning activities
(Research Questions 2—4). For this purpose, a large sample of nurses from several hos-
pitals was surveyed in a cross-sectional field study employing the Cases Approach. This
section starts with providing a summary of the results from testing the model and from
the exploratory analyses presented in the previous section. Secondly, these results are


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































the conclusiveness of the study is reflected by elaborating on strong and weak aspects, and
conclusions for the research questions are summarised.
Summary of the results. The main results from testing the research model and the
findings from the exploratory analyses are summarised in Figure 5 through a comparison
of models. For clarity, the measurement parts of the models are omitted.
The hypothesised research model is depicted in Figure 5a. After preparatory item analyses
that aimed to specify an adequate measurement part of the model, a statistical model has
been specified on the basis of this research model. In the analysis, this model provided an
adequate fit to the data so that the stated hypotheses could be tested. Figure 5b illustrates
which of the assumed relationships have actually been found. Paths that were found to
be insignificant are omitted for this purpose. These results can be summarised as follows.
From the variables regarding the interpretation of an error situation, the estimation of an
error as a chance for learning and the tendency to cover up an error significantly predict
nurses’ engagement in social learning activities after an error, whereas negative emotions
resulting from an error do not (Hypotheses 1—3). The perception of the social context
in terms of a safe team climate did not significantly contribute to explain the engagement
in social learning activities (Hypothesis 4). Concerning the interrelation of the variables
regarding the interpretation of an error situation and the perception of the social context,
large correlations were found between the estimation of an error as a chance for learning
and error strain (Hypothesis 6), and between the tendency to cover the error and a safe
team climate (Hypothesis 9), whereas the other hypothesised correlations were insignificant
(Hypotheses 5, 7, 8, & 10).
In order to elicit possibilities to advance the model, the following steps were taken. In a
first step, empirical modification indices were inspected (LM-test, W-test). The LM-test
findings indicated a potentially omitted path from the tendency to cover up an error to the
engagement in general cause analysis in the model. The hypothesis suggested by this path
is that there may be a stronger threshold to pass for people with a particular defensive
orientation towards errors, before they initiate action- and future-oriented analyses of an
error. However, because of the adequate fit of the initial model and the tentative status of
this path, it was not considered for inclusion in the model. The W-test identified only the
insignificant paths from Model 1 as being redundant and made no further suggestions to
remove paths. Hence, after removing the insignificant paths, no measures for increasing
the model’s parsimony had to be taken.
In a second step, it was checked whether the insignificant contribution of error strain
and the perception of a safe team climate to the explanation of nurses’ engagement in
social learning activities in Model 1 is an effect of the shared variance with the respective
other predictors. Indeed, the findings indicated that both variables were significant pre-
dictors for the engagement in learning activities when analysed alone. The fact that this
significant relation disappears in the joint analysis with the estimation of an error as a
chance for learning and the tendency to cover up an error indicates that error strain and
a safe team climate have too little independent predictive variance. On the basis of this
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Figure 5: Comparison of the models based on (a) the hypothesised re-
search model, (b) the results from the test of the research
model, and (c) the mediation model as hypothesis for fur-
ther research.
pattern of findings the research model was reinterpreted to build a mediation model as
a hypothesis for further research (Fig. 5c). In this model (a) the estimation of an error
as a chance for learning is hypothesised to be a mediating variable between error strain
and the engagement in social learning activities, and (b) the tendency to cover errors is
hypothesised to be a mediating variable between the perception of a safe team climate and
the engagement in social learning activities. A respective model provided good fit to the
data and the indirect relations of error strain and safe team climate on the engagement in
learning activities were small but statistically significant.
The following paragraphs will elaborate substantive interpretations of the described results
and their implications for the theory provided above.
Interpretation of the findings and their implications for theory. Concerning the
relation between variables regarding the individual interpretation of an error situation
in nursing and nurses’ engagement in social learning activities after an error (Research
Question 2), the study provided evidence that the estimation of an error as a chance
for learning is a facilitating variable. The more nurses think that an error situation is
prone to deliver relevant information for the improvement of their work, the more they are
prepared to address others at work for joint analyses of the error and the development of
strategies to avoid it in future. This finding is consistent with the assumption that learning
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from an error requires a subject to take a learning orientation and to expect benefits in
return for the effort of engaging in learning (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Rybowiak et al.,
1999; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). It also strengthens the proposition that only those episodes
which are perceived as relevant for the engagement in learning activities become learning
experiences (Gruber, 1999a).
Furthermore, the tendency to cover up an error, that is, focusing on disadvantages from
communicating about an error, is an inhibiting factor. Nurses who have the perception
that it is useful to conceal that an error has happened, avoid approaching others for the
engagement in learning activities. This result supports the conjecture that anticipated
uselessness or disutility of communicating an error episode to team members – as ex-
pressed by the tendency to cover up an error – inhibits taking a problem solving or action
orientation after an error and addressing others for cause analysis and strategy develop-
ment (Arndt, 1996; Edmondson, 1999; Meurier et al., 1997; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zhao
& Olivera, 2006). It has been stated that such a tendency may result from individual
fear by perceiving the error as a threat, as well as from the anticipation that the social
and organisational context will react with accusations and negative sanctions (Barach &
Small, 2000; Edmondson, 1999). This interpretation also receives support from the strong
negative correlation of the tendency to cover up an error with the perception of a safe
team climate.
Both described results are obtained from the confirmatory test of the hypothesised model,
replicate findings from Study 2, and match the expectations derived from the theory and
the findings presented above. The total variance explained by these predictors is 28% when
analysed alone (cf. Model 2) and in a range that can be expected from non-experimental
field research. In combination, these results provide support to the assumption that learn-
ing from errors involves a cost-benefit evaluation (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). The evaluation
of an error as a chance for learning focusses on potential benefits of the error, while covering
the error focusses on the costs. More broadly speaking, this is in line with expectancy-value
models of human motivation and action (Beckmann & Heckhausen, 2006).
In contrast to the theoretical expectations, the hypothesis that negative emotions experi-
enced after an error situation inhibit the engagement in learning activities after an error
was rejected by the model test (Research Question 2). The same holds true for the hypoth-
esis that a safe team climate facilitates addressing colleagues for discussing and analysing
an error (Research Question 3). Both variables were insignificant in Model 1. However,
the position advanced here is that these results do not imply a complete rejection of the
theory regarding the impact of negative emotions and the perception of a safe team climate
on learning from errors, but suggest a differentiation that is expressed in the hypothesised
mediation model. As proposed by the post hoc analyses, the insignificant contribution of
both variables in Model 1 is not due to the fact that they are unrelated to the engage-
ment in social learning activities, but seems to be an effect of the large amount of shared
variance between a chance for learning and error strain, and covering up the error and a
safe team climate, respectively. The findings of Model 3 – with only error strain and safe
team climate as predictors – indicated that both variables are significantly related with
the engagement in social learning activities, when analysed alone. The fact that these
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relations disappear in the joint comparison in Model 1 points to the suggested mediation
model.
Concerning the interrelation of the variables regarding the interpretation of an error and
the perception of a safe social context (Research Question 4), two significant correlations
were found, whereas the other hypotheses were rejected. In accordance with the expecta-
tion, a significant negative correlation between the perception of a safe team climate and
the tendency to cover up an error could be found. The more nurses perceive a trustful
team climate in their wards that enables the open discussion of errors, the less they tend
to perceive advantages from covering up an error. This result replicates the finding from
Study 2. It is consistent with the assumption that a safe team climate should mitigate
potential fears from having committed an error as well as anticipated risks of admitting
an error to others and, therefore, reduce the tendency to cover it up (Edmondson, 1999).
In the mediation model, this has been reinterpreted in terms of a direct relation by hy-
pothesising that the perception of a safe team climate predicts the tendency to cover up
an error.
The correlation between the experience of negative emotions after an error and the estima-
tion that an error is a chance for learning was significant, but in contrast to the expectation
with a positive sign. The more nurses experience emotional strain after an error situation
the more they estimate it as a relevant chance for learning. The insignificant path between
error strain and the engagement in learning activities in Model 1 was also positive. This
contradicts the conjecture that negative emotions may inhibit taking a learning orientation
after an error (Boud, 1999; Greif, 1996; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zhao & Olivera, 2006).
In contrast, the finding is consistent with the proposition of the potentially fostering role
of consternation (Oser & Spychiger, 2005) and the argument that the experience of neg-
ative emotions may create a personal feeling of salience that is required to interpret the
episode as relevant for learning (Gruber, 1999a). Negative emotions may create a desire
not to repeat the experience and therefore lead to the conclusion that learning activities
are required that aim at identifying potential causes and changing them. More broadly,
this is in line with a conception of emotions as self-regulatory processes. This concep-
tion proposes that emotions modulate cognitive and motivational processes, and shape
action tendencies via them (Do¨rner, 2004; Forgas, 1995; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). In the
suggested mediation model, this has been reinterpreted in terms of a directed relation by
hypothesising that negative emotions predict the estimation of an error as a chance for
learning. However, more research is required on the impact of negative emotions. Even if
the finding that negative emotions create a motivational relevance for learning from errors
could be consolidated, it still might be that they interfere with the quality of cognitive
elaboration processes. Spitzer (2007) points out that fear in particular causes quick learn-
ing but inhibits a deep integration with prior knowledge, decreases flexible application of
the constructed knowledge, and induces rigid cognitive styles that prevent finding creative
problem solutions. Exactly these processes are required for learning from errors, involv-
ing the search for effective new strategies for avoiding an error in future. Further studies
should aim to identify qualities of motivation induced by negative emotions about an error
as well as to elicit cognitive processes. For this purpose, more differentiated perspectives
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on negative emotions and how they may relate to learning from errors are needed. One
may be to search for interaction effects or non-linear relationships. However, the inspec-
tion of scatter plots in this study yielded no sign of such a non-linear relationship. Another
perspective is to differentiate more clearly between different kinds of negative emotions.
In the scale error strain different feelings such as shame, fear, and anger are treated as a
single variable. Though the results of this study and the analyses from Rybowiak et al.
(1999) indicate the unidimensionality of the scale error strain, the assumption that these
emotions work in a similar way may be inadequate. Finally, a differentiation between the
time directly after the error, and a later time when a re-evaluation of the experience and
the involved emotions has taken place, may be required.
Beyond the just discussed two significant correlations, the results from the study indicated
that several of the hypothesised correlations among the predictor variables are insignificant
and essentially zero. This concerns the correlations between (a) a chance for learning and
covering up an error, (b) error strain and covering up an error, (c) a safe team climate and
a chance for learning, and (d) a safe team climate and error strain (Hypotheses 5, 7, 8, and
10). The rejection of these hypotheses draws a picture that is apparent from Figure 5b.
It indicates that the four predictor variables operate – or at least are measured – on two
separate levels. On the upper side of Figure 5b are variables that primarily concern the
personal interpretation of the error, that is, the emotions aroused by the error and the
estimated relevance of the experienced episode for learning. The variables on the lower
side concern the interpretation or anticipation of social interactions (i.e., the perception of
a safe climate, anticipated disadvantages from communication of the error). This suggests
that the tendency to cover up an error has more to do with the situationally dependent
anticipation of social interactions, than with a purely individual decision to disclose an
error. In contrast, negative emotions and the evaluation of an error as a chance for learning
seem to belong mainly to the individual and are not intertwined with the perception of a
safe team context, as originally expected.
Substantively, the lack of relations between these levels indicates that the way nurses feel
about an error and their estimation of its relevance for learning belongs to their own
subjective interpretation of the episode and is independent of the perception of the so-
cial context. Whereas a safe team climate seems to mitigate anticipated disadvantages
from communicating an error, it does not alleviate feeling bad about having committed
an error. This interpretation also accounts for the failure to find the hypothesised rela-
tionship between error strain and covering up an error. Both findings indicate that the
negative emotions measured by the scale error strain mainly express nurses’ dissatisfac-
tion or indignation with themselves, and less socially oriented emotions (Pekrun & Frese,
1992). Furthermore, the absence of a relationship between a safe team climate and the
estimation of an error as a chance for learning seems to contradict a finding from Cannon
and Edmondson (2001) that team members tend to hold shared beliefs about errors. This
discrepancy may be due to the strong situational emphasis in the present study. Whereas
it may be the case that team members hold similar generalised beliefs about errors, the
interpretation of an error in a specific situation may be mainly dependent on the charac-
teristics of this very episode. A similar explanation can be applied to the findings that the
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tendency to cover up an error is unrelated with the estimation of the error as a chance
for learning. Whereas a general positive attitude towards errors in terms of conceiving
them as learning chances may be negatively related to a general tendency not to com-
municate about errors (if such general tendencies exist) the present results suggest that
the situational interpretation of a single error episode as a chance for learning, and the
anticipation of disadvantages from communicating about it, address independent aspects
of this episode. Put simply, thinking that an error is a useful chance for learning and
thinking that it may be wise to keep it for oneself are not related with each other.
Because of the adequate initial model fit, exploring possibilities to advance the model
relied mainly on interpreting the overall pattern of the findings discussed so far. These
findings can be integrated to build the hypothesised mediation model that is a substantive
reinterpretation of the research model. The mediation model advances the research model
by differentiating the assumptions about the interplay between the variables concerning
the interpretation of an error and the perception of the context (Research Question 4),
and about how these variables relate to the engagement in learning activities after an error
(Research Questions 2 and 3), as discussed below.
Mediation models are receiving increasing attention in the social sciences and particularly
in research on professional learning (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Keith & Frese, 2005;
Van den Bossche, 2006), because they allow us to model explanations for how relations
between ’input’ and ’output’ variables may work (Bentler, 2006; Wu & Zumbo, in press).
The proposed model suggests that cognitive interpretations (i.e., of an error as a chance
for learning, of expected disadvantages from communicating an error) intervene between
experiences (i.e., strain suffered from the error, safety of the social context) and the inten-
tion to engage in learning activities. This assumption is consistent with the proposition
made above that emotions as well as contextual characteristics at work influence behaviour
primarily through their effects on individual cognition (Billett, 2006; Do¨rner, 2004; Forgas,
1995; Jørgensen & Warring, 2002; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). More precisely, the mediation
model differentiates the assumptions about the impact of negative emotions on learning
from errors by hypothesising that the experience of negative emotions creates a feeling of
salience for estimating an error episode as relevant for learning (Gruber, 1999a; Oser &
Spychiger, 2005) and therefore indirectly affects the engagement in learning activities via
this estimation. Furthermore, the model hypothesises that a safe team climate reduces per-
ceived disadvantages from communicating an error to colleagues (Edmondson, 1999), and
therefore indirectly facilitates the engagement in learning activities through this reduction
of potential costs. This proposition differentiates the assumption that initiating learning
behaviour within a team may be constrained by the fear to appear incompetent or to lose
face (Argyris, 1982; Argyris & Scho¨n, 1996; Van Dyck et al., 2005; Edmondson, 1999) by
emphasising the role of intervening cognitive processes regarding the interpretation of a
specific situation.
In the proposed mediation model, the correlations (a) between error strain and the es-
timation of an error as a chance for learning, and (b) between a safe team climate and
covering up errors are reinterpreted as hypotheses about direct relations. Because no causal
conclusions can be drawn from the correlative findings from this study, the hypothesised
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direction of the relations is assumed for the substantive reasons provided above and cannot
be clarified with the present data. It is acknowledged that there may be also arguments
to assume the opposite directions. Concerning (a) the hypothesis that the estimation of
an error as a chance for learning has an effect on the experience of negative emotions
is possible. Consistent with the assumption that reflection involves a (re-)interpretation
of the emotions involved in an episode (Boud et al., 1989a), it can be argued that the
estimation of an error as a chance for learning involves a re-appraisal of the involved emo-
tions. Nevertheless, the position advanced here is that negative emotions result in the first
place from having committed an error (Keith & Frese, 2005; Zapf, 1991). Reflective pro-
cesses involving cognitive reinterpretations of the event and of the involved emotions take
place subsequently. Furthermore, individuals have been found to use occurring emotions
as heuristics that inform their judgements of situations (Forgas, 1995; Zhao & Olivera,
2006). Concerning (b) it may be argued that the experience of specific error episodes leads
to the reappraisal of the perceived safety of the social context. However, this effect should
work over a longer time, because the perception of the social context is the result of a
cumulated experience over a prolonged interaction history (Kramer, 2006). In contrast,
the perception of the social context provides an expectational backdrop for interpretation
of specific error episodes within this context (Edmondson, 1999; Kramer, 2006). Since the
error orientation variables have been conceptualised as situationally grounded in the error
cases, assuming an immediate effect of the tendency to cover up an error in a given error
situation on the general perception of a safe team climate seems implausible.
Concluding the discussion of the mediation model, the position taken here is that the find-
ings from Model 1 do not suggest a rejection, but a differentiation of the theory regarding
the impact of error strain and a safe team climate on learning from errors. Hypothesising
the described mediation model is theoretically attractive, because cognitive interpretations
intervene between experiences and intended behaviour. This advances the originally stated
research model by contributing to differentiate the assumptions about the interplay of the
interpretation of an error situation and the perception of the social context (Research
Question 4) and about how these variables relate to the engagement in learning activities
(Research Questions 2 and 3). Because mediation models require that the direction of
relations is correctly specified (Kline, 2005), further studies should address the issue of
direction of causality in the proposed relations, for example, by using cross-lagged panel
designs (Bortz & Do¨ring, 2006). Furthermore, qualitative data could be helpful to deepen
the understanding of the processes going on.
The paragraph below will critically reflect on the conclusiveness of this study and sum-
marise the discussion so far, leading to conclusions for the research questions.
Limitations and summary of the conclusions for the research questions. This
study contributed to answering the research questions about how nurses’ engagement in
social learning activities after an error at work relates to their interpretation of the error
and to the perception of a safe team climate (Research Questions 2 and 3). These variables
have widely been assumed to foster or constrain learning from errors at work (Arndt, 1996;
Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Meurier et al., 1997; Tjosvold et
6.3. Discussion 99
al., 2004; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Van Woerkom, 2003). Furthermore, the study
addressed the question about how the variables regarding the interpretation of an error
and the perception of a safe social context interrelate (Research Question 4). Before
turning to a summary of the conclusions for these research questions, a summary of weak
and strong aspects of the present study is appropriate.
Weaknesses of this study that constrain its conclusiveness concern the limited explanatory
power of the non-experimental design, that the findings are limited to the field of nursing,
and the potential selectivity of the sample. However, the study provided information
about the association between the investigated variables as an elementary precondition
for potential causal relations (Hoyle, 1995) and thereby contributed to identify and select
potential determinants for learning from errors at work that can be investigated more
deeply in further studies. Furthermore, a problem was that the scale ’cause analysis’ did
not work exactly in the intended way. In contrast to the intention, the factor analysis
revealed a two-dimensional structure of the original scale ’joint cause analysis’. This
underlying two-dimensionality may be a reason why in Study 2 several items had to be
excluded from this scale. However, the resulting factor solution was interpretable, the
items had substantial loadings on their factors, and the scales that were built on the basis
of the factors proved to be reliable. The problem that the scales consist only of few items
was resolved by the fact that the scales were used in combination as the second order
variable ’engagement in social learning activities’. Furthermore, for many applications it
is preferable to have a few good indicators than many items that are actually paraphrases
of one question (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Nevertheless, the scales should be extended
in a revision. In terms of content validity, the scale general cause analysis has a narrow
construct scope (i.e., an initial readiness to communicate about an error), so that with
one or two additional items the scale should represent the construct adequately. The scale
specific cause analysis should be extended in a way that it reflects more relevant reasons
that underlie the present error cases. Despite of the problem with the cause analysis scale,
the instrument seems to have been adequate: a reliable and well fitting measurement
model could be established on its basis.
Overall, the implementation of the Cases Approach seems to have been successful. The
majority of the participants’ perceived the error vignettes as authentic, in both Studies 1
and 2. This supports the assumption that they worked in the intended way. Although the
position advanced here is that the Cases Approach is a more valid way of investigating
learning from errors than asking for activities after errors in general, a concern regard-
ing this approach may be that it is uncertain to what degree the results generalise to
other kinds of knowledge- and rule-based errors. This concern can, however, be clarified
empirically in further studies.
That the initial model provided an adequate fit to the data enhances the conclusiveness of
the findings, because it rendered an overreliance on modification indices in order to attain
adequate model fit unnecessary (MacCallum et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the discussed
limitations and the fact that a research method has been applied that is novel to this
field of research, caution from making final conclusions regarding the support or rejection
of theoretical assumptions on the basis of the study. The finding that several of the
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hypothesised relationships could not be found despite of theoretical plausibility or previous
evidence may be an effect of the strong situational interpretation of learning from errors
and the respective design of the study. Whether these results demand revisions in theory
will depend on their stability in further studies.
Taking into account the above mentioned problems, the study still delivered adequate in-
formation for a test of the hypotheses and contributed to answering the research questions.
The results from testing the hypothesised research model as well as from the exploratory
analyses that aimed to advance it help to differentiate theorising and to state more elabo-
rate hypotheses about learning from errors. The main conclusions from the study for the
research questions can be summarised as follows.
Research Question 2. The results support the assumption that the interpretation of an
error situation in terms of the estimation as a chance for learning fosters nurses’
engagement in social learning activities regarding joint analysis of causes and the
development of new action strategies. In contrast, the tendency to cover up an error
seems to be an inhibiting variable. These findings are consistent with the assumption
that open communication about an error at work depends on a perceived positive
cost-benefit balance (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). In contrast, the amount of negative
emotions aroused by having committed an error made no independent contribution to
explain nurses’ engagement in learning activities. The exploratory analyses indicated
that the theoretical assumptions about the impact of negative emotions may need to
be differentiated in the sense that additional cognitive processes intervene between
emotions and the engagement in learning.
Research Question 3. The findings for the assumption that a perceived safe team climate
supports nurses’ engagement in social learning activities indicate that a safe team
climate did not independently contribute to explain the engagement in learning activ-
ities. As for the variable error strain, the theoretical assumptions about the impact
of a safe team climate on nurses’ learning activities may have to be differentiated
by considering additional cognitive processes regarding the estimation of potential
disadvantages from communicating the error (Zhao & Olivera, 2006).
Research Question 4. The study revealed a negative correlation between the perception of
a safe team climate and the tendency to cover up an error. This is consistent with the
assumption that a safe team climate is relevant to mitigate fears about social reper-
cussions from communicating an error to colleagues (Edmondson, 1999). Further
research should investigate whether the hypothesis that a safe team climate reduces
the tendency to cover up errors is sustainable. Furthermore, the study indicated a
positive correlation between the amount of negative emotions experienced after an
error and the estimation of the error as a chance for learning. Concerning the con-
tested role of negative emotions for learning from errors (Greif, 1996; Keith & Frese,
2005; Mehl, 1993; Oser & Spychiger, 2005; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zapf, 1991; Zhao
& Olivera, 2006), the finding can be interpreted in a sense that negative emotions
create a motivational relevance for the interpretation of the error as a learning sit-
uation (Gruber, 1999a; Oser & Spychiger, 2005). Still, negative emotions may have
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detrimental effects on cognitive elaboration processes (Greif, 1996; Keith & Frese,
2005; Spitzer, 2007). Further research should investigate whether the hypothesis
that negative emotions predict the estimation of an error as a chance for learning is
sustainable. Furthermore, more differentiated analyses concerning different qualities
of negative emotions are required. Beyond these found relations, the study revealed
that variables regarding the personal interpretation of the error on the one side and
the perception of the social context or its anticipated reactions to the error on the
other side are not as narrowly intertwined as assumed. The findings indicate that
the individual interpretation of an error in terms of aroused emotions and the esti-
mated relevance for learning is independent of the perception of the quality of social
relationships at work and of perceived disadvantages of communicating an error.
The present study has made a first contribution to answering the stated research questions.
Primary tasks for further research are to cross-validate the findings and to check the
assumed directions of the relations among the variables in experimental studies. For this
purpose, a revision and extension of the cause analysis scales is required. Two more issues
for further research come to mind. The first is how to increase the amount of explained
variance in the engagement in learning activities. For this purpose, it may be worthwhile
to include variables that have been found to influence many relevant outcomes in work and
organisational psychology, such as self-efficacy, motivational orientations, and attributional
styles (A. B. Weinert, 2004). An inclusion of these variables was beyond the scope of this
study, given that the goal was to investigate those variables that most prominently have
been assumed to affect learning from errors at work. Furthermore, in applied field research
a tribute has to be paid to the amount of time and effort people in work organisations
are prepared to spend participating in research. Another way to increase the explained
variance may be to investigate more systematically how organisational characteristics add
to explaining learning from errors. For example, the existence of critical incident reporting
systems or compulsory after event meetings could be varied systematically in order to
evaluate their effects. Multi level analysis is an appropriate tool for this purpose (Hox,
1998).
Another question is how to substantiate the validity of the activity approach to learning
from errors. This might prove difficult, due to the lack of established outcome criteria for
learning from errors. The introduced process approach to learning in terms of the engage-
ment in learning activities was chosen, because learning from errors occurs incidentally
and no meaningful learning outcomes can be defined without referring to specific error
episodes. In laboratory experiments with induced error situations, knowledge elicitation
techniques such as concept maps or the critical decision method may be used in order to
investigate how the engagement in joint discussions and analyses about an error changes
individuals’ knowledge (Hoffman & Lintern, 2006; O’Hare & Wiggins, 2004). In simulation
studies, performance measures could also be used, if tasks can be constructed that involve
the same demands as in an error situation, but allow no immediate practice effects (Mehl
& Wehner, in press). In nursing, judging the risk of bedsore might be such a task.
Concerning practical implications, the question arises what possibly can be done to support
nurses to take a learning orientation and to engage in learning after an error. A cynical
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interpretation of the found relation between error strain and the estimation of an error as
a chance for learning may be that it should ensure that nurses feel bad about their errors.
This conclusion is not supported by the data from this study. A blaming versus a non-
punitive approach to errors is a facet of the variable ’safe team climate’ that has been found
to be unrelated to error strain and negatively related to covering up an error in this study.
Substantively, this implies that the way people feel about an error belongs to themselves
and is not related to their perception about how errors are dealt with in the team. This is
consistent with the proposal that only a kind of embarrassment that is internally driven
by individuals’ self-indignation will create a feeling of relevance for learning from an error
(Oser & Spychiger, 2005). Put simply, being blamed or accused may not induce the
same quality of relevance as feeling bad about the error for intrinsic reasons. In contrast,
blaming may increase the tendency to disclose errors. Based on the current findings, what
a hospital may do is to create relevance by emphasising the importance of discussing errors
and to reduce potential costs of discussing errors by promoting a safe team climate, even
if the effect may only be indirect.
7. General discussion and outlook on further research issues
To conclude this thesis, it has to be elaborated what the studies have contributed to
answering the research questions, what has been added to our understanding of learning
from errors at work, and in what ways this opens new perspectives for research in this
area. Four research questions have been stated in the opening chapter.
Research Question 1. How can learning from errors at work be conceptu-
alised and measured?
Research Question 2. To what degree does the individual interpretation of
an error situation foster or constrain the engagement in learning from errors
at work?
Research Question 3. To what degree does the perception of the social context
at work foster or constrain the engagement in learning from errors at work?
Research Question 4. How are the variables regarding the individual inter-
pretation of an error and the perception of the social context at work interre-
lated?
How these research questions have been addressed and the contributions arising through
that process are summarised below.
Contribution for answering the research questions. For addressing Research Ques-
tion 1, a theoretical framework of learning from errors at work has been developed. The
contribution of this framework lies in drawing on different fields of research on errors
and integrating their perspectives. Existing studies are often too much focussed on the
problems, theories, and perspectives of their specific field and fail to incorporate valuable
solutions from other domains (Bauer & Mulder, in press). Research on human factors
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and safety management has developed precise and detailed definitions, taxonomies, and
explanations of human error (Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 1991). However, it often
fails to inform about individual learning and, rarely, incorporates findings from cognitive-
psychological and educational studies on expertise and learning at work. In contrast, many
existing studies on learning from errors use too little of the available knowledge about er-
rors and, therefore, neglect to elaborate on the conceptual premises of their research. These
conceptual problems inhibit the integration of findings to build a cumulative body of re-
search (Ohlsson, 1996; Sitkin, 1992). In order to understand and elaborate the concept of
error, the potential of errors as antecedents of learning, and the processes and outcomes
of learning from errors, the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 draws on and
integrates concepts and findings from cognitive and action-oriented approaches to human
error on the one hand (e.g., Frese & Zapf, 1994; Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 1991),
and research on experiential learning, adult learning, learning at work, and professional
development on the other hand (e.g., Billett, 2004b; Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984).
On the basis of the developed framework, two propositions about how to measure learning
from errors at work have been advanced. First, learning from errors can be operationalised
in terms of learning activities that start a process of inquiry into root-causes and aim at
changing the underlying causes. This activity perspective on learning from errors is system-
atically derived from experiential learning theory (Gruber, 1999a; Kolb, 1984; Kolodner,
1983; Schank, 1999), which is a prerequisite for the content validity of the operationalisa-
tion. Secondly, questions about the engagement in error-related learning activities should
be grounded in concrete error cases that represent a specific type of error. Reasons for this
are (a) that different types of errors bear a different potential for learning and may require
specific learning activities that do not generalise to other types of errors (Glendon et al.,
2006; Keith & Frese, 2005) and (b) that employees are better able to explicate knowledge
or learning activities when questions refer to concrete events at work (Billett, 2000; Eraut
et al., 1998; Ericsson, 2006b; Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Simons, 2005).
In Studies 1 and 2 an exemplary operationalisation of the engagement in error-related
learning activities in nursing has been developed and applied in Study 3. In Study 1 rele-
vant examples of error cases and learning activities were collected to assist the development
of an operationalisation that is contextualised to the domain of nursing. On the basis of
the findings, the decision was made to focus on socially performed learning activities and
errors regarding the misinterpretation of a situation. In Study 2 a decision between the
Critical Incident Technique and the Cases Approach to grounding was made and initial
evidence about the psychometric properties of the learning activity scales was gathered.
Although the conclusiveness of the findings is limited due to the selective sample, the
results were also encouraging in that reliable scales could be built and that theoretically
expected correlations with the interpretation of an error situation and the perception of
a safe team climate could be found. The required separation of the scale ’cause analysis’
into general and specific cause analysis in Study 3 indicates requirements for revising and
extending the developed scales. However, the fact that a reliable and well fitting measure-
ment model could be specified in this study justifies further efforts to advance and validate
the developed operationalisation of learning from errors.
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In summary, the proposed answer to Research Question 1 is that learning from errors
can be conceptualised and measured in terms of the engagement in learning activities
that aim to change potential underlying cases and to prevent the recurrence of the error.
It is acknowledged that the developed operationalisation is limited (a) to the domain of
nursing, (b) to a specific type of error (i.e., misjudging a situation and subsequently making
a wrong decision), and (c) to the special case of learning activities that are performed in
social exchange. However, the position advanced here is that this degree of specificity is
necessary, because asking for activities taken after errors in general neglects the variability
of errors (Reason, 1995) and the situated nature of work related learning (Billett, 2004a).
Nevertheless the proposed learning activity perspective can potentially be applied flexibly.
Combining the introduced learning activity framework with error taxonomies allows us to
construct new operationalisations of learning activities systematically for given errors in
given domains of work.
Research Questions 2—4 were addressed in combination, because they concern the in-
terplay of individual and contextual variables for explaining the engagement in learning
activities after an error in nursing. Based on current theorising on learning from errors
and learning at work, hypotheses were derived (a) about the potential impact of the indi-
vidual interpretation of an error – in terms of estimating the error as a chance for learning,
negative emotions aroused by having committed an error, and the motivational tendency
to cover up an error (Rybowiak et al., 1999) – and (b) about the potential relevance of a
safe team climate for openly discussing an error with colleagues (Edmondson, 1999). (c)
The expectation of a tight interrelation between individual and social aspects of learning
from errors was informed both by theorising on learning at work (Billett, 2004b; Eraut
et al., 1998) and learning from errors (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). The developed hypotheses
were integrated in the research model depicted in Figure 1, that subsequently was subject
to empirical investigation.
The process of examining the research model involved, first, several steps of narrowing
the scope, in order to make it more specific, manageable, and precise. This involved the
above mentioned decision to focus on social learning activities and on errors in terms
of misinterpretations of a situation, based on the findings from Study 1. Secondly, the
research model was tested and advanced in the Study 3 by surveying a large sample of
nurses from different hospitals with the developed questionnaire. It has been acknowledged
that the conclusiveness of this study is limited through the non-experimental design, a
potentially selective sample, and the focus on the domain of nursing. However, the study
contributed to answer the research questions by delivering initial evidence that can be
cross-validated and deepened in further studies. With all required caution, the findings
from the study indicate the following answers on the Research Questions 2—4.
The findings on the individual interpretation of the error situation support the assumption
that the estimation of an error situation as a chance for learning fosters exchange with other
nurses about potential causes and strategies to avoid similar errors in future. In contrast,
perceiving advantages from hiding an error seems to be an inhibiting factor. These findings
are consistent with the proposal that learning from errors depends on a subjective cost-
benefit balance (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Negative emotions aroused by having committed
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an error seem to play only a marginal role for the engagement in learning activities. The
same was observed for the perception of a safe team climate, that did not independently
contributed to explain nurses’ engagement in learning activities.
The findings concerning the interrelation of the interpretation of the error and the percep-
tion of the social context indicate that negative emotions and the estimation of an error as
a chance for learning seem to belong mainly to the individual and are not intertwined with
the perception of a safe team context, as originally expected. The tendency to cover up
an error seems to have more to do with the situationally dependent anticipation of social
interactions, than with a purely individual decision to disclose an error. As indicated by
the found correlations, the experience of negative emotions is associated with the estima-
tion of an error as a chance for learning, and the perception of a safe team climate with
the tendency to cover up an error.
On the basis of this pattern of findings, a mediation model has been suggested as hypothe-
sis for further research that differentiates the initial assumptions about relevant predictors
for learning from errors. It proposes that negative emotions after an error create a feeling
of salience as a basis for estimating an error as relevant for learning and for engaging in
learning activities. Furthermore, the model proposes that a safe team climate reduces per-
ceived disadvantages that may hinder communicating an error to others. These hypotheses
require validation in further studies.
By delivering these findings and further hypotheses, Study 3 contributed to deepen our
understanding of learning from errors at work. It enables further studies that cumulatively
build upon the current findings in order to answer more fully the question what individual
and contextual variables foster or constrain employees’ engagement in learning after the
experience of an error at work. Findings from the current and future studies may eventually
enable intervention programmes for supporting learning from errors in nursing and other
work domains. Below, an outlook on several salient issues for further research is provided.
Outlook: Issues for further research. Conducting the studies presented above com-
prised a process of continuously narrowing the focus on learning from errors, in order
to understand its processes and potential enabling factors. Two lines of further inquiry
are worth pursuing from here. The first one is to go for even greater specificity and to
engage in exploring the detailed relationships between the variables in more depth than
was possible in this research. Several respective research problems have been identified
in the discussion of Study 3. These are to deepen our understanding of the relationships
between the evaluation of an error as a chance for learning and error strain, and between
a safe team climate and the tendency to cover up an error, to further explore and explain
the diverse role of negative emotions on learning motivation and cognitive processes, to
include further potentially relevant variables, and to integrate the learning activity per-
spective with a knowledge perspective. The second way is to pick up open questions that
were excluded by the decisions made. These concern (a) other types of errors, (b) other
types of learning activities, (c) specific combinations of types of errors, types of learning
activities, and their outcomes, (d) other levels of learning, (e) other domains of work, and
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(f) alternative research methods. An outlook on these potential further lines of inquiry is
provided, below.
The decision to focus on the misinterpretation of a situation excluded many other sub-
types of knowledge- and rule-based errors that may ask for other kinds of learning activities
than those addressed in the present study. One of the reasons for this decision was that
misinterpretations of situations are to a certain extent representative for knowledge- and
rule-based errors (Reason, 1995). Despite this, other forms of knowledge- and rule-based
errors are worthy of investigation. For example, errors that are mainly based on deficient
domain specific knowledge may be best solved by training or self-regulated learning ac-
tivities, such as reading (Glendon et al., 2006). Hence, an open issue is to analyse which
types of errors may be addressed by which types of learning activities.
The decision to focus on social learning activities, demands that we explore other ones
that have not been addressed here. This concerns the whole side of individually performed
learning activities (cf. Tab. 1) and the issue of how the conclusions that may be derived
from reflection on causes can be shaped into strategies to avoid an error in future and
implemented in work practice. This implementation is not solely a matter of individual
motivation, but also has to take constraints in the social context, power issues, and features
of the organisation of work into account. For example, even if an individual elects to
seek social exchange after an error, those approached for participation might refuse to
participate or resist the individual attempt to initiate a change. A community may have
a particular interest in not analysing an error and in maintaining a current practice, even
though it is contested (Hoeve & Nieuwenhuis, 2006). If team members typically react like
that, this may lead to a perception that the team is unsupportive and that it is of little use
to approach others for help or reflection (Arndt, 1996; Edmondson, 1999). Furthermore,
characteristics of the organisation of work, such as the work pace and intensity, number of
patients per ward, or the availability of help and resources, cannot simply be changed by
an individual employee’s or sometimes even a team’s or the management’s decision. They
may reflect the socio-historically developed nature of a work domain (Billett, 2001a).
In combination, the two issues above ask researchers to investigate specific combinations
of types of errors, on the one hand, and sets of learning activities, on the other. An even
more demanding problem would be, to integrate the issue of the relationship among types
of errors, learning activities, and different types of knowledge that can be constructed
from them. This is important to deepen our understanding about what kinds of learning
activities are helpful in what kinds of error situations, and what kind of knowledge can be
constructed from a given type of error.
Since the present research focussed on the individual, a next step would comprise to in-
vestigate learning from errors on the team level more systematically. This regards errors,
the learning processes, and outcomes in the form of knowledge and behaviour. Errors that
emerge directly out of joint team work were not addressed in this study. The implicit
assumption, that only the individual actor is responsible for a given error, is very rigid
and inapplicable to many work situations (Wehner & Mehl, 2003). As for the issue of
team learning processes, the present theoretical framework provided a number of links
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between individual and team learning from errors. This has been most explicit in the
focus on socially oriented learning activities. Furthermore, the processes and outcomes of
learning at work have been characterised as the change of scripts. Equivalent processes
can be modelled regarding the change of routines that are assumed to express the enacted
knowledge of a team (Becker, 2004; Hoeve & Nieuwenhuis, 2006). An interesting perspec-
tive for further research would be to analyse the impact of errors on a team’s shared or
distributed knowledge. This could be done by investigating how team mental models or
team transactive memory systems change after errors, and how knowledge about errors is
transmitted in work groups (Levine & Moreland, 1999; Moreland, 1999; Van den Bossche,
2006).
The decision to focus on the domain of nursing limits the findings to this specific domain.
While the developed theoretical framework may be contextualised to other domains, no
claim is made that the results from the studies generalise. Investigating other domains will
become increasingly complex according to the level to which the criteria for judging errors
become dubious or idiosyncratic for a given domain. For example, investigating learning
from errors in business consulting may be interesting, but the criteria for evaluating actions
as errors are less codified in this domain than in health care. Discourse analyses on who
participates in the definition of an acceptable practice may be required in such domains
prior to conducting research on learning from errors (Arndt, 1996; Heid, 1999).
The last issue concerns the applied methodology. Although the position has been taken
above that the grounding in concrete error episodes enhances the validity of the measure-
ment of learning from errors, the implemented Cases Approach has to be validated and
complemented with other methods. Whereas the Cases Approach enhances the standard-
isation of error episodes, it imposes the chosen situations on the participants and loses a
rich data source as compared to the Critical Incident Technique. It should be critically
evaluated under what conditions the Critical Incident Technique works for researching
learning from errors and whether the results are comparable with the cases approach. The
Multitrait-Multimethod Technique provides a useful perspective for comparing the validity
of these approaches (Eid, Lischetzke, & Nussbeck, 2006). Another issue is how to reduce
self-serving and social desirability tendencies. The Randomised Response Technique may
be useful here (Clark & Desharnais, 1998), but it is unlikely to work in large samples
because it is very time consuming and not easy to understand for the participants. There-
fore, developing alternative methods that get close to actual errors, facilitate participation
in the research, and mitigate methodological biases, would be helpful.
The proposed lines of inquiry indicate that the contribution of this thesis lies in preparing
the field by providing a conceptual framework of learning from errors, a research instru-
ment, and initial evidence for what individual and contextual variables may foster or
constrain it. Based on the findings and substantive considerations, it is proposed that the
individual interpretation of an error situation in terms of a cost-benefit balance is relevant
for the decision to engage in learning activities. The perception of contextual character-
istics, such as the quality of social relationships and interactions is potentially indirectly
relevant through this cognitive evaluation of costs and benefits. A central message at the
end of this thesis is that individuals can learn from their errors at work and that the




Anderson, J. R.(2005). Cognitive psychology and its implications. New York: Freeman.
Anderson, N. R., & West, M. A.(1994). Team climate inventory. Windsor: Berks ASE.
Argote, L., & Todocara, G. (2007). Organizational learning. In G. P. Hodgkinson &
J. K. Ford (Eds.), International review of industrial and organizational psychology
(Vol. 22, pp. 193-234). Chichester, NY: Wiley.
Argyris, C. (1982). Reasoning, learning, and action. Individual and organizational. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Argyris, C., & Scho¨n, D.(1996). Organizational learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Arndt, M.(1994). Nurses’ medication errors - an interpretative study of experiences. Bern:
Lang.
Arndt, M.(1996). Aus Fehlern lernen [Learning from errors]. Pflege, 9, 12-18.
Aspden, P., Corrigan, J. M., Wolcott, J., & Erickson, S. M.(2004). Patient safety. Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Academies Press.
Atkinson, J. W.(1986). Michigan studies of fear of failure. In F. Halisch & J. Kuhl (Eds.),
Motivation, intention, and volition (pp. 47-59). Berlin: Springer.
Badke-Schaub, P.(2002). Kritische Situationen als Analyseeinheit komplexer Handlungen
[Critical situations as unit of analysis of complex actions]. In R. Trimpop, B. Zi-
molong, & A. Kalveram (Eds.), Psychologie der Arbeitssicherheit und Gesundheit.
Neue Welten - alte Welten (pp. 137-142). Heidelberg: Asanger.
Bandalos, D. L., & Finney, S. J. (2001). Item-parceling issues in structural equation
modeling. In G. A. Marcoulides & R. E. Schumacker (Eds.), New developments and
techniques in structural equation modeling (pp. 269-296). Mahwah, N.J.: LEA.
Barach, P., & Small, S. D.(2000). Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: lessons from
non-medical near miss reporting systems. British Medical Journal, 320, 759-765.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in
social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Bauer, J. (2004). Fehlerkultur und epistemische U¨berzeugungen als Einflussfaktoren in-
dividuellen Kompetenzerwerbs im Arbeitsalltag [Error culture and epistemological
beliefs as determinants of competence development during daily work]. In H. Gru-
ber, C. Harteis, H. Heid, & B. Meier (Eds.), Kapital und Kompetenz. Vera¨nderungen
der Arbeitswelt und ihre Auswirkungen aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher Sicht (pp.
59-75). Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Bauer, J., Festner, D., Harteis, C., Heid, H., & Gruber, H.(2004). Fehlerorientierung im be-
trieblichen Arbeitsalltag. Ein Vergleich zwischen Fu¨hrungskra¨ften und Bescha¨ftigten
ohne Fu¨hrungsfunktion [Error orientation in daily work. A comparison of managers
and staff members]. Zeitschrift fu¨r Berufs und Wirtschaftspa¨dagogik, 100, 65-82.
Bauer, J., & Gruber, H.(2007). Workplace changes and workplace learning: advantages of
an educational micro perspective. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 26,
675-688.
References 109
Bauer, J., & Mulder, R. H.(2007). Modelling learning from errors in daily work. Learning
in Health and Social Care, 6, 121-133.
Bauer, J., & Mulder, R. H. (in press). Conceptualising learning from errors at work:
A literature review. In S. Billett, C. Harteis, & A. Etela¨pelto (Eds.), Emerging
perspectives on learning through work. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Bauer, J., Rehrl, M., & Harteis, C.(2007). Measurement of learning culture: a motivational
approach. In H. Gruber & T. Palonen (Eds.), Learning at the workplace – new
developments (pp. 21-50). Turku: Finnish Educational Research Association.
Bayerische Krankenhausgesellschaft e.V. (2005a). Die Krankenhausversorgung in
Bayern [Supply with hopsitals in Bavaria]. Retrieved October 30, 2007, from
http://www.bkg-online.de/bkg/app/Content/BKG/Info_und_Service_Seiten/
KH_Versorgung/index.jsp.
Bayerische Krankenhausgesellschaft e.V. (2005b). Sammlung von aktuellem statis-
tischem Material u¨ber die deutschen Krankenha¨user [Collection of cur-
rent statistical data on German hospitals]. Retrieved October 30, 2007,
from http://www.bkg-online.de/bkg/app/Content/BKG/Info_und_Service
_Seiten/downloads/dl-22-2005-Schlagzeilen-anlage.pdf.
Bayerisches Staatsministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Familie und Frauen.
(2007). Krankenhausplan des Freistaates Bayern [Hospital plan of the Fedaral
State of Bavaria]. Retrieved May 14, 2007. from http://www.stmas.bayern.de/
krankenhaus/plan/index.htm.
Becker, M. C. (2004). Organizational routines: a review of the literature. Industrial and
Corporate Change, 13, 643-677.
Beckmann, J., & Heckhausen, H. (2006). Motivation durch Erwartung und Anreiz [Moti-
vation through expectancy and value]. In J. Heckhausen & H. Heckhausen (Eds.),
Motivation und Handeln (pp. 105-142). Berlin: Springer.
Bentler, P. M. (2006). EQS 6 structural equations program manual. Encino, CA: Multi-
variate Software, Inc.
Berings, M. G. M. C., Gelissen, J. P. T. M., & Poell, R. F. (2005, December). What
and how do nurses learn on the job? The development of a classification. Paper
presented at the 4th International Conference on Researching Work and Learning,
Sydney (Australia).
Bu¨hner, M. (2006). Einfu¨hrung in die Test- und Fragebogenkonstruktion [Construction of
tests and questionnaires]. Mu¨nchen: Pearson.
Billett, S.(2000). Guided learning at work. Journal of Workplace Learning, 12, 272-285.
Billett, S.(2001a). Knowing in practice: Re-conceptualising vocational expertise. Learning
and Instruction, 11, 431-452.
Billett, S.(2001b). Learning in the workplace: strategies for effective practice. Crows Nest:
Allen and Unwin.
Billett, S. (2001c). Learning through work: workplace affordances and individual engage-
ment. Journal of Workplace Learning, 13, 209-214.
Billett, S.(2004a). Learning through work: workplace participatory practices. In H. Rain-
bird, A. Fuller, & A. Munro (Eds.), Workplace learning in context (pp. 109-125).
London: Routledge.
References 110
Billett, S.(2004b). Workplace participatory practices. Conceptualising workplaces as learn-
ing environments. Journal of Workplace Learning, 16, 312-324.
Billett, S. (2006). Work, subjectivity and learning. In S. Billett, T. Fenwick, & M. Som-
merville (Eds.), Work, subjectivity and learning (pp. 1-20). Dordrecht: Springer.
Bogner, M. S. (Ed.). (1994). Human error in medicine. Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
Bollen, K. A.(1989). Structural equations with latent variables. New York: Wiley.
Bortz, J., & Do¨ring, N. (2006). Forschungsmethoden und Evaluation [Research methods
and evaluation]. Berlin: Springer.
Boshuizen, H. P. A.(2004). Does practice make perfect? A slow and discontinuous process.
In H. P. A. Boshuizen, R. Bromme, & H. Gruber (Eds.), Professional learning: gaps
and transitions on the way from novice to expert (pp. 73-95). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Boshuizen, H. P. A., Bromme, R., & Gruber, H.(2004a). On the long way from novice to
expert and how traveling changes the traveller. In H. P. A. Boshuizen, R. Bromme,
& H. Gruber (Eds.), Professional learning: gaps and transitions on the way from
novice to expert (pp. 3-8). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Boshuizen, H. P. A., Bromme, R., & Gruber, H. (Eds.). (2004b). Professional learning:
gaps and transitions on the way from novice to expert. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Boud, D.(1999). Experience and learning: Reflection at work. Deakin: Deakin University.
Boud, D. (2006). Creating the space for reflection at work. In D. Boud, P. Cressey, &
P. Docherty (Eds.), Productive reflection at work (pp. 158-169). London: Routledge.
Boud, D., Cressey, P., & Docherty, P. (Eds.). (2006). Productive reflection at work.
London: Routledge.
Boud, D., Keogh, R., & Walker, D.(1989a). Promoting reflection in learning: a model. In
D. Boud, R. Keogh, & D. Walker (Eds.), Reflection: turning experience into learning
(pp. 18-40). London: Kogan Page.
Boud, D., Keogh, R., & Walker, D. (1989b). What is reflection in learning? In D. Boud,
R. Keogh, & D. Walker (Eds.), Reflection: turning experience into learning (pp.
7-17). London: Kogan Page.
Boud, D., & Middleton, H.(2003). Lerarning from others at work: communities of practice
and informal learning. Journal of Workplace Learning, 15, 194-202.
Bu¨ssing, A., & Glaser, J. (2002). Das Ta¨tigkeits- und Arbeitsanalyseverfahren fu¨r das
Krankenhaus - Selbstbeobachtungsversion (TAA-KH-S) [Activity and work analysis
inventory for hospitals - self report version]. Go¨ttingen: Hogrefe.
Bu¨ssing, A., & Glaser, J.(2003). Dienstleistungsqualita¨t und Qualita¨t des Arbeitserlebens
im Krankenhaus: Einleitung und U¨berblick [Service quality and work satisfaction
in hospitals: introduction and overview]. In A. Bu¨ssing & J. Glaser (Eds.), Di-
enstleistungsqualita¨t und Qualita¨t des Arbeitserlebens im Krankenhaus (pp. 15-34).
Go¨ttingen: Hogrefe.
Byrne, B. M.(2006). Structural equation modeling with EQS. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Cannon, M. D., & Edmondson, A. C. (2001). Confronting failure: Antecedents and con-
sequences of shared beliefs about failure in organizational work groups. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 22, 161-177.
Cannon, M. D., & Edmondson, A. C.(2005). Failing to learn and learning to fail (intelli-
References 111
gently): how great organizations put failure to work to innovate and improve. Long
Range Planning: International Journal of Strategic Management, 38, 299-319.
CIRSmedical.(2005). Cumputerbasiertes anonymes critical incident reproting: Ein Beitrag
zur Patientensicherheit [Cumputer-based anonymous critical incident reproting: a
contribution to patient safety]. Retrieved November 14, 2005 from https://www
.cirsmedical.ch/dokument/CIRSmedINFO.htm.
Clark, S. J., & Desharnais, R. A. (1998). Honest answers to embarrassing questions:
detecting cheating in the randomized response model. Psychological Methods, 3,
160-168.
Collins, A. (1990). Reformulating testing to measure learning and thinking. In N. Fred-
eriksen, R. Glaser, A. Lesgold, & M. G. Shafto (Eds.), Diagnostic monitoring of skill
and knowledge acquisition (pp. 75-87). Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
Cressey, P., Boud, D., & Docherty, P. (2006). The emergence of productive reflection. In
D. Boud, P. Cressey, & P. Docherty (Eds.), Productive reflection at work (pp. 11-26).
London: Routledge.
Cseh, M., Watkins, K. E., & Marsick, J., Victoria.(2000). Informal and incidental learning
in the workplace. In G. Straka (Ed.), Conceptions of self-directed learning: theoretical
and conceptional considerations (pp. 59-74). Mu¨nster: Waxmann.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999). Implications of a systems perspective for the study of cre-
ativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 313-335). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Deutsches Netzwerk fu¨r Qualita¨tsentwicklung in der Pflege. (2007). Expertenstandards
in der Pflege: Zur Entwicklung wissenschaftsbasierter Expertenstandards [Expert
standards for nursing: on the development of evidence based expert standards].
Retrieved October 30, 2007, from http://www.dnqp.de/Qualimeth.htm.
Diekmann, A.(2007). Empirische Sozialforschung. Grundlagen, Methoden, Anwendungen
[Empirical social science. Foundations, methods, applications]. Reinbeck: Rowohlt.
Dovey, S. M., & Phillips, R. L.(2004). What should we report to medical error reporting
systems? Quality and Safety in Health Care, 13, 322 - 323.
Do¨rner, D. (2004). Emotion und Wissen [Emotion and knowledge]. In G. Reinmann &
H. Mandl (Eds.), Psychologie des Wissensmanagements (pp. 117-132). Go¨ttingen:
Hogrefe.
Duffy, T. M., Lowyck, J., & Jonassen, D. H. (Eds.). (1993). Constructivism and the
design of learning environments: context and authentic activities for learning. Berlin:
Springer.
Edmondson, A. C. (1996). Learning from mistakes is easier said than done: group and
organisational influences on the detection and correction of human error. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 32, 5-28.
Edmondson, A. C. (1999). Psychological safety and working behaviour in work teams.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 350-383.
Edmondson, A. C. (2004). Learning from errors in health care: frequent opportunities,
pervasive barriers. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 13, 3-9.
Eid, M., Lischetzke, T., & Nussbeck, F. W. (2006). Structural equation models for
multitrait-multimethod data. In M. Eid & E. Diener (Eds.), Handbook of psycho-
References 112
logical measurement: A multimethod perspective (pp. 283-299). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Ellis, S., & Davidi, I. (2005). After-event reviews: drawing lessons from successful and
failed experience. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 857-871.
Ellstro¨m, P.-E. (2001). Integrating learning and work: problems and prospects. Human
Resource Development Quarterly, 12, 421-435.
Ellstro¨m, P.-E. (2006). The meaning and role of reflection in informal learning at work.
In D. Boud, P. Cressey, & P. Docherty (Eds.), Productive reflection at work (pp.
43-53). London: Routledge.
Eraut, M.(1994). Developing professional knowledge and competence. London: Routledge-
Falmer.
Eraut, M. (2000). Non-formal learning and tacit knowledge in professional work. British
Journal of Educational Psychology, 70, 113-136.
Eraut, M., Alderton, J., Cole, G., & Senker, P.(1998). Development of knowledge and skills
in employment (Research Report No. 5). Sussex: University of Sussex, Institute of
Education.
Eraut, M., Alderton, J., Cole, G., & Senker, P. (2002). Learning from other people at
work. In R. Harrison, F. Reeve, A. Hanson, & J. Clarke (Eds.), Supporting Lifelong
Learning, Vol 1, Perspectives on Learning (pp. 90-108). London: Routledge/Falmer.
Ericsson, K. A. (2006a). The influence of experience and deliberate practice on the de-
velopment of superior expert performance. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. J.
Feltovich, & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert
performance (pp. 683-703). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ericsson, K. A. (2006b). Protocol analysis and expert thought: concurrent verbalization
of thinking during experts’ performance on representative tasks. In K. A. Ericsson,
N. Charness, P. J. Feltovich, & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of
expertise and expert performance (pp. 223-241). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Ericsson, K. A. (2006c). Reproducibly superior professional performance in a changing
world: How it is maintained and improved by deliberate practice. Presentation at
the EARLI SIG Professional Learning and Development Conference, Heerlen (The
Netherlands).
Ericsson, K. A., & Lehmann, A. C.(1996). Expert and exceptional performance: evidence
of maximal adaptation to task constraints. Annual Review of Psychology, 47, 273-
305.
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1984). Protocol analysis. Verbal reports as data. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fabrigar, L. R., Wegener, D. T., MacCallum, R. C., & Strahan, J., Erin. (1999). Evalu-
ating the use of exploratory factor analysis in psychological research. Psychological
Methods, 4, 272-299.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A.(2007). G*power 3: A flexible statistical
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior
Research Methods, 39, 175-191.
Feldman, S. E., & Roblin, D. W. (2000). Accident investigation and anticipatory failure
References 113
analysis in hospitals. In P. Spath (Ed.), Error reduction in health care. A systems
approach to improving patient safety (pp. 139-154). San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.
Felstead, A., Fuller, A., Unwin, L., Ashton, D., Butler, P., & Lee, T. (2005). Surveying
the scene: learning metaphors, survey design and the workplace context. Journal of
Education and Work, 18, 359-383.
Fenwick, T.(2003). Learning through experience. Malabar, FL: Krieger.
Fivars, G., & Fitzpatrick, R. (2001). The critical incident technique bibliography. APA
Online PsychINFO.
Flanagan, J. C.(1954). The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 51, 327-358.
Forgas, J. P.(1995). Mood and judgment: the affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological
Bulletin, 117, 39–66.
Frese, M., & Zapf, D.(1994). Action as the core of work psychology: a German approach.
In H. C. Triandis, M. D. Dunette, & L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and
organizational psychology (2 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 271-340). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting
Psychologists Press.
Gerbing, D. W., & Hamilton, J. G. (1996). Viability of exploratory factor analysis as a
precursor to confirmatory factor analysis. Structural Equation Modeling, 3, 62-72.
Glazinski, R., & Wiedensohler, R.(2004). Patientensicherheit und Fehlerkultur im Gesund-
heitswesen [Patient safety and error culture in health care]. Eschborn: Brainwave.
Glendon, I., Clarke, S. G., & McKenna, E. F.(2006). Human safety and risk management.
Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis.
Greif, S. (1996). Lernen aus Fehlern [Learning from errors]. In S. Greif & H.-J. Kurtz
(Eds.), Handbuch selbstorganisiertes Lernen (pp. 313-327). Go¨ttingen: Hogrefe.
Gruber, H.(1999a). Erfahrung als Grundlage kompetenten Handelns [Experience as basis
of competent action]. Bern: Huber.
Gruber, H.(1999b). Wissen [Knowledge]. In C. Perleth & A. Ziegler (Eds.), Pa¨dagogische
Psychologie (pp. 94-112). Bern: Huber.
Gruber, H., Harteis, C., Mulder, R. H., & Rehrl, M. (Eds.). (2005). Bridging individual,
organisational, and cultural aspects of professional learning. Regensburg: Roderer.
Hacker, W. (1998). Allgemeine Arbeitspsychologie. Psychische Regulation von Arbeit-
sta¨tigkeiten [Work psychology]. Bern: Huber.
Hacker, W.(1999). Regulation und Struktur von Arbeitsta¨tigkeiten [Regulation and struc-
ture of work activities]. In C. G. Hoyos & D. Frey (Eds.), Arbeits- und Organisa-
tionspsychologie (pp. 385-397). Weinheim: Beltz.
Hager, P.(2004a). The conceptualization and measurement of learning at work. In H. Rain-
bird, A. Fuller, & A. Munro (Eds.), Workplace learning in context (pp. 242-258).
London: Routledge.
Hager, P. (2004b). Lifelong learning in the workplace? Challenges and issues. Journal of
Workplace Learning, 16, 22-32.
Hakkarainen, K., Palonen, T., Paavola, S., & Lehtinen, E. (2004). Communities of net-
worked expertise: educational and professional perspectives. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Harteis, C., Bauer, J., & Haltia, P. (2007). Learning from errors at the workplace -
insights from two studies in Germany and Finland. In H. Gruber & T. Palonen
References 114
(Eds.), Learning at the workplace - new developments (pp. 119-138). Turku: Finnish
Educational Research Association.
Harteis, C., Bauer, J., & Heid, H. (2006). Der Umgang mit Fehlern als Merkmal be-
trieblicher Fehlerkultur und Voraussetzung fu¨r Professional Learning [Handling of
errors as indicator for organisational error culture and condition for professional
learning]. Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu¨r Bildungswissenschaften, 28, 111-129.
Heckhausen, H.(1975). Fear of failure as a self-reinforcing motive system. In I. G. Sarason
& C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Stress and anxiety (Vol. 2, pp. 117-128). Washington,
D.C.: Hemisphere.
Heckhausen, H., & Beckmann, J.(1990). Intentional action and action slips. Psychological
Review, 97, 36-48.
Heid, H.(1999). Autorita¨t. U¨ber die Verwandlung von Fehlern in Verfehlungen [Authority.
On the transformation of misconducts into errors]. In W. Althof (Ed.), Fehlerwelten.
Vom Fehlermachen und Lernen aus Fehlern (pp. 129-136). Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
Heid, H. (2005). U¨bertragung von Verantwortung [Delegation of responsibility]. In
M. Eigenstetter & M. Hammerl (Eds.), Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik - ein
Widerspruch in sich? (pp. 163-182). Kro¨ningen: Asanger.
Heimbeck, D., Frese, M., Sonnentag, S., & Keith, N. (2003). Integrating errors in the
training process: the function of error management instructions and the role of goal
orientation. Personnel Psychology, 56, 333-361.
Hershberger, S. L.(2006). The problem of equivalent structural models. In G. R. Hancock
& R. O. Mueller (Eds.), Structural equation modeling: a second course (pp. 13-42).
Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.
Hoeve, A., Mittendorff, K., & Nieuwenhuis, L. F. M. (2003, July). The interface between
learning and innovation: Building a conceptual model. Paper presented at the 3rd
International Conference of Researching Work and Learning (RWL), Tampere (Fin-
land).
Hoeve, A., & Nieuwenhuis, L. F. M. (2006). Learning routines in innovation processes.
Journal of Workplace Learning, 18, 171-185.
Hoffman, R. R., & Lintern, G. (2006). Eliciting and representing the knowledge of ex-
perts. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. J. Feltovich, & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), The
Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance (pp. 203-222). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hofinger, G. (2002). Erfassung kritischer Zwischenfa¨lle am Beispiel der Luftfahrt und
Medizin [Analysis of critical incidents – examples from aviation and health care]. In
R. Trimpop, B. Zimolong, & A. Kalveram (Eds.), Psychologie der Arbeitssicherheit
und Gesundheit (pp. 143-148). Heidelberg: Asanger.
Holt, J. K. (2004, October). Item parceling in structural equation models for optimum
solutions. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Mid-Western Educational
Research Association, Columbus, OH (USA).
Holzer, E., Thomeczek, C., Hauke, E., Cohnen, D., & Hochreutener, A.-A. (Eds.). (2005).
Patientensicherheit. Leitfaden fu¨r den Umgang mit Risiken im Gesundheitswesen
[Patient safety. Guidelines for handling risks in health care]. Wien: Facultas.
Honebein, P. C., Duffy, T. M., & Fishman, B. J. (1993). Constructivism and the design
References 115
of learning environments: context and authentic activities for learning. In T. M.
Duff, J. Lowyck, & D. H. Jonassen (Eds.), Designing environments for constructive
learning (pp. 87-108). Berlin: Springer.
Hox, J. J. (1998). Multilevel modeling: when and why? In I. Balderjahn, R. Mathar, &
M. Schader (Eds.), Classification, data analysis, and data highways (pp. 147-154).
New York: Springer.
Hoyle, R. H. (1995). The structural equation modeling approach: Basic concepts and
fundamental issues. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural equation modeling. Concepts,
issues, and applications (pp. 1-15). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Høyrup, S., & Elkjaer, B.(2006). Reflection: taking it beyond the individual. In D. Boud,
P. Cressey, & P. Docherty (Eds.), Productive reflection at work (pp. 29-42). London:
Routledge.
Jørgensen, C. H., & Warring, N.(2002). Learning in the workplace - the interplay between
learning environments and biographical learning trajectories. In C. H. Jørgensen &
N. Warring (Eds.), Adult education and the labour market VII (Vol. B, pp. 9-33).
Roskilde: Roskilde University Press.
Jo¨reskog, K. G.(1993). Testing structural equation models. In K. A. Bollen & J. S. Long
(Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 294-316). London: Sage.
Ja¨rvinen, A., & Poikela, E. (2001). Modeling reflective and contextual learning at work.
Journal of Workplace Learning, 13, 282-289.
Kaufmann, M., Staender, S., Below, G. von, Brunner, H. H., Portenier, L., & Scheidegger,
D. (2002). Computerbasiertes anonymes Critical Incident Reporting: ein Beitrag
zur Patientensicherheit [Computer based, anonymous Critical Incident Reporting: a
contribution to patient safety]. Schweizerische A¨rztezeitung, 83, 2554-2558.
Keith, N., & Frese, M. (2005). Self-regulation in error management training: emotion
control and metacognition as mediators of performance effects. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 90, 677-691.
Keith, N., & Frese, M.(2008). Effectiveness of error management training: a meta analysis.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 59-69.
Kela, N., & Kela, P. (2006). Miteinander statt gegeneinander. Fehlermanagement in
Krankenha¨usern und Pflegeeinrichtungen [Together, not against each other. Error
management in hospitals and care facilities]. Pflegezeitschrift, 59, 54-57.
Kim, K. H., & Bentler, P. M. (2006). Data modeling: structural equation modeling. In
J. L. Green, G. Camilli, & P. B. Elmore (Eds.), Handbook of complementary methods
in education research (pp. 161-175). Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Kleinbeck, U. (2006). Handlungsziele [Action goals]. In J. Heckhausen & H. Heckhausen
(Eds.), Motivation und Handeln (pp. 255-276). Berlin: Springer.
Kline, R. B. (2005). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (2 ed.). New
York: Guilford.
Klockmann, D. (2005). Didaktische Modellierung und empirische Anna¨herung an das
Lernen aus Fehlern [Learning from errors. Didactical model and empirical approach].
In P. Gonon, R. Huisinga, F. Klauser, & R. Nickolaus (Eds.), Kompetenz, Kognition
und neue Konzepte der beruflichen Bildung (pp. 177-189). Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Kohn, L. T., Corrigan, J. M., & Donaldson, M. S. (Eds.). (1999). To err is human.
References 116
Building a safer health system. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Kolb, D. A.(1984). Experiential Learning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kolodner, J. (1983). Towards an understanding of the role of experience in the evolution
from novice to expert. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 19, 497-518.
Kolodner, J.(1993). Case-based reasoning. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufman Publishers.
Kolodner, J. (1997). Educational implications of analogy. American Psychologist, 52,
57-66.
Kolodner, J., & Simpson, R. L.(1986). Problem solving and dynamic memory. In J. L. K.
Riesbeck & C. K. Riesbeck (Eds.), Experience, memory, and reasoning (pp. 99-114).
Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
Korsten, V. A.(2003). The development of an management error orientation questionnaire.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, South
Africa.
Kramer, R. M.(1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: emerging perspectives, enduring
questions. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 569-598.
Kramer, R. M.(2006). Organizational trust: progress and promise in theory and research.
In R. M. Kramer (Ed.), Organizational trust: a reader (pp. 1-17). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kriegesmann, B., Kley, T., & Schwering, M. G.(2005). Creative errors and heroic failures:
capturing their innovative potential. Journal of Business Strategy, 26, 57-64.
Kwakman, K. (2003). Factors affecting teachers’ participation in professional learning
activities. Teaching and Teacher Education, 19, 149-170.
Lave, J. (1991). Situating learning in communities of practice. In L. B. Resnick, J. M.
Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially shared cognition (pp. 63-82).
Washington, DC: APA.
Law, L.-C., & Wong, K.-M. P.(1996). Expertise und Instructional Design [Expertise and
instructional design]. In H. Gruber & A. Ziegler (Eds.), Expertiseforschung (pp.
115-147). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Lehtinen, E., Hakkarainen, K., & Palonen, T. (2004). Organisationales Lernen und
Expertennetzwerke [Organisational learning and expert networks]. In H. Gruber,
C. Harteis, H. Heid, & B. Meier (Eds.), Kapital und Kompetenz. Vera¨nderungen
der Arbeitswelt und ihre Auswirkungen aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher Sicht (pp.
199-224). Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Leonard, L. M., & Tesser, A. (1996). Some ruminative thoughts. In R. S. Wyer (Ed.),
Ruminative thoughts (pp. 1-47). Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Leontiev, A. (1978). Activity, consciousness, and personality. Englewood Cliffs, CA:
Prentice-Hall.
Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L.(1999). Knowledge transmission in work groups: Helping
newcomers to succeed. In L. L. Thompson, J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick (Eds.),
Shared cognition in organisations (pp. 267-296). Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Little, T. D., Cunningham, W. A., Shahar, G., & Widaman, K. F. (2002). To parcel
or not to parcel: exploring the question, weighting the merits. Structural Equation
Modeling, 9, 151-173.
MacCallum, R. C.(1995). Model specification. Procedures, strategies, and related issues. In
References 117
R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural equation modeling. Concepts, issues, and applications
(pp. 16-36). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
MacCallum, R. C., Roznowski, M., & Necowitz, L. B. (1992). Model modifications in
covariance structure analysis: The problem of capitalization on chance. Psychological
Bulletin, 111, 490-504.
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J., & Schoorman, F. D.(1995). An integrative model of organizational
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 709-734.
Mehl, K. (1993). U¨ber einen funktionalen Aspekt von Handlungsfehlern. Was lernt man
wie aus Fehlern? [On a functional aspect of action slips. What can be learned how
from errors?]. Mu¨nster: Lit.
Mehl, K., & Wehner, T. (in press). U¨ber die Schwierigkeiten, aus Fehlern zu lernen [On
the difficulties of learning from errors]. Erwa¨gen, Wissen, Ethik.
Meurier, C. E. (2000). Understanding the nature of errors in nursing: using a model
to analyse critical incident reports of errors which had resulted in an adverse or
potentially adverse event. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32, 202-207.
Meurier, C. E., Vincent, C. A., & Parmar, D. G. (1997). Learning from errors in nursing
practice. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 26, 111-119.
Meyer, L., Seidel, T., & Prenzel, M. (2006). Wenn Lernsituationen zu Leistungssituatio-
nen werden: Untersuchungen zur Fehlerkultur in einer Videostudie [When learning
situations become achievement situations: investigation of error culture in a video
study]. Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu¨r Bildungswissenschaften, 28, 21-41.
Mezirow, J.(1990). How critical reflection triggers transformative learning. In J. Mezirow
(Ed.), Fostering critical reflection in adulthood (pp. 1-20). San Francisco, CA: Jossey
Bass.
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H.(1960). Plans and the structure of behavior.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Moon, J.(2004). Reflection in learning and professional development. London: Routledge-
Falmer.
Moreland, R. L. (1999). Transactive memory: Learning who knows what in work groups
and organizations. In L. L. Thompson, J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Shared
cognition in organisations (pp. 3-31). Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Norman, D. A.(1981). Categorization of action slips. Psychological Review, 88, 1-15.
O’Connor, B. P.(2000). Using parallel analysis and Velicner’s MAP test. Behavior Research
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 32, 396-402.
O’Hare, D., & Wiggins, M. (2004). Remembrance of cases past: who remembers what,
when confronting critical flight events? Human Factors, 46, 277-287.
Ohlsson, S.(1996). Learning from performance errors. Psychological Review, 103, 241-262.
Oser, F., & Spychiger, M.(2005). Lernen ist schmerzhaft [Learning is painful]. Weinheim:
Basel.
Palonen, T. (2003). Shared knowledge and the web of relationships. Turku: Univeristy of
Turku.
Palonen, T., Hakkarainen, K., Talvitie, J., & Lehtinen, E. (2004). Network ties, cognitive
centrality, and team interaction within a telecommunication company. In H. P. A.
References 118
Boshuizen, R. Bromme, & H. Gruber (Eds.), Professional learning: gaps and tran-
sitions on the way from novice to expert (pp. 271-294). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Pekrun, R., & Frese, M.(1992). Emotions in work and achievement. In C. L. Cooper & I. T.
Robertson (Eds.), International review of industrial and organizational psychology
(Vol. 7, pp. 153-200). Chichester, NY: Wiley.
Perrow, C.(1984). Normal accidents: living with high risk technologies. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press.
Peters, T. J., & Peters, T. (1987). Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a Management
Revolution. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Popper, K. R.(1968). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.
Popper, K. R. (1992). In search of a better world: lectures and essays from thirty years.
New York: Routledge.
Porst, R. (1998). Im Vorfeld der Befragung: Planung, Fragebogenentwicklung, Pretest-
ing [Before survey: design, construction of questionnaires, pretesting] (ZUMA-
Arbeitsbericht No. 98/02). Mannheim: Zentrum fu¨r Umfragen, Methoden und Anal-
ysen.
Porst, R.(2001). Wie man die Ru¨cklaufquote bei postalischen Befragungen erho¨ht [How to
increase the return quote in postal survey] (ZUMA How-to-Reihe No. 9). Mannheim:
Zentrum fu¨r Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen.
Putz, D., Schilling, J., Kluge, A., & Stangenberg, C.(in press). OLAF - Fragebogen zur Er-
fassung des organisationalen Klimas fu¨r Lernen aus Fehlern [OLAF - a questionnaire
for measuring the organisational climate for learning from errors]. In W. Sarges,
H. Wottawa, & C. Roos (Eds.), Handbuch wirtschaftspsychologischer Testverfahren.
Band 2: Organisationspsychologische Instrumente. Langerich: Pabst.
Rasmussen, J.(1987a). Cognitive control and human error mechanisms. In J. Rasmussen,
K. Duncan, & J. Leplat (Eds.), New technology and human error (pp. 53-60). Chich-
ester: Wiley.
Rasmussen, J.(1987b). The definition of human error and a taxonomy for technical system
design. In J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan, & J. Leplat (Eds.), New technology and human
error (pp. 23-30). Chichester: Wiley.
Rasmussen, J.(1987c). Reasons, causes, and human error. In J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan, &
J. Leplat (Eds.), New technology and human error (pp. 293-301). Chichester: Wiley.
Raykov, T., & Marcoulides, G. A. (2006). A first course in structural equation modeling.
Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Reason, J. T.(1990). Human error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, J. T. (1995). Understanding adverse events: human factors. Quality in Health
Care, 4, 80-89.
Reason, J. T. (2005). Human error: models and management. British Medical Journal,
320, 768-770.
Rehrl, M., Gruber, H., & Palonen, T. (2006, July). Expertise development in science:
Network analysis of EARLI SIG ”Professional learning and development” activities.
Paper presented at the conference Expertise in Context, Berlin (Germany).
Robinson, S. L. (1996). Trust and breach of the psychological contract. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 41, 574-599.
References 119
Rogoff, B. (1984). Introduction: Thinking and learning in social context. In J. Lave &
B. Rogoff (Eds.), Everyday cognition in social context (pp. 1-8). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Rybowiak, V., Garst, H., Frese, M., & Batinic, B.(1999). Error orientation questionnaire
(EOQ): reliability, validity, and different language equivalence. Journal of Organi-
zational Behavior, 20, 527-547.
Schafer, J. L., & Graham, J. W. (2002). Missing data: our view of the state of the art.
Psychological Methods, 7, 147-177.
Schank, R. C. (1999). Dynamic memory revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Schermelleh-Engel, K., Moosbrugger, H., & Mu¨ller, H.(2003). Evaluating the fit of struc-
tural equation models: tests of significance and descriptive goodness-of-fit measures.
Methods of Psychological Research Online, 8, 23-74.
Schiefele, U., & Schiefele, H. (1997). Motivationale Orientierung und Prozesse des Wis-
senserwerbs [Motivational orientation an processes of knowledge acquisition]. In
H. Gruber & A. Renkl (Eds.), Wege zum Ko¨nnen. Determinanten des Kompetenz-
erwerbs (pp. 14-31). Bern: Huber.
Scho¨n, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner. How professionals think in action. London:
Temple Smith.
Schumacker, R. E., & Lomax, R. G. (2004). A beginner’s guide to structural equation
modeling. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Scriven, M.(1991). Evaluation thesaurus. London: Sage.
Senders, J. W., & Moray, N. P. (1991). Human error. Cause, prediction, and reduction.
Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
Senge, P. (1990). The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization.
New York: Random House.
Simons, P. R.-J. (2005). Theories of unconscious learning confronted. European Journal
of School Psychology, 3, 41-55.
Simons, P. R.-J., & Ruijters, M. C. P. (2004). Learning professionals: Towards an inte-
grated model. In H. P. A. Boshuizen, R. Bromme, & H. Gruber (Eds.), Professional
learning: Gaps and transitions on the way from novice to expert (pp. 207-229). Dor-
drecht: Kluwer.
Sitkin, S. B. (1992). Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses. Research in
Organizational Behavior, 14, 231-266.
Smith, P. J. (2003). Workplace learning and flexible delivery. Review of Educational
Research, 73, 53-88.
Spitzer, M.(2007). Lernen [Learning]. Mu¨nchen: Elsevier.
Stangenberg, C.(2005). Entwicklung eines Fragebogens zur Erhebung des organisationalen
Klimas fu¨r Lernen aus Fehlern bei der Arbeit [Development of a questionnaire for
measuring the organisational climate for learning from errors at work]. Unpublished
master’s thesis, RWTH Aachen, Aachen.
References 120
Stark, R., Mandl, H., Gruber, H., & Renkl, A.(1998). Indeed, sometimes knowledge does
not help: a replication study. Instructional Science, 26, 391-407.
Sternberg, R. J., & Lubart, T. I. (1992). Buy low and sell high: an investment approach
to creativity. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1, 1-5.
Stiensmeier-Pelster, J., & Heckhausen, H. (2006). Kausalattribution von Verhalten und
Leistung [Causal attribution of behaviour and achievement]. In H. Heckhausen &
J. Heckhausen (Eds.), Motivation und Handeln (pp. 355-392). Berlin: Springer.
Strasser, J., & Gruber, H. (2004). The role of experience in professional training and
development of psychological counsellors. In H. P. A. Boshuizen, R. Bromme, &
H. Gruber (Eds.), Professional learning: gaps and transitions on the way from novice
to expert (pp. 11-27). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Strauch, B.(2002). Investigating human error: incidents, accidents, and complex systems.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Tabachnik, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston:
Pearson.
Thompson, M. A., & Kahnweiler, W. M.(2002). An exploratory investigation of learning
culture theory and employee participation in decision making. Human Resource
Development Quarterly, 13, 271-288.
Thorndike, E. L. (1913). Educational psychology: The psychology of learning. Vol 2. New
York: Teachers College.
Tjosvold, D., Yu, Z.-Y., & Hui, C.(2004). Team learning from mistakes: The contribution
of cooperative goals and problem solving. Journal of Management Studies, 41, 1223-
1245.
Tucker, A. L., & Edmondson, A. C. (2003). Why hospitals don’t learn from failures:
organizational and psychological dynamics that inhibit system change. California
Management Review, 45, 55-72.
Tulving, E.(1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.),
Organization of memory (pp. 381-403). New York: Academic Press.
Tulving, E.(1993). What is episodic memory? Current Directions in Psychological Science,
2, 67-70.
Tulving, E.(2002). Episodic memory: from mind to brain. Annual Review of Psychology,
53, 1-25.
Urban, D., & Mayerl, J. (2006). Regressionsanalyse: Theorie, Technik und Anwendung
[Regression analysis: theory, techniques, and application]. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Uribe, C. L., Schweikhart, S. B., Pathak, D. S., & Marsh, G. B. (2002). Perceived barri-
ers to medical-error reporting: An exploratory investigation. Journal of Healthcare
Management, 47, 264-279.
Valisner, J., & Van der Veer, R.(2000). The social mind. Construction of the idea. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van de Wiel, M. W. J., Szegedi, K. H. P., & Weggeman, M. C. D. P. (2004). Profes-
sional learning: Deliberate attempts at developing expertise. In H. P. A. Boshuizen,
R. Bromme, & H. Gruber (Eds.), Professional learning: Gaps and transitions on the
way from novice to expert (pp. 181-206). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
References 121
Van den Bossche, P.(2006). Minds in Teams. The influence of social and cognitive factors
on team learning. Maastricht: Datawyse.
Van Dyck, C., Frese, M., Baer, M., & Sonnentag, S. (2005). Organizational error man-
agement culture and its impact on performance: a two-study replication. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 90, 1228-1240.
Van Lehn, K. (1988). Towards a theory of impasse-driven learning. In H. Mandl &
A. Lesgold (Eds.), Learning issues for intelligent tutoring systems (pp. 19-41). New
York: Springer.
Van Woerkom, M. (2003). Critical reflection at work. Bridging individual and organisa-
tional learning. Twente: Twente University Press.
Volpert, W. (1987). Psychische Regulation von Arbeitsta¨tigkeiten [Psychological regu-
lation of work activities]. In U. Kleinbeck & J. Rutenfranz (Eds.), Enzyklopa¨die
der Psychologie, Themenbereich D, Serie III, Band 1, Arbeitspsychologie (pp. 1-42).
Go¨ttingen: Hogrefe.
Volpert, W. (1992). Wie wir handeln - was wir ko¨nnen [How we act - what we can do].
Heidelberg: Asanger.
Wehner, T. (Ed.). (1992). Sicherheit als Fehlerfreundlichkeit [Safety as error friendliness].
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Wehner, T., & Mehl, K. (2001). Handlungsfehlerforschung und kein Ende [Research on
action errors: not an end]. In H. Reuter, P. Schwab, D. Kleiber, & G. Gniech (Eds.),
Wahrnehmen und Erkennen- Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Michael A. Stadler
(pp. 264-274). Lengerich: Pabst.
Wehner, T., & Mehl, K. (2003). U¨ber die Vitalita¨t fehlerhaften Handelns und den ver-
meintlichen Gegensatz zur Unfall- und Sicherheitsforschung [On the vitality of er-
roneous actions and the seeming contradiction to accident and safety research]. In
B. Boothe & W. Marx (Eds.), Panne, Irrtum, Missgeschick. Die Psychopathologie
des Alltagslebens aus interdisziplina¨rer Perspektive. (pp. 107-126). Bern: Huber.
Wehner, T., & Stadler, S.(1989). Fehler und Fehlhandlungen [Errors and action slips]. In
S. Greif, H. Holling, & N. Nicholson (Eds.), Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie.
Handbuch in Schlu¨sselbegriffen. Mu¨nchen: PVU.
Wehner, T., & Stadler, S. (1996). Gestaltpsychologische Beitra¨ge zur Struktur und
Dynamikfehlerhafter Handlungsabla¨ufe [Gestalt-psychological contributions on the
structur and dynamics of erroneous actions]. In J. Kuhl & H. Heckhausen (Eds.),
Enzyklopa¨die der Psychologie, Themenbereich C, Serie IV, Band 4, Motivation, Vo-
lition und Handlung (pp. 795-815). Go¨ttingen: Hogrefe.
Weiner, B., Frieze, I. H., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., & Rosenbaum, R. M. (1971).
Perceiving the causes of success and failure. New York: General Learning.
Weinert, A. B. (2004). Organisations- und Personalpsychologie [Organisational and per-
sonnel psychology]. Weinheim: Beltz PVU.
Weinert, F. E. (1999). Aus Fehlern lernen und Fehler vermeiden lernen [Learning from
errors and learning to avoid errors]. In W. Althof (Ed.), Fehlerwelten. Vom Fehler-
machen und Lernen aus Fehlern (pp. 101-109). Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
Weingardt, M. (2004). Fehler zeichnen uns aus [Errors characterise us]. Bad Heilbrunn:
Klinkhardt.
References 122
Wenger, E.(1998). Communities of practice. Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
West, S. G., Finch, J. F., & Curran, P. J.(1995). Structural equation models with nonnor-
mal variables. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural equation modeling. Concepts, issues,
and applications (pp. 56-75). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Westermann, R. (2002). Merkmale und Varianten von Evaluation: U¨berblick und Klassi-
fikation [Characteristics and types of evaluation studies: a review and classification].
Zeitschrift fu¨r Psychologie, 210, 4-26.
Wu, A. D., & Zumbo, B. D.(in press). Understanding and using mediators and moderators.
Social Indicators Research.
Zapf, D. (1991). Fehler, Stress und organisationaler Kontext [Errors, stress, and the
organisational context]. In M. Frese & D. Zapf (Eds.), Fehler bei der Arbeit mit dem
Computer (pp. 106-117). Bern: Huber.
Zapf, D., Frese, M., & Brodbeck, F. C.(1999). Fehler und Fehlermanagement [Errors and
error management]. In C. G. Hoyos & D. Frey (Eds.), Organisationspsychologie (pp.
398-411). Weinheim: Beltz PVU.
Zapf, D., Lang, T., & Wittmann, A.(1991). Der Fehlerbewa¨ltigungsprozess [Error recovery
processes]. In M. Frese & D. Zapf (Eds.), Fehler bei der Arbeit mit dem Computer
(pp. 60-79). Bern: Huber.
Zhao, B., & Olivera, F.(2006). Error reporting in organizations. Academy of Management
Review, 31, 1012-1030.
Zimolong, B. (1990). Fehler und Zuverla¨ssigkeit [Errors and reliability]. In B. Zimolong
& C. G. Hoyos (Eds.), Enzyklopa¨die der Psychologie, Themenbereich D, Serie III,
Band 2, Ingenieurspsychologie (pp. 313-345). Go¨ttingen: Hogrefe.
A. Appendices 123
A. Appendices
A.1. Appendices for Study 1
Original German vignettes of the error cases
Beispiel 1: Falsche Interpretation von Messwerten. Bei der Krankenbeobachtung einer
jungen, ku¨nstlich beatmeten Patientin lesen Sie den Messwert fu¨r die Sauerstof-
fkonzentration im Blut von einem Monitor ab. Dabei stellen Sie fest, dass der Wert
bei nur gut 70 liegt! Sie fassen dies als kritische Situation auf und stellen als erstes
die Sauerstoffkonzentration am Beatmungsgera¨t ho¨her. Außerdem rufen Sie eine
Kollegin zur Unterstu¨tzung, um weitere Maßnahmen einzuleiten. Als die Kollegin
da ist, stellt sich heraus, dass der Sensor am Finger der Patientin so platziert ist,
dass die Messung nicht zuverla¨ssig war. Das Einleiten einer Notfallprozedur war also
nicht angebracht . . .
Beispiel 2: Falsche Einscha¨tzung von Komplikationen. Sie werden wa¨hrend einer
Nachtschicht von einem Patienten gerufen, der nach einem Sturz wegen einer
Verletzung am Knie operiert wurde. Er klagt u¨ber Schmerzen im Bein und dass er
deshalb nicht schlafen ko¨nne. Da momentan kein Arzt erreichbar ist, mu¨ssen Sie
selbst entscheiden. Sie geben dem Mann ein Schmerzmittel und dokumentieren die
Verabreichung. Als kurz darauf eine A¨rztin ihre Runde macht, bitten Sie sie, sich
den Patienten anzusehen. Sie stellt fest, dass der Patient eine Thrombose im Bein
hat und leitet sofort entsprechende Maßnahmen ein . . .
Beispiel 3: Falsche Einscha¨tzung des Dekubitus-Risikos. Sie sind dabei, das Dekubitus-
Risiko einer a¨lteren, bettla¨gerigen Patientin einzuscha¨tzen. Anhand der Braden-
Skala scha¨tzen Sie das Dekubitus-Risiko mit 18 Punkten als mittelma¨ßig ein. Ihnen
perso¨nlich erscheint die Haut der Patientin aber in Ordnung zu sein. Sie leiten
deshalb keine zusa¨tzlichen Prophylaxe- oder Behandlungsmaßnahmen ein. Bei der
na¨chsten Beurteilung derselben Patientin kurze Zeit spa¨ter stellt sich heraus, dass die
Patientin bereits leichte Symptome von Dekubitus zeigt. Ein erho¨htes Risiko wa¨re
- nach der Einscha¨tzung zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt - auch schon bei der vorherigen
Beurteilung erkennbar gewesen . . .
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Table 11: Items used in Study 2
Constructs and scales Items
Error orientation
Estimation of errors
as chance for learning
Fehler sind fu¨r mich sehr hilfreich, um meine Arbeit zu verbessern.
Wenn mir ein Fehler passiert, ist dies eine wichtige Information fu¨r die
Durchfu¨hrung meiner Arbeit.
Meine Fehler zeigen mir, was ich besser machen kann.
Aus eigenen Fehlern habe ich schon viel fu¨r die Bewa¨ltigung meiner Auf-
gabe gelernt.
Error strain
Ich empfinde es als belastend, einen Fehler zu machen.
Ich habe o¨fter Angst davor, Fehler zu machen.
Wenn mir ein Fehler passiert ist, scha¨me ich mich dafu¨r.
Wenn ich bei meiner Arbeit einen Fehler mache, dann verliere ich den
ku¨hlen Kopf und a¨rgere mich.
Ich mache mir wa¨hrend meiner Arbeit o¨fter Sorgen, etwas falsch zu machen.
Covering up errors
Warum einen Fehler erwa¨hnen, wenn er nicht auffa¨llt.
Es hat nur Nachteile, wenn man in der Arbeit seine Fehler preisgibt.
Fu¨r mich ist es von geringem Nutzen, wenn ich u¨ber meine Fehler rede.
Es hat Vorteile, Fehler zu vertuschen.
Ich behalte meine Fehler lieber fu¨r mich.
Arbeitende, die ihre Fehler zugeben, machen damit einen großen Fehler.
Safe team climate
Trust
Die Leute in meiner Arbeitsgruppe sind in der Lage, Probleme und kritische
Fragen anzusprechen.
Ich habe den Eindruck, mich in dem was ich Mitgliedern meiner Arbeits-
gruppe gegenu¨ber a¨ußere, vorsichtig verhalten zu mu¨ssen.r
Bei seiner Arbeit auf dieser Station besteht unter den Kollegen/innen ein
vertrauensvolles Verha¨ltnis.
Bei seiner Arbeit auf dieser Station geht man unter den Kollegen/innen
fair miteinander um.
Bei seiner Arbeit auf dieser Station ha¨lt man unter den Kollegen/innen
zusammen.
Die Leute, mit denen ich zusammenarbeite mo¨gen mich nicht besonders.r
Bei seiner Arbeit auf dieser Station bestehen unter den Kollegen/innen
Konflikte und Spannungen.r
Bei seiner Arbeit auf dieser Station besteht unter den Kollegen/innen
gegenseitige Achtung und Anerkennung.
Es ist schwierig, Mitglieder meiner Arbeitsgruppe um Hilfe zu bitten.r
Wenn jemand in meiner Arbeitsgruppe einen Fehler gemacht hat, kann er
die anderen um Rat fragen, wie es weitergehen soll.
(Table continues)
A.2. Appendices for Study 2 125
(Table 11 continued)
Constructs and scales Items
Non-punitive orienta-
tion
Wenn jemand aus meiner Arbeitsgruppe einen Fehler macht, wird das ha¨u-
fig gegen diese Person verwendet.r
Wenn in meiner Arbeitsgruppe ein Fehler passiert, ist die Frage, wer Schuld
hat mindestens genauso wichtig, wie die Situation schnell zu bereinigen.r
Wer in meiner Arbeitsgruppe einen Fehler zugibt, bekommt ganz scho¨n
A¨rger.r
Die Leute in meiner Arbeitsgruppe haben Angst davor, Fehler zu machen.r
Normalerweise scha¨men sich Mitgliedern meiner Arbeitsgruppe sehr, wenn
sie einen Fehler gemacht haben.r
Die Leute in meiner Arbeitsgruppe sind ziemlich froh, wenn ein Fehler
nicht ihnen selbst, sondern jemand anderem passiert ist.r
Die Leute in meiner Arbeitsgruppe denken, dass uns unsere Fehler zeigen,





Mich mit Kollegen/innen daru¨ber austauschen . . .
. . . was zu der Fehlentscheidung gefu¨hrt hat.
. . . wie ich selbst zum Auftreten der Fehlentscheidung beigetragen habe.
. . . ob meine Kompetenz lu¨ckenhaft ist.
. . . ob etwas in der Zusammenarbeit in der Arbeitsgruppe zur Entstehung
des Fehlers beigetragen hat.
. . . ob mit der Kommunikation mit dem Patienten/der Patientin etwas nicht
gestimmt hat.
. . . wie das Arbeitsumfeld zur Entstehung des Fehlers beigetragen hat.
. . . welche Rolle Zeitdruck gespielt hat
. . . welche Rolle meine Arbeitsbelastung gespielt hat.




Erfahrene Personen auf meiner Station fragen, wie sie an meiner Stelle
gehandelt ha¨tten.
Andere auf meiner Station um Rat fragen, wie ich es in Zukunft besser
machen kann.
In einer Team-Besprechung U¨berlegungen anstoßen, was in Zukunft eine
gute Strategie wa¨re, um solche Fehlentscheidungen zu vermeiden.
Mit Personen aus der Arbeitsgruppe Vor- und Nachteile von verschiedenen
Handlungsalternativen diskutieren.
Mit meinem Vorgesetzten neue Richtlinien besprechen.
Im Team Vereinbarungen u¨ber neue Vorgehensweisen und Richtlinien tre-
ffen.
Personen aus meinem Team bitten, mich in a¨hnlichen Situationen zu kon-
trollieren.
Note. r = reverse scored.
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Table 12: Items used in Study 3
Constructs and scales Items Parcel
Error orientation
Estimation of errors
as chance for learning
Dieser Fehler ist fu¨r mich sehr hilfreich, um meine Arbeit zu
verbessern.
CL1
Dieser Fehler liefert mir eine wichtige Information fu¨r die Durch-
fu¨hrung meiner Arbeit.
CL2
Dieser Fehler zeigt mir, was ich besser machen kann. CL2




Ich empfinde es als belastend, einen solchen Fehler zu machen. ES1
Es macht mir Angst, einen solchen Fehler zu machen. ES1
Ich scha¨me mich dafu¨r, dass mir dieser Fehler passiert ist. ES2
Ich a¨rgere mich sehr. ES1
Ich mache mir wa¨hrend meiner Arbeit Sorgen, nochmals etwas falsch
zu machen.
ES2
Covering up the error
Warum sollte ich diesen Fehler gegenu¨ber anderen erwa¨hnen, wenn
er nicht weiter auffa¨llt.
CE2
Ich habe nur Nachteile davon, wenn ich mit meinen Kollegen/innen
u¨ber diesen Fehler spreche.
CE1
Fu¨r mich ist es von geringem Nutzen, wenn ich mit meinen Kol-
leg/innen u¨ber den Fehler rede.
CE2
Es hat Vorteile, solche Fehler zu vertuschen. CE1
Ich behalte diesen Fehler lieber fu¨r mich. CE2
Safe team climate
Trust
Bei der Arbeit auf dieser Station besteht unter den Kollegen/innen
ein vertrauensvolles Verha¨ltnis.
TR
Bei der Arbeit auf dieser Station geht man unter den Kollegen/innen
fair miteinander um.
TR
Bei der Arbeit auf dieser Station besteht unter den Kollegen/innen
gegenseitige Achtung und Anerkennung.
TR
Bei der Arbeit auf dieser Station ha¨lt man unter den Kollegen/innen
zusammen.
TR
Wenn jemand in meiner Arbeitsgruppe einen Fehler gemacht hat,




Wenn jemand auf meiner Station einen Fehler macht, wird das ha¨ufig
gegen diese Person verwendet. r
NPO
Die Kollegen/innen auf meiner Station freuen sich, wenn ein Fehler
nicht ihnen selbst, sondern jemand anderem passiert ist. r
NPO
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(Table 12 continued)
Constructs and scales Items Parcel
Die Kollegen/innen auf meiner Station denken, dass uns Fehler zeigen,
was wir besser machen ko¨nnen.
NPO
Wer auf meiner Station einen Fehler macht, muss mit Disziplinarmaß-
nahmen rechnen. r
NPO
Ich habe den Eindruck, dass ich vorsichtig sein muss, was ich Kolle-
gen/innen gegenu¨ber a¨ußere. r
NPO
Bei der Arbeit auf dieser Station bestehen unter den Kollegen/innen







Mich mit Kollegen/innen daru¨ber austauschen, . . .
. . . warum ich diese Fehlentscheidung getroffen habe. GCA1
. . . was zu der Fehlentscheidung gefu¨hrt hat. GCA2





. . . ob meine Kompetenz lu¨ckenhaft ist. SCA1
. . . ob etwas in der Zusammenarbeit in der Arbeitsgruppe zur Entste-
hung des Fehlers beigetragen hat.
SCA2
. . . ob die Kommunikation mit dem Patienten/der Patientin nicht
gestimmt hat.
SCA3
. . . wie das Arbeitsumfeld zur Entstehung des Fehlers beigetragen
hat.
x





Anderen im Team von dem Vorfall erza¨hlen, damit ihnen nicht der
gleiche Fehler passiert.
DS1
Erfahrene Personen auf meiner Station fragen, wie sie an meiner Stelle
gehandelt ha¨tten.
DS1
Andere auf der Station um Rat fragen, wie ich es in Zukunft besser
machen kann.
DS2
In einer Team-Besprechung U¨berlegungen anstoßen, was in Zukunft
eine gute Strategie wa¨re, um solche Fehlentscheidungen zu vermeiden.
DS2
Mit meinem Vorgesetzten neue Richtlinien besprechen. DS2
Im Team Vereinbarungen u¨ber neue Vorgehensweisen und Richtlinien
treffen.
DS1
Personen aus meinem Team bitten, mich in a¨hnlichen Situationen zu
kontrollieren.
x
Note. Parcel = parcel to which an item was grouped; r = reverse scored; x = sorted out; CL = chance
for learning; ES = error strain; CE = covering errors; NPO = non-punitive orientation; TR = trust;
GCA = general cause analysis; SCA = specific cause analysis; DS = development of new strategies.
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